

U.S.I. JOURNAL

INDIA'S OLDEST JOURNAL ON DEFENCE AFFAIRS

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PRINCIPAL CONTENTS

- | | |
|--|--|
| President's Report for the
Year 1991 | - Lt Gen VK Sood, PVSM
AVSM, ADC, Ph.D |
| The Gulf War - An Informed
Observer's View | - Fd Marshal Lord Bramall,
KG, GCB, OBE, MC, JP |
| The Gulf War - A Reappraisal | - Lt Gen A S Kalkat,
SYSM, AVSM, VSM |
| United Nations and the
New World Order | - Prof Satish Kumar |
| War and Peace in the Indian Ocean | - Vice Adm Mihir K Roy,
PVSM, AVSM (Retd) |
| Foreign Policy Options for India
During the 1990s | - Wing Cdr. S C Sharma,
VrC |

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of National Security
in general and of the
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CONTENTS

Editorial.....	1
MAIN ARTICLES	
President's Report for the Year 1991	
Lt Gen V K Sood, PVSM, AVSM, ADC, Ph D, Vice Chief of the Army Staff and President USI Council.....	2
The Gulf War - An Informed Observer's View	
Field Marshal the Lord Bramall, KG, GCB, OBE, MC, JP.....	6
The Gulf War - A Reappraisal	
Lt Gen A S Kalkat SYSM, AVSM, VSM.....	25
United Nations and the New World Order	
Professor Satish Kumar.....	35
War and Peace in the Indian Ocean	
Vice Admiral Mihir K Roy, PVSM, AVSM (Retd).....	43
Foreign Policy Options for India During the 1990s	
Wing Commander SC Sharma, Vr C.....	52
Initiatives to Normalise Indo-Pak Relations as a Result of	
New Detente Between US and USSR	
Major R Bhanti, 17 Raj Rif (SWAI MAN).....	66
Civil-Military Interaction: New Perspectives	
Rajesh Rajora.....	88
No Medals for Moral Courage	
Brig N B Grant, AVSM (Retd).....	101
The Hazards of Early Parachuting in India 1941-43	
Colonel F G Neild L/RAMC (Retd).....	107
REVIEW ARTICLES	
The Fall of the Last Emperor	
by Lt General M L Thapan, PVSM (Retd).....	111
Story of an Aviator General	
by Air Marshal HK Oberai, PVSM, AVSM, VM (Retd).....	114
Mineral Resources and US Security	
by Col R Rama Rao, AVSM (Retd).....	116
China in the Year 2000 AD	
by Maj Gen D Banerjee.....	118
BOOK REVIEWS	
Waging War : A Philosophic Introduction	
by Ian Clark -- Brig C B Khanduri	120
Arms Control, Disarmament and International Security, 1987 :	
Annual Bibliography	
by Richard Dean Burns -- Maj Gen Pratap Narain	120
Handbook of War Studies	
by Manus I. Midlarsky -- Maj Gen Afzir Karim, AVSM (Retd)	120
New Weapon Technologies and the ABM Treaty	
by Herbert Lin. -- Ms G. Sathyawati JNU	121
Rising from the Ashes, "Development Strategies in Times of Disaster"	
by Mary B. Anderson & Peter J Woodrow -- Shahram Sepahi JNU	121
Sea-Power in Global Politics, 1494-1993	
by George Modelski -- Commodore RP Bhalla (Retd)	122
The Nuclear Debate : Issues and Politics	
by Phil Williams -- Gautam Sen IDAS	122

Security with Nuclear Weapons? Different Perceptives on National Security by Regina Cowen Karp -- Maj Gen MM Walia, SM	123
Warship 1989 by Robert Gardiner -- Captain RP Khanna AVSM (Retd) IN	124
Life on the Line : Stories of Vietnam Air Combat by Philip D Chinnery -- Maj Gen SK Talwar	124
The Security of South Asia: American and Asian Perspectives by Stephan Philip Cohen -- Brig Ramesh Chandra	124
The Pacific : Peace Security and the Nuclear Issue by Ranginvi Walker & William Sutherland -- Maj Gen BD Kale (Retd)	125
The Afghanistan Conflict : Gorbachev's Options by Amin Saikal -- Col AK Sethi	125
The Soviet Union and the Strategy of Non-Alignment in the Third World by Roy Allison -- Maj Gen TP Singh	126
Gorbachev's Third World Dilemmas by Kurt M Campbell and S Neil MacFarlane -- Maj Gen LS Lehl PVSM (Retd)	126
Afghanistan : The Great Game Revisited by Rosanne Klass -- Maj Gen APS Chauhan	127
Chekisty : A History of the KGB by John J Dziak -- Lt Gen PE Menon PVSM (Retd)	127
Europe and Japan : Changing Relationships since 1945 by Gordon Daniels & Reinhard Drifte -- Dr B.C. Chakravorty	128
The Japanese Way of Politics by Gerald L. Curtis -- PC Bansal	129
NATO at 40 : Confronting a Changing World by Ted Galen Carpenter -- Lt Gen R Sharma, AVSM	129
The Army, Politics and Society in Germany, 1933-45 : Studies in the Army's Relation to Nazism by Klaus - Jürgen Müller -- Lt Gen SL Menezes, PVSM, SC (Retd)	130
The Agony of Uganda; From Idi Amin to Obote : Repressive Rule and Bloodshed : Causes, Effects and the Cure by Francis A.W. Bwengye -- Brig Rai Singh, MVC, VSM (Retd)	130
Treason at 10 : Fiji at the Cross Roads by Kenneth Bain -- Lt Col YP Gupta (Retd)	131
Fletcher's Gang : A B-17 Crew in Europe 1944-45 by Eugene Fletcher -- Brig YP Dev (Retd)	131
Jack Northrop and the Flying Wing: the Story Behind the Stealth Bomber by Ted Coleman with Robert Wenkham -- Maj Gen Nirmal Sondhi, AVSM and Bar (Retd)	132
The Invasion of England 1940 : The Planning of Operation Sealion by Peter Schenk -- Brig RD Law (Retd)	132
War and Secession : Pakistan, India and the Creation of Bangladesh by Richard Sisson and Leo E. Rose -- Lt Gen KK Nanda (Retd)	133
Naukar, Rajput and Sepoy : The Ethno-History of the Military Labour Market in Hindustan, 1450-1850. by Dirk H.A. Kolff -- Maj Gen Amarjit Singh (Retd)	133
India's Security : Super Power Threat by K.S. Nagar and Lt Col Gautam Sharma -- Lt Col AK Sharma	134
Bofors : A Selling of a Nation by Prashant Bhushan -- Maj Gen Ram Nath	134
The Indian Metropolis : A View Toward the West by Norma Evenson -- Dr Rajesh Kadian	134
Men of the Red Beret Airborne Forces 1940-1990 by Max Arthur -- Maj Gen JN Goel (Retd)	135
Second Anglo-Maratha War - 1802 - 1805 (A Study in Military History) by Brigadier K.G. Pitre -- Maj General SC Sinha PVSM (Retd)	136
The Great Game: On Secret Service in High Asia By Peter Hopkirk -- NBS	137
Additions to the USI Library	138

NOTE

"The views expressed in the Journal are in no sense official and the opinions of contributors and the Editor in their published articles are not necessarily those of the Council of Institution".

Design for A Grand Strategy

"Tactics", says Clausewitz, "is the art of using troops to win the battle, and strategy, the art of using battles to win the war". Grand strategy, on the other hand, according to Basil Liddell Hart, should both calculate and develop the economic resources and manpower of nations in order to sustain the fighting services. It should also regulate the distribution of power between several services, and between the services and industry. Liddell Hart feels that the fighting power is but one of the instruments of grand strategy, which should take account of and apply the power of economic and diplomatic pressures to weaken the opponent's will.

Another military writer, Edward Mead Earle, defines grand strategy as the art of controlling and utilising the resources of a nation or a coalition of nations - including its armed forces - to the end that its vital interests shall be effectively promoted and secured against enemies, actual, potential or merely presumed. Grand strategy so integrates the policies and armaments of the nation that the resort to war is either rendered unnecessary or is undertaken with maximum chance of victory.

Grand strategy, therefore, implies integration of military, diplomatic, political, and economic power to maintain peace or win the war. It is well to remember that the need for a grand strategy to secure vital interests is as much in peace as during a conflict.

In this context, it may be difficult to find a better example of the formulation and execution of a grand strategy in the history of modern warfare than in the conduct of the operations 'Desert Shield' and 'Desert Storm' during the recent Gulf War.

The economic and psychological warfare, the build-up of the world public opinion in the form of several UN Security Council Resolutions against Iraqi aggression, the formation of a multi-nation force including many Arab countries, the integrated operational planning between the armed forces of allied nations indicate the larger limits of strategy mentioned above. These aspects of the Gulf War are described with penetrating and remarkable insight by Field Marshal the Lord Bramall in the lead article of this issue.

Perhaps, India too needs to formulate a "Grand Strategy" to frame its responses to the internal and external challenges to national security arising from the emerging world order. Will our national security apparatus exercise its profound wisdom to get to the heart of the problem?

President's Report for the Year 1991

LT GENERAL VK SOOD, PVSM, AVSM, ADC, PHD
VICE CHIEF OF THE ARMY STAFF AND
PRESIDENT USI COUNCIL

Gentlemen, it gives me great pleasure to welcome you to the USI Council Meeting. I also hope that all of you will be able to attend our National Security Lecture being delivered this evening by Shri Jagmohan, former Governor of J&K and MP at the Nehru Memorial Museum & Library Auditorium.

At our last meeting my predecessor, Air Chief Marshal NC Suri, had given you the happy news about the allotment of 3 acres of land on the Palam Road for our building project. We had high hopes of our building work commencing right away but most unfortunately that was not to be. When it came to the actual demarcation of the plot we found that the Ministry had given us a narrow plot with very little frontage on the road, thus making it quite unsuitable for the sort of prestigious building we had in mind. The Ministry was obsessed with dividing the available land between USI and IDSA, thus making both plots unbuildable. It has taken the best part of the year to get the demarcation sorted out to our satisfaction. In the process not only have we lost time but runaway inflation in construction costs has inflicted a heavy burden on us in the way of increased costs of the project. We will have more of this later.

In all other matters, I am happy to say that our Institution continues on a steady path of progress, albeit a bit stifled by its present cramped quarters. I will briefly touch on all these aspects.

MEMBERSHIP

This year upto 15 Dec 91 we have seen an addition of 213 life members, which is better than last year. We now have almost 3000 life members. There has however been a reduction by about 30 in our total of ordinary members, which stands at 1170.

There has been a fairly sizable increase in subscriber membership, which has risen from 520 to 622. But seeing the very large number of units we have in the three Services, I think this figure ought to have been very much larger. In this year's additions, I am told the response from Naval and Air Force units has not been very good.

We have recently had enquiries for membership from various civilian gentlemen who are not otherwise entitled to become members. I have, there-

fore, brought before you on the agenda a proposal of introducing Associate Membership in our Institution for such gentlemen.

FINANCES

The audited balance sheets have been with you for sometime and I hope you have had time to go through them. The audit report was not circulated as it had no point or objection of any substance deserving your attention. These have, however, been placed before you.

The income and expenditure position over the last three years is :-

<i>Year</i>	<i>Income</i>	<i>Expenditure</i>	<i>Surplus/def</i>
1988/89	5,60,044.59	8,47,869.87	Def Rs. 2,87,825.28
1989/90	5,40,231.60	7,38,351.12	Def Rs. 1,98,119.52
1990/91	6,24,749.25	9,89,301.93	Def Rs. 3,64,552.68

This annual income and expenditure state does not take into account the income from the interest that accrued over the period from our investments, which are :-

(a) USI Corpus Fund.

(i) Public Sector Undertakings	Rs. 1,13,16,000.00
(ii) U.T.I.	Rs. 2,06,600.00

(b) Building Fund.

Public Sector Undertakings	Rs. 2,50,64,000.00
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The interest accrued this financial year is Rs. 15,26,811.00 in the USI Corpus and Rs. 29,77,783.00 in the Building Fund. This income puts our funds in a satisfactory position but it still does not hide the bare fact that our normal annual income is not keeping up with the annual outflow without dipping into the income from our past savings. There is, therefore, a case to reconsider the membership subscriptions, which figures on the agenda.

THE USI JOURNAL

You will undoubtedly agree that the high quality of our Journal has

been maintained and the Editorial Staff again deserve to be commended for their good work. But the steep rise in the cost of paper has resulted in a big increase in the cost of production of the Journal and this needs to be suitably offset.

I am afraid the number of advertisements received this year has been poor. Efforts need to be made to improve this. Here, I would request the help of all our Council Members to use their not inconsiderable influence to obtain a better response from firms and commercial organisations.

Although it has not been placed on the agenda, but I am sure there will be sooner than later a need to increase the amount of the honorarium being paid to authors of articles published in the Journal. This too will add to cost of production.

CORRESPONDENCE COURSES

The results obtained by officers taking our correspondence courses have been good. There has, however, been a slight drop in the number of officers taking the DSSC preparatory Correspondence Courses. This is probably due to the normal fluctuation that occur from year to year in the total number of candidates appearing for the examination.

From 1993 Army HQ will be abolishing the Command Preparatory Staff Courses. We will have to gear up to accept a large number of officers wanting to take our preparatory correspondence course for the Army Staff Course.

GOLD MEDAL ESSAY COMPETITION

This year we received 20 essays in the category Open to all officers and 10 essays in the category for officers below ten years of service. During the tea break, we will be doing the presentation to the award winners of the 1990 Essay Competition.

MACGREGOR MEDAL

This has again been a disappointing year as we have received no recommendations for the award of the MacGregor Medal from the Joint Planning Committee. I will request my colleagues the VCNS and the VCAS to please find out why there has been this lack of recommendations. I am sure that even in the realms of military reconnaissance let alone other adventure activities we should be able to find enough cases deserving recognition by the

award of MacGregor Medal. I have a strong feeling that the weakness lies in the way such recommendations are being processed and this needs to be looked into.

SEMINARS & LECTURES

I am happy to say that the USI continues to be active in organising Seminars and Lectures. These have been well attended and very well received.

NEW BUILDING PROJECT

I am happy to be able to report that the USI has taken over a three acre plot of land off the Palam Road, opposite the Signals Enclave. The construction has been entrusted to the AWHO. They have appointed an architect, Messers D Mukherji, whose conceptual plans have been approved by our Building Sub Committee headed by Gen ZC Bakshi. The model of the building will be placed before you for confirming the decision of the Building Sub Committee. We have run into some problems of finding sufficient additional funds for meeting the escalated costs of project. The COAS has very kindly agreed to approach the PM for a further grant from NDF. Similarly, the QMG has kindly agreed to take up a case for a one time grant from the CSD profits.

CONCLUSION

At the end of this meeting I propose to hand over my responsibilities to a successor to be chosen by you. I am happy to say that during this year not only has the Institution turned in satisfactory working results but it has also maintained a steady progress in all spheres. What augurs well for its future is that it is now well set to start work on its long awaited building project. I have no doubt that my successor will be able to report substantive results in the building work at the Council meeting at the end of next year. I will end by thanking you all for being here with us this morning.

The Gulf War - An Informed Observer's View*

FIELD MARSHAL THE LORD BRAMALL, KG, GCB, OBE, MC, JP

Gentlemen,

I am greatly honoured to have been asked to address this distinguished and prestigious Institution. I only hope the subject I have chosen will prove of interest.

I must, however, ask you to bear in mind that although I did visit the Gulf area in December 1990, after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, and before the shooting war started in earnest, and talked to commanders and troops on the spot, and have since had a number of discussions with the Commander of the British Forces who were under the American General Swartzkopf, and indeed although I am not unused to crisis management when I was eight years a Chief of Staff, including during the Falklands Campaign, I was not an eye-witness to the battle and for that I can but apologize.

Indeed, I have been largely dependant, as many in this audience will have been, on the copious, almost too copious, often exaggerated and sometimes contradictory reports of the media, which one has had to measure and assess against historical parallels and sometimes personal experiences of one's own.

I also, inevitably, look at the background to the campaign itself and its aftermath through Western eyes, which may not always coincide with the perspective of those situated on this side of the Middle East, who may look at the events and problems from the background of different experiences and culture.

I have, however, tried to be as objective and open-minded as I can be and I hope that I don't say anything that jars too much to Indian ears. If I do, then no doubt it will come out in questions afterwards, which will make that session all the livelier. In any case I will much look forward to that session. So, with that proviso, here goes.

And my goodness, how topical this war and its aftermath still are - some even believing that somehow it was Saddam Hussein who after all came

* Text of an address to the members of the United Service Institution of India on 28 January, 1992 at New Delhi. Field Marshal The Lord Bramall was Chief of the Defence Staff, United Kingdom during 1982-1985.

out on top - or at least not as far underneath as he ought to have been. But that it was a remarkable and notable campaign there is surely no doubt. It illustrated so many of the ingredients, some of them new, of modern war, and I will try to analyse these. It's bound to influence the world's attitude to conflict for a very long time to come and it will undoubtedly be discussed and taught at staff colleges and training establishments all over the world.

It was also in purely military terms a very famous victory, in which the Iraqi army in Kuwait was virtually destroyed, losing in the process out of its vast war machine, the fifth largest in the world, 280 of its latest aircraft, either destroyed or fled to Iran, well over 3,000 tanks, 2000 other vehicles, 73 ships and patrol boats, and leaving behind 175,000 prisoners of war and approximately, and perhaps many more, 65,000 dead - all at a cost to the Coalition of 60 aircraft shot down, well under 200 killed, including just under 40 British, 207 wounded and a hundred or so missing or captured, and now, thankfully, all accounted for.

There are only a handful of battles throughout history in which victory has been so complete, and hardly any in which the ratio of casualties between vanquished and victor has been so great. In more recent history, one can recall Wavell's and O'Connor's destruction of the Italian Army in Libya in 1940, in which the Indian Army (4 Div) played such a distinguished part, the Blitzkrieg, also in 1940, which forced the evacuation of Dunkirk and brought about the fall of France, Hindenberg and Ludendorff's encirclement and defeat of the Russians at Tannenberg in the First World War, Kitchener's massacre of the Khalifa's army at Omdurman at the end of the last century, and before that I suppose you have to go for equally inexpensive and decisive victories back to Frederick the Great against the Austrians in 1757, Hannibal's destruction of the Roman Legions at Cannae in 216 BC and Alexander the Great's rout of the Persians in 331 BC at a place called Gaugamella, only just up the road from Baghdad. And it was really only that last, and at Omdurman, where the victors' casualties were quite so low.

And if the Iraqis' destruction was not greater still it was only because Saddam Hussein was always more concerned about protecting his power base and fighting a political battle than engaging in a last ditch defence of Kuwait itself. Once he had lost his gamble of a cheap annexation of Kuwait, (and there was no doubt he was taken by surprise by the vehemence and speed of the international reaction to what he had portrayed as the tidying up of a local dispute), he used his propaganda machine to do all he could to deter any counter reaction and to split the Coalition.

And if this failed he certainly wanted to do damage and cause casualties

to any Coalition attack, but he had no intention of sacrificing his future on the altar of a fight to the finish in Kuwait which he must have known he couldn't win. With this in mind he kept much of his best troops, his Republican Guard, perhaps more than we thought at first, around or north of Basra and out of the battle altogether.

It would, however, be absolutely wrong to suppose that the battle went exactly as Saddam Hussein anticipated. In fact he greatly misjudged the strength of the Coalition's air resources and the extraordinary accuracy of their weapon systems and the effect of these on the conduct of the land battle, particularly in severing communications with the front line and the extent to which, cut off as they would be, his troops would continue to fight. The promised 'mother of all battles' may have been largely a figment of his propaganda machine, but he certainly expected to do much better than he did, and I'll come back to all this in a moment, after we've taken a look at the background and lead-up to the war itself.

Now, the Middle East, as everyone knows, has for many years, perhaps throughout history, been an area of great potential danger. And those dangers are still there, even if the ending of the Gulf War does give us a fleeting opportunity to produce something more in the way of stability there.

Whether it will be taken is a different matter, and personally I fear the worst. There are, of course, deep conflicts of interest, particularly over the West Bank and the other Israeli occupied territories and in the last fifty years there has been much inter-state and internal violence - three Arab-Israeli wars, an almost everlasting civil war in the Lebanon and a nine year war between Iraq and Iran, at the end of which it was virtually certain that one of the protagonists would turn their attention to making trouble elsewhere, initially in the Gulf area and after the death of the Ayatolla Khomeini the odds would have been on Saddam Hussein - an architypal power-hungry dictator, with an appalling record of cruelty amongst his own people and against the Kurds and a determination to extend his influence over the whole area, leading, I suppose, eventually to cataclysmic conflict with Israel in the name of Arab unity and under the guise of a holy war.

And like many dictators before him, he had committed all this to paper, just as Hitler had done in Mein Kampf. So the warning signs should have been there instead of which many countries which should have known better armed him to the teeth. Indeed, even at the height of the Cold War, when NATO and the now defunct Warsaw Pact were glowering at each other over the inner German border, I personally, as Chief of the Defence Staff never believed that the most likely threat to world peace was the Russians coming

across the Elbe.

The stability of NATO and the balance of nuclear terror saw to that. But rather in the Middle East with some sort of showdown involving Israel, Syria and Iraq and bringing in the United States on one side and the Soviet Union on the other, all of which would then, of course, later have involved NATO. Well, happily we've been spared all that, although if we had been back in the cold war period the Kuwait situation could have looked very different and might have had to be treated very differently.

But notwithstanding all that, the crisis in the Gulf when it came owed something to a security vacuum, wrong signals perhaps being sent, and seemed still to have come as something as a surprise, at least as regards timing. And Britain's contribution of a significant number of Tornado and Jaguar aircraft and eventually a whole armoured division was, I am sure, entirely unexpected in the the Ministry of Defence or at least entirely unplanned, which is perhaps why it was such a success.

It was put together because it was the political perception of the British Prime Minister (Mrs. Thatcher at the time), correct as it turned out, that more than token support for the Americans was needed and it was the military belief that this was the minimum, and, bearing in mind the distance and logistic problems, probably also the maximum viable force under the circumstances. And if it had been seriously thought about, and planning to be ready to implement it did start, in the Defence Estimate Debates in our Upper House, the House of Lords, I did in fact warn that British Forces might be required to support the United States in the Middle East in containing a pervading threat in the area. But had the planners actually got down to it there would have been no political nor financial support.

The planners would have been told, as they would have been told before the Falklands, that they were out of their minds, so quickly do political parameters change. All of which only underlines what the military have always claimed, and politicians, and particularly our Treasury, have never been prepared to admit - that what you plan for seldom happens, probably because you are seen to be ready, and what you don't prepare for, and make no funding for, invariably does. Unexpectedness is indeed one of the features of modern conflict as far as the British are concerned, look at Korea, Borneo and the Falklands to name but three, and it is wise for governments not to forget it.

The next characteristic of modern conflict, illustrated so well by the Gulf crisis, is its inevitable coalition nature. No one country can any longer bear the financial and political burdens of going it alone in a full scale

sophisticated conflict, except in defence of its own soil. The only way to sustain effective action, however justifiable in one's own mind, is by means of as wide a consensus in the international community as possible. and the widest and most convincing and the most legitimate of all, of course, is through the United Nations Security Council, however the military force emanating from that consensus is actually controlled on the field of battle.

The financial burdens are pretty obvious, but the wider the consensus the easier it is at home and abroad to stand up to the various political pressures that ensue, for example those of sustaining casualties, in this war, as I said, miraculously light, of inflicting civilian casualties on one's opponent, of indirect reactive violence through terrorism of one sort or another, of real issues getting clouded and distorted and of ecological disasters, which are yet another characteristic of modern war.

Finally, and while we are still on the characteristics of modern war, rather than the way it, in this case, unfolded, it is clear that after moving in that direction over the last few years, the Gulf represents something of a sea change in the technology of war. Perhaps as great as was experienced in the 14th Century, with the introduction of gunpowder, in 1860 with the industrially supported American Civil War, 1904-5 with the trench warfare and machine guns of the Russo-Japanese War and in 1940 with the Blitzkrieg. And certainly no one can accuse General Schwartzkopf and his team, as Generals sometimes get accused, of fighting this war with the tactics and weapons of the last. Indeed, they conducted a brilliant and innovative campaign, based on the old principles of war but using the latest technology to the maximum, and with the most imaginative end game, of which I will remind you in a minute.

And also a sea change in the way war has to be publicly conducted, with every strategy, tactic, disposition, and nuance now crawled over in the public eye and with the enemy's propaganda priorities, (Saddam Hussein's threats of the 'mother of all battles', chemical warfare, ghastly, unspecified surprises, civilian casualties etc. etc), often boosted and disseminated by one's own media.

Now, in the restless seeking by the media of all facts, from which the truth may or may not emerge, this may be unavoidable. But it can, on occasions, seem a bit odd and it would have made life undoubtedly very difficult to both our political leaders and military commanders alike if, during this war, Coalition had to go through some really difficult fighting as in earlier, wars. And the extent to which the West did some of Saddam Hussein's job for him can best be judged by the enthusiasm with which he received Western media repre-

sentatives while the war was on and how little he wanted them when the war was over.

But the main change was the high technology of what may be described as SMART weapons - those that can be delivered from a great distance away, find their target by laser guidance or other means with the very greatest accuracy, like the Tomahawk cruise missile, fired from the battleship Missouri, which could virtually fly up a street in Baghdad, turn right at the traffic lights and go straight down the well on the inside of a building of a strategic military target with very little damage and casualties outside at all.

Also weapons to attack enemy radar and other early warning systems. Equipment - thermal imaging, to enable military formations to fight at night and in virtually all weathers, which gave general Schwarzkopf's armour an enormous advantage over that of the Iraqis. Navigation systems, which told the forward troops exactly where they were in the wide open desert, a most unusual experience for any desert warriors of the past, as any member of the Indian Division who fought in Libya in the early 40s will know.

And anti-missile missiles like Patriot, with a great success rate (at a cost of about half a million dollars a shot against relatively first generation missiles like SCUD. And in the horrible business of war, this high technology has done those who possessed it and enjoy the advantages it bestows a double service in that they not only increased lethality against vital targets and reduced own casualties, but by such selective targeting reduced the loss of civilian life to the minimum.

And if ever in the future we are to use the military option to prevent still worse evils occurring and to maintain international order, both of which aims made this war, I believe, utterly justified, all who use it must try to maintain the moral high ground both for their own peace of mind and to retain public and international support. Unfortunately, at the end of World War II Britain did not have that technology to do this and I believe that we lost some of that moral authority in what was so undoubtedly a just war by fairly indiscriminate mass destruction of German cities even if, for a time, this was the only means we had to fight back.

But turning now to the way the Gulf War actually developed, two things happened immediately after Saddam Hussein had moved in and claimed the annexation of Kuwait. First, it became the perception of virtually the whole world that he had pinched something - in this case a sovereign state of some seventy year's standing, which didn't belong to him and he shouldn't be allowed to get away with it. And secondly, the immediate priority was to

ensure that he could not exploit his surprise attack into the oil fields and refineries of Saudi Arabia, which he might well have done if he had found only light opposition.

So against this background, and in answer to requests from Saudi Arabia as well as Kuwait for help, the United States, with as much international support and as many allies as it could muster, fortified by a Security Council condemnation of Iraq, put together in August under the code name Desert Shield a formidable array of defensive power which could simultaneously demonstrate that the international community was in earnest about Saddam Hussein leaving Kuwait, put real, albeit slow moving, pressure on him by enforcing a near total economic blockade, agreed by the United Nations, and guarantee the safety of the Saudi oil installations.

Now initially the American contribution was non-mechanised airborne troops and marines, and at this point Britain offered both what was most needed and, at the time, most readily available - Tornado aircraft both for air defence and airfield destruction if Saddam Hussein was to attack Saudi Arabia, ships to enforce the blockade and later, with more difficulty because the British Army of the Rhine had to be virtually grounded, an armoured brigade of main battle tanks and mechanised infantry, of which the Americans were short. And, of course, we can detect Mrs. Thatcher's hand both in President Bush's initial resolution and in the speed and comparative strength of Britain's support.

The next few weeks were then taken up by the American Administration in consolidating that consensus and support. In Congress, amongst his own people, throughout the Coalition and the United Nations. And the British kept very much in line with this. The aim was to legitimise both the American defensive deployment and also any possible subsequent offensive operations, if Saddam Hussein would not go of his own accord, and the main means were a series of United Nations Resolutions, ranging from the initial condemnation and the agreement to sanctions to the ultimate authorisation of any force that might be necessary after a final ultimatum to enforce compliance with all the United Nations Resolutions.

Now Mrs. Thatcher had worked in a similar manner during the Falklands crisis, which gave a fair wind to that operation. But at Suez in 1956, admittedly with a less good case, the British and French were unable to get the United States and world opinion behind them, which meant that the military operations were doomed if not to failure then at least to a most unsatisfactory outcome.

Now at this stage anyone else but Saddam Hussein, I suppose, might have taken the hint and cut his losses when he saw what he had let himself in for. But as many here will realise, he is obviously a clever as well as a tyrannical man and, not without reason, felt that he could extract a great deal more advantage out of the crisis and still stay in power, perhaps even with increased prestige in the Arab world. Because he just did not believe that President Bush after Viet Nam, and Britain, possibly after Mrs. Thatcher, and the Arab countries in the Coalition with the Palestine problem still unresolved, really had it in them to take what might amount to bloody action - to have it in them to do anything other, perhaps, than impose sanctions, which he may have thought that he could ride out, or circumvent. He still thought they were bluffing. So he relied on his propaganda machine, promising body bags, a holy war, other unspeakable horrors to weaken their resolve and to encourage the doubters in the peace movements and the purveyors of other courses of action, which would have left him still in possession of his prize.

Moreover, since his own air force, although not of such high quality as those of the Coalition, and his ground forces, said to number in Kuwait alone half a million men, considerably at that time outnumbered the allies and had plenty of operational experience under their belt, he was, perhaps not surprisingly, quite confident that not only might he deter attack, but, if attacked, his troops, fighting with their backs to their country, supported by many SCUD missiles and a potential chemical capability, could cause the Coalition enough casualties for either nervous public opinion to force them to break off the battle or he himself would be able to withdraw gracefully under pressure and retain his power base with his prestige as an Arab hero enhanced.

So there was no way, despite the Resolutions and the sanctions, that Saddam Hussein was going to back down before what I described in the House of Lords in early January, before the battle started, as 'five minutes past midnight' - midnight being the time when the talking stopped and when he was actually attacked from the air or, more probably, because he would use the airborne bombardment on him, linked, as he imagined, to high civilian casualties, as further opportunity for a propaganda offensive against the Coalition from the ground.

So, in mid-November, shortly before I myself visited the Gulf with a Parliamentary delegation, and with all this becoming fairly evident, the decision was taken, sensibly, courageously, and I detect the senior military commanders behind this, massively to reinforce the Coalition forces so that the offensive operation could now become a feasible option without the probability of disastrous Coalition casualties.

The numerical disparity alone had to be redressed and so the number of US ground troops was therefore doubled, including two American armoured divisions, a cavalry division and two mechanised divisions, with all the supplies, the ammunition, medical facilities, general logistic backing, and, even more significantly, the air power was nearly quadrupled, to take it way above the Iraqis' 700 aircraft.

It was a formidable logistic and movements' operation, which in its scope could only have been tackled by the United States, although Britain more than pulled its weight by sending more Tornado and Jaguar aircraft and another mechanised brigade to bring our ground forces up to a complete division, with all its backing. And General de la Billiere told me that the logistic support sent out by the British Chiefs of Staff and the UK Ministry of Defence was absolutely superb and made all the subsequent and very complicated manoeuvres, which we'll go into in a moment, possible.

The Coalition was now in business, and by mid-January had also assembled about half a million men, around 2,000 upto date aircraft, ranging from the massive B52 bombers to tank busting helicopters, and it was keen to get on with it, for as the Arab leaders we met put it to us so succinctly when we were out there 'one: we want Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait, and the sooner the better, two: we want him taught a lesson, three: we don't want him in a position to do it again, and four: we don't want Iraq destroyed as a country, otherwise the balance in the Middle East will be disrupted'.

Now please notice that wording, because in the light of what happened at the end of the war it is important - no mention at that stage, rightly or wrongly, of invading Iraq or removing Saddam Hussein. And important, too, because these points more or less became the political aim of Desert Storm, the code name of the air/land battle, no doubt with the nick-name 'Stormin' Norman' in mind. And this was to start after the final ultimatum expired in mid-January.

Every operation has to have a clear aim, indeed its selection and maintenance is the first principle of war, and those points I've set out undoubtedly influenced the whole planning of the Desert Storm operation.

Now apart from a clear aim, there are, as all the staff-trained people in the audience know, traditionally nine other principles of war. Although the British Field Marshal Montgomery wisely after World War II added a tenth as a pre-requisite of any operation: winning the air battle. And never was that tenth principles more important than in this war, because with the strength of the whole Iraqi war machine, which had to be written down very consid-

erably if the land forces were to stand a chance, and now the great superiority of the Coalition's air forces, both in numbers and in technology, the air battle was going to be absolutely critical, and the whole operation was going to therefore have to be conducted in three phases.

The first phase, which started on the 17th of January was to use the full Coalition air power and its technology to attack and destroy Iraq's infrastructure, its very centralised command and control communications, cutting off Baghdad from the battle area, its retaliatory capability, such as its airfields and aircraft dispersal areas and generally winning air superiority, becoming air supremacy, and, of course, the SCUD missiles. And for good measure dealing with any nuclear and chemical production plants or local dumps of these weapons.

Now this, I have from General de la Billiere himself, was brilliantly planned and most bravely and expertly conducted. The attention to detail was fantastic, each daily air-tasking order being about ninety foolscap pages in length, and it was this careful strategic targeting, combined with the extraordinary accuracy of the weapon delivery systems, which caused Saddam Hussein so to misjudge the strength and duration of our air resources, and the effect it would have on his subsequent control of his forward land formations.

Saddam Hussein apparently planned to hold back his own air effort on the assumption that ours would be spent within three or four days. The land battle would then, he thought, be immediately engaged, in which case his air would then intervene with effect. But of course having failed to deploy his air in the early stages he was then denied the opportunity to do so, because most of the strategic targeting was, as I said, directed specifically to destroying his capability to launch and control his aircraft. And in this the United Kingdom's Tornados played a formidable and very brave part, having the only weapon, the JP 233, specifically designed for airfield runway destruction, but which could be very hazardous to deliver because there was no alternative but for the pilot to fly straight down the runway at very low altitude.

However, and this surprised me, I have been assured by the UK Chief of the Air Staff that in fact only one of the six Tornados lost was actually shot down on a low-level run. Anyhow, the result was that the Iraqi air force was never able to get in to the air battle, and eventually to save itself, and possibly to preserve Saddam Hussein's future power base, 140 of its best aircraft abandoned the Iraqi ground forces and fled to Iraq, where I sincerely hope they still are.

Now, the chief agents of the air assaults, apart from the Tornados, were Stealth bombers, launching laser-directed bombs, and those Tomahawk missiles I mentioned earlier, the F-111s and, later, the B52 bombers, the latter because of their greater spread and destruction on troop targeting in the open desert. SCUD missile sites, both fixed and mobile, were also attacked and in this and as well as in other important information-gathering roles our Special Forces, particularly the SAS, played a notable and gallant role in the wide open spaces of south western Iraq.

Now, some of the first reports of the air assault were both inaccurate and over euphoric. In war, as most of us know, nothing is ever as it first seems, neither as good nor as bad, and this led to some initial disappointment when everything seemed to be taking longer than some thought and there were casualties to our aircraft. For a short period we were losing a Tornado a day. And ultimately, as I said, the total loss did reach sixty, (which is certainly not negligible), Coalition aircraft shot down throughout the whole war.

But the battle had achieved a large element of surprise, it had got off to an excellent start and Saddam Hussein's only response was to fire off, rather irregularly, any SCUDs he could, using mostly the mobile sites, as most of his fixed ones had been destroyed early on. And firing them off not very effectively and nor, until the last fluke shot on the United States Marines' barracks, near Dahrain, really causing very many casualties, but cunningly and predictably he included Israel in his targeting, hoping they could be provoked to enter the war in a way that would split the Coalition. He certainly kept everyone on their toes with the threat of chemical attack on congested populated areas, although there was no evidence that he actually had the capability to arm SCUDs with chemical warheads.

Fortunately, Israel, fortified with US Patriot anti-missile missiles, and maybe exacting some political price of which we are not yet aware, showed restraint and the world stood by, largely contentedly, even the Arab world, while Saddam Hussein took his punishment.

Now the second phase, also an air phase, was undertaken using the Coalition's now unchallenged air supremacy to turn the weight of its air power on to Iraqi ground forces, destroying their more local communications, particularly bridges, their tanks and personnel carriers, both of the more immediate reserve, behind the front line, and the more centralised reserves, notably the Republican Guard, with its better equipment and its T72 tanks, many of which were bound to be dispersed and dug in the desert, with a wide assortment of dummies and decoys.

The aim of this phase was to write down by perhaps as much as 40 - 50% the morale and the fighting effectiveness and numbers of the Iraqi Army, so as to make a land assault, even through the fixed defences and minefields on the Kuwaiti border, feasible and comparatively inexpensive to our own troops; and very effective all this turned out to be, as was proved later.

And the third phase was going to have to be the land offensive, because whatever the overwhelming success and power of the air battle, which, as I say, was critical to the whole operation, air power could only, and can only ever, do so much. The full coalition aims could only be met if Saddam Hussein was actually driven out of Kuwait and it was re-possessed by land forces.

Now these three phases did, of course, go on to some extent concurrently, but the second and third phases couldn't proceed until the previous phase had achieved a satisfactory position. In fact the first two phases took a good deal longer than was originally anticipated, largely, I think, because after the ultimatum expired there was very considerable political pressure to get on with it and start something early. So the time between the start of Phase 1, the air bombardment, and being completely ready for Phase 3, the land phase, which wasn't going to really be until the middle of February, was longer than originally planned - about five and a half weeks.

But this had the advantage of putting greater and more devastating pressure on Iraq's war machine, and as long as the international political front held, and keeping civilian casualties down was critical in this and that, of course, was the one danger of prolonging the air bombardment too long - but as long as it held it was actually a bonus. There were also some problems with the weather and the difficulty in getting confirmation that certain critical strategic and tactical targets had in fact been destroyed. So it all added up to a prolonged first and second phase.

But by mid-February the land forces had made all their plans, they had completed their deployment, tactical and logistic, and the air bombardment had probably achieved as much as it ever could, both strategically and tactically, without getting the Republican Guard up in the north out into the open, and this would only happen when they were about to combat an actual attack. Then continuing the bombardment would be able to do them a very great deal of damage. In any case, because of the atrocities and ecological devastation being caused in Kuwait, the attack could now no longer be delayed.

General Schwarzkopf was therefore now in a proper position, (five and

a half weeks after Desert Storm started) to launch his ground offensive, prepared, no doubt, indeed I know he was, for a tough encounter, at least for a few days, while we, watching at home once D-Day came, were able to appreciate the brilliance of his design for battle, which kept faithfully to the well-established principles of war and had as its military aim to meet the political one I mentioned earlier: the encirclement and complete destruction of the entire Iraqi army south of the Euphrates, or - as General Colin Powell, Chief of the United States Combined Chiefs of Staff put it more succinctly: "We're going to cut him off and kill him".

Now, I think of all the principles of war, and all came in to it in some form, I suspect most of the experts in the audience would agree, surprise is probably the most effective. There has scarcely been any great victorious battle or campaign in history in which the element of surprise has not been employed to seize the initiative, reduce own casualties while threatening an enemy's morale, and generally achieve material advantages consistent with a much larger force. All great commanders have consistently sought ways to mystify and mislead the enemy as to their true intentions so as to achieve their aims more easily, and this 100-hour battle was no exception. Indeed, Mao-Tse-Tung's dictum of 'make a noise in the east and attack in the west' could never have been more apt.

The Americans had a formidable amphibious capability, which the United States Marines were dying to use (no doubt with an eye on the long-term costings in the United States defence budget), and the Iraqis certainly expected them to use it. Yet to do so, up at the northern end of the Persian Gulf, would have inevitably, because of mines, coastal obstacles and the concentrations of Iraqi troops on either side of Kuwait City, been costly in casualties and heavy on destruction of property around Kuwait City from suppressive supporting fire, designed to reduce those casualties to a minimum.

So the grand design started, not with a landing but with a major feint, deploying selective suppressive fire from the Battleship Missouri in the build-up period, increasing attacks on what had been left of Iraq's coastal navy, and carrying out the full deployment and final run-up of the amphibious shipping to some miles off shore. It was even reported that the Marines had landed on an off-shore island near Kuwait City, when in fact they were prepared to go ashore much further south actually behind the troops attacking up from the south.

All this helped to keep Iraq's divisions tied down on the coast and facing the wrong way. At the same time, the first effective arm of the

envelopment got under way well out to the west, in Iraq itself, with the French (largely Foreign Legion) and the American 82nd Airborne Division striking across the desert, first to seize a forward airfield, to be used for resupply and reinforcement, and then to push on to the nearest point in the valley of the Euphrates, and thus shortly afterwards cut off one of Saddam Hussein's main escape and supply routes to and from Baghdad, as well as, of course, providing flank protection for the whole operation.

Then, with the preliminary moves completed, under the cover of artillery fire, to remove and fill in the forward minefields and obstacles, an assault echelon progressively from the east was launched by the Kuwaitis, the US Marine Corps, the Saudis and the Egyptians and other Arab forces on the fixed defences along the southern border of Kuwait and on the shortest route due north to Kuwait City.

This was an operation that could have been most dangerous and expensive, because it was the one area where Saddam Hussein might have used chemical weapons fired from artillery at the moment when the assaulting troops were concentrated, crossing the minefields and obstacles. In fact no chemical weapons were to be found deployed with the forward artillery at all. He had no doubt been deterred, partly by realising that with the prevailing wind the wrong way they really wouldn't do a great deal of damage, but partly also, perhaps, by the fear of nuclear retaliation by the Americans against him, however unlikely that might be.

But nobody knew, then, that chemical weapons would not be used, and all precautions had to be taken, which were considerably burdensome to the forward troops. But thanks to superb intelligence from numerous sources, the pounding the Iraqis had taken from the air over several days and supporting artillery, which produced a disastrous deterioration to their morale, which their disrupted propaganda machine and chain of command were quite unable to stem, and the skill and professionalism of the assaulting engineers prior to and after H-Hour, the break-in, which quickly became a breakthrough, was quickly achieved with minimum casualties, which must have been a great relief to the commanders.

Finally, with their frontal and direct threat to Kuwait City going well, General Schwarzkopf - again calling on the element of surprise - delivered the coup de grace. Having kept his two United States Army Corps, the 18th and the 7th, well behind the front line in the east, the British Armoured Division ostentatiously linked in with the US Marines in the coastal sector, he moved them all at the eleventh hour in a wide, sweeping approach march, which must have stretched his logistic resources to the limit, the British

Armoured Division alone did about a 500 mile approach march, to the open flank to the west of the Iraq-Kuwait border and, using them in the traditional way he struck where the extended fortified defences were weakest, and drove northwards and eastwards deep into Iraq and Kuwait respectively.

The northern thrust, consisting of air-mobile and mechanised troops thrust up to the Euphrates, to the east of the 82nd Airborne Division, and swung right-handed to cut off as many as possible of the Republican Guard and other troops escaping, and to pin those that remained against the water-way south-east of Basra, so that they could not get their equipment out.

The eastern thrust, consisting of the two United States armoured divisions and a cavalry division, with the 1st British Armoured Division on their right, using the 1st US Infantry Division to break through the fixed defences, cut a swathe between the more immediate armoured reserves, supporting the fortified positions to the south, and the main Republican Guard reserve divisions, with their T72s in the northern part of Kuwait and over its northern border, and then pressed on directly to cut the main road from Kuwait City to Basra.

It was indeed a classic armoured action delivered with great speed and boldness by, as far as the British were concerned, two brigades abreast, and thrusting deep into the enemy vitals, and it achieved almost complete surprise. Saddam and his generals, strange as it may seem, completely failed to identify the threat from the flank, being convinced that the only one they would have to worry about would be the frontal attack, combined with the marine amphibious assault, a view that all the Coalition deception plans would have been designed to foster. As a result they were facing the wrong way and, due to the disruption to their command and control system, they were quite incapable of redeploying at the speed necessary to counter the extraordinary rapid advance of the armour, which in the final phase to the Kuwait road covered forty-five miles in little over an hour. In World War II we thought we were doing very well if we were doing fifty miles in a day.

The old Desert Warriors of World War II, both of the red (7th Armoured Division) and of the black (4th Armoured brigade) varieties, would have approved of the élan and panache of the Royal Scots Dragoon Guards, the Queen's Own Irish Hussars, the 14th/20th Hussars and their supporting infantry, to name but a few of these, and how they would have envied the better equipment of today - the tanks, the Challengers, which despite having to cover that 500 mile approach march after intense training, showed an over 95% serviceability rate at the end of the battle and were well able to stand up to anything the Iraqis could throw at them and could, of course, knock

out anything that was in their way, which only shows what can be done when there is no cheeseparing of spare parts, track mileage and things like that.

The infantry personnel carriers, the 'Warriors' were equally effective. The navigation equipment I have mentioned in most of the vehicles, told them exactly where they were in the wide open desert which, as I said would have been a rare experience for the Desert Rats of the 'Forties. Then there was the infinitely more effective artillery support which, as a result of the accurate position-fixing and the greatly improved equipment, including the multi-launcher rocket system, with its terrifying airburst over a wide area and its release of hundreds of bomblets to destroy targets from on top; and of course the thermal imaging sights, which enabled our tanks and 30mm cannon to engage enemy targets at night and in bad weather before they could see us.

And to give some idea of the power of the artillery, one Iraqi brigade entered the war with one hundred tanks, and after air bombardment had done its worst for many, many days against its dispersed tanks, it was down to eighty. But after the artillery concentration, which preceded the armoured thrust on each objective, had lifted he was down to seventeen.

This shock action by the Coalition armies, coming after the days of softening up, was indeed formidable, and as a result all resistance quickly collapsed. The back end of the forward reserves, with their T55s were either destroyed or abandoned their equipment and surrendered with their out-flanked comrades in droves, thus opening up the way to Kuwait City. And the Republican Guard now taken on by the United States armoured divisions retreated northwards towards and beyond the border, only to be destroyed by tank-busting helicopters and other forms of air power, using cluster bombs. The same happened on the road north from Kuwait City to Basra, where, sadly, a lot of escaping civilians, or hostages, got killed as well. All to be cut off and hemmed in and forced to abandon their equipment by the other US corps' outflanking movement.

So it became a most decisive military victory in which forty out of the Iraqis' forty-one divisions actually in Kuwait had been rendered ineffective and only 250 out of his 4,000 tanks had escaped. And although it is all too simple to consider that the campaign was a walkover, certainly both the land and air battles were executed with much greater ease and far, far lower casualties, than even the most optimistic of us armchair strategists or, far more importantly, the commanders on the spot had expected, all the planning and mounting had been done rightly on the basis that in the early days of the execution the enemy would be an altogether tougher nut to deal with; if there

was some overinsurance, it was better to be safe than sorry. And certainly General Schwarzkopf can't be blamed, for winning with so few casualties to his own side. In fact, just the reverse. Because, as the Chinese General Sun reminded us many centuries ago, the best general of all may be the one who wins his victories without having to fight at all.

General Schwarzkopf proved himself not only the master of strategy, in the mode of Hannibal (whom he is said much to admire) but also a consummate manager and orchestrator of the battle), and all that goes to make it up, as was Montgomery and Wellington, to quote two British Generals, amongst, no doubt, many others. And the scope and technical complications of this one must have been immense, particularly when you think that he was doing the job of commander-in-chief and army commander at the same time, although I have no doubt that he was extremely well-advised by our own General Peter de la Billiere, who tells us that General Schwarzkopf did it, as did Monty and Wellington before him, by standing no nonsense, tolerating no 'bellyaching and being bloody rude to people if necessary.

And should we have stopped when we did? Well, had we known exactly the terrible things which were going to happen to the Kurds in particular, which could, I suppose, be looked on, at least in part, and whether intended or not, as connected with President Bush's invitation to the Iraqi people to remove Saddam Hussein, things might have looked a bit different. But in general terms, without hindsight, and bearing in mind the aims of the operation, which I have spelled out in some detail, and which included keeping Iraq as an entity, I am sure we did the right thing.

As General Schwarzkopf confirmed, south of the Euphrates there was nothing left to fight, and to continue would have involved more fighting through Basra, and even up to Baghdad, more casualties, more destruction on all sides and perhaps getting involved in an open-ended commitment and a civil war. All way outside the United Nations' remit and, I suspect, international and national tolerance. Saddam Hussein has been taught a lesson; he isn't in a position to do it again and, indeed, was in no position to interfere in what we subsequently decided to do. And it was a much better contribution to come in from NATO Turkey, in a purely humanitarian capacity, which hopefully will eventually lead to United Nations monitoring the Kurdish autonomy within Iraq, then to blunder forward into a continuing and unpredictable battle.

Saddam Hussein, of course, remains a problem, but his international clout is nil, the international community still has considerable hold over him in the way of reparations and sanctions if he fails to comply, and his prestige

with his own people must be a wasting asset. If everyone keeps to his word, including the Commonwealth of Independent States, as successor to the defunct Soviet Union, then Iraq will be an international pariah until Saddam Hussein stands down. I should have thought his days are numbered.

But then winning the peace is often much more difficult than winning the war. War, however necessary and just, seldom settles anything properly. In this case so much remains to be done to take the fleeting opportunities there may be still in the Middle East to make it a safer and less dangerous touch-point for world conflagration.

The other lessons? Well, the two main ones, apparently contradictory but complementary, I think: first, because of the appalling cost of making war both in human and financial terms, and its ecological repercussions, we've got to do all we can by diplomacy to see if we can in future maintain international order, national honour and justice by peaceful and not warlike means. This, of course, means maintaining adequate security arrangements in areas where these have already been successful, as, for instance, in NATO for forty years and helping to establish them where hitherto they have not existed; Or proved inadequate, inadequate because often, and both the Falklands and, to some extent, the Gulf were examples of this, there has been no credible in situ deterrent and the wrong signals have been sent to potential aggressors. When an state of affairs is achieved, and its sometimes easier said than done, the chief value of military forces in the area, or ready to come to the area, becomes the expression of interest, determination to maintain a proper balance of power and act as a deterrent to any military option being used for aggressive purposes. And you will have many parallels in this part of the world.

The second lesson is if this stability cannot be achieved, and even if it can only be achieved with difficulty, the world remains a dangerous and uncertain place, in which those who have it in mind to extend their power and threaten international order are still prepared to use military force, which may affect our kith and kin, our economic interests or our international responsibilities. In both instances, this calls for a continuing, adequate and flexible insurance policy for our country, which is what defence spending amounts to, and armed forces which are flexible in thought and organisation and have both the modern operational capability and mobility to react to the unexpected, which always turns up, and to support our foreign policy as the government of the day thinks fit, which politics sometimes requires to be done at very short notice.

It is also well to remember that quality in men and equipment is not something which can be manufactured overnight. It can't be turned off for

long periods and then turned on again at a drop of a hat. Britain should have learned that lesson in the 'Twenties, when after the Treasury cuts at the end of the First World War they nearly lost the Second.

These things have to be nurtured and need a certain amount of stability, tradition, and esprit de corps. They need the confidence and professionalism that comes from a credible operational capability and the self-respect of those who know they are appreciated. For the last forty years the armed forces of the British Crown have been needed in one form or another a remarkable number of times, and they are still needed in Europe, in the Middle East, in the aftermath of the Gulf and indeed in other places in the world. Moreover there can be few national institutions, and I am sure this goes for your Armed Forces as well, which have so well preserved their reputation and integrity in the eyes of the public and after this latest example of their value, it is important they should not be forgotten and stinted on, as so often in the past.

No one, in any country, likes paying insurance premiums. When everything is quiet, we bitterly resent doing so. But my goodness when the winds blow and the floods come, and we find ourselves in the worst winter or monsoon or whatever for five years, how glad we are that we didn't suspend those premiums, and I should have thought that money spent on defence in this most uncertain world, with its record in peace as well as in the happily only occasional periods of war, and the impact that defence has on employment and industrial expansion, I think these premiums are worth paying more than most.

USI GOLD MEDAL ESSAY COMPETITION - 1991

On the recommendations of the Evaluation Committee, the USI Council during its meeting on 18 December, 1991, selected the following officers for the award of prizes in the USI Gold Medal Essay Competition - 1991:

Group 'A' - "FOREIGN POLICY OPTIONS FOR INDIA DURING THE 1990s"

Wg Cdr SC Sharma, VrC	First Prize	Rs. 2,000/-
Major Rajiv Kumar	Second Prize	Rs. 1,000/-

Group 'B' - "MILITARY LEADERSHIP IN TODAY'S ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT"

Captain Akshaya Handa	First Prize	Rs. 2,000/-
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The Gulf War - A Reappraisal

LT GEN A S KALKAT* SYSM, AVSM, VSM

INTRODUCTION

There is inherent danger of subjectivity if the Gulf War is analysed in isolation of the prevailing geo-strategic environment. The Gulf War happened and followed the course it took, because of a major event that had preceded the Gulf Crisis; the virtual collapse of the Soviet Union as a major player in the international strategic arena resulting in the emergence of a new world order which impacted on the UN Security Council resolutions and actions by members of the Western Alliance. In effect, for universal applicability, the issues are the consequences of the West's victory in the Cold War rather than the Gulf War by itself.

The US and its allies had decisive advantages over Iraq in terms of both quality & quantity of weapons. They had advantages, moreover, in their ability to establish and maintain logistics, maintenance and intelligence facilities to a degree unprecedented in modern warfare. The US military had ample time to set up and debug its vast and elaborate network of satellites and high altitude recce aircraft, information gathering and data processing, intelligence, co-ordination and command & control systems before hostilities began. Whether the Allies would have been able to act as well, and with such small losses, if they had been denied the time to mobilize, train and prepare, and the freedom to use their advanced intelligence and communication technologies without hindrance, remains problematic. Organizational integrity & integration are most critically dependent upon the performance of new systems of high technical sophistication; command, control, communications and intelligence links are more vulnerable to enemy interference and design failures than are tanks or aircraft. Iraq's failure or inability to disrupt these systems was more important to the Allied success than the performance of any of the individual new weapons technologies. Consequently, while the combat lessons of this war are few; in contrast, the strategic, organizational and operational level lessons are many.

THE GEO - POLITICAL DIMENSION

The Gulf Crisis was a test case for a 'New World Order'. This was apparent soon after the Iraqi tanks rolled into Kuwait, when the US President in his address to the US Congress on 11 Sep 90 spelt out the basic

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objectives of US Gulf Policy; "Immediate and unconditional Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait: restoration of Kuwait's legitimate Government: assurance of security & stability in the Gulf: protection of American citizens; and the hope of emergence of a new world order; a new era-freer from the threat of terror, stronger in the pursuit of justice, and more secure in the quest for peace. An era in which the nations of the world, East and West, North & South, can prosper & live in harmony." After the successful conclusion of the Gulf War, the US President spelt out his concept as follows : "The New World Order does not mean surrendering our national sovereignty or forfeiting our interests. It really describes a responsibility imposed by our successes. It refers to new ways of working with other nations to deter aggression and to achieve peace. It springs from hopes for a world based on a shared commitment among nations large & small to a set of principles that under-gird our relations: peaceful settlement of disputes, solidarity against aggression, reduced and controlled arsenals, and just treatment of all peoples".

The underlying theme is that the United States has now acquired a pre-eminent position in the international hierarchy. The precipitate demise of the Soviet Union and the new US relationship with Moscow created the possibility of this new order. Its essential feature is not the values it is said to embody nor the principles upon which it is to be based, but that it has the United States at its centre. The basis for the common perception of a 'Pax Americana' lies in the US capability to exert overwhelming military power and leadership over a multinational coalition. The problem lies if there is an overestimation of US capabilities including economic and its readiness to intervene when the next challenge arises.

In the Gulf War the US policy was based on the principle of non-aggression and not as a support for the UN in itself. Although the initial economic & military moves were made after the Security Council had condemned the invasion of Kuwait, but these were before specific authority was obtained for the strong measures effected. While the use of the UN was supported, the intention to develop policy through a coalition of forces was evident from the beginning, and indeed was a precondition for the successful use of the Security Council.

For future challenges in regional conflicts, some of the most important questions concern the effect of the Gulf experience on potential adversaries. The sweeping victory in the Gulf demonstrated that the Third World cannot as yet compete with the West in the military sphere. In conventional war scenario, this difference is most marked with respect to the US due to the sheer size and range of its military capabilities. Even where high-technology systems have been acquired by the Third World states, sophisticated intelligence, command and control, and training is still lacking. This gap was

obscured earlier as US military conflicts in the Third World involved jungle or urban conflicts in politically complex situation such as Vietnam or Lebanon.

The belief that availability of a military capability and its application for speedy, decisive action can present the world community with a fait accompli and, that a limited gain can be extracted by combining an occupation with a promise of early withdrawal, resulted from a failure to recognise that an act of aggression is an issue by itself, and not simply a alternative option for resolving an otherwise intractable dispute. For a country to embark on a 'just war', it is essential to provide rationales which are convincing for the public and generate an international consensus in the UN.

The most feared component of the Iraqi armed forces were the elements of mass destruction capability; i.e., ballistic missiles and NBC weapons. The West and the permanent Security Council members will seek every measure to block the Third World acquiring this capability.

THE STRATEGIC LEVEL

Centralized Command. The battle field was not carved up into subordinate 'fiefdoms' for each Service or for subordinate commanders to 'do their own thing'. Every thing that came into the War Zone was under General Schwarzkopf's command. All air sorties, for example, went into a single, integrated Air Tasking Order, thereby avoiding the problems that materialised in Vietnam, where separate, tactical and Naval campaign were conducted.

Decentralized Control. General Schwarzkopf held frequent conferences with his commanders in the allied forces and therefore they were fully aware of the concept & mechanics of his operational plan, which obviated need for rigid control from the top when the ground operations commenced. Commanders were assigned objectives and given a great deal of latitude in determining the best way to realize those objectives. This was unprecedented for an operation of this size.

Non-linear battle. Although US doctrine envisages ground forces fighting separate, sometimes simultaneous battles in the forward zone, depth & the rear of the enemy, in the Gulf War, the battles were both simultaneous & overlapping.

Speed. 24 Infantry Division's tanks and mechanised infantry drove farthest & faster than any armoured force in history; nearly 320 Km in less than 24 hours. Helicopters ahead of the VII Corps advance reported Iraqi troop dispositions enabling Corps thrusts to move rapidly for substantial distances

without slowing. Similarly, by use of tactical reconnaissance systems, the Marines were able to locate the boundaries between Iraqi Divisions & thereby split the 'seams'. Such measures allowed the Allied Forces to bypass Iraq's forward defences and rapidly close in on their objective; i.e., the Republican Guard and the heavy armoured formations held in the rear.

Preparation of the Battlefield. The battlefield changed significantly between 15 Jan & 24 Feb. The formidable 'Saddam Line' was weakened, and the ability of Iraqi forces to shift was seriously diminished by allied air power. Iraqi logistics were decimated and hundreds of tanks destroyed and strong points degraded. Allied intelligence collections - human & electronic - penetrated Iraqi positions with the result that Iraqi strengths and weaknesses were known before launching of the ground forces.

Deception. Operational deception worked. It is not just that the amphibious force offshore and the initial assault by the Marines & Saudi forces fooled Iraq into assessing that the main attack was coming in that area; the fact of the matter was that amphibious landing could have taken place with high chance of success, though casualties may have been higher, and was therefore an option available to the Allies. The point here is that for deception to succeed, the alternatives must be viable.

THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL

The ground battle was an unprecedented combination of three operational concepts; penetration, turning movement and envelopment. The penetration was conducted by the US Marine Division, Saudi & other Allied forces at different points along the entire 200 Km length of the Kuwait - Saudi border. The US VIII Corps with the British Division conducted a turning movement, pivoting on the Wadi - at Batir and swinging a wide arc back to the East to embrace the Western Kuwaiti Border with Iraq. The US XVIII Corps with the French Division enveloped the Iraqi force by closing-in from the far West & North, cutting off its escape and destroying it from the rear.

Whether ground operations began on 08 Aug 90 when the 82 Air Borne Brigade & US Air Force Units landed at airfields in Saudi Arabia or 16 Jan 91 when the US President announced, 'tonight the battle has been joined', or 0400 hours 24 Feb when Iraqi defences were penetrated by coalition forces on the ground; the start point of the allies ground operation is difficult to pinpoint. This is because it was a totally integrated campaign involving sea, air & ground forces throughout the period from 08 Aug 90 to 03 Mar 91.

The speed & overwhelming success of the ground campaign was direct

result of the highly successful air campaign. In five weeks of air bombardment, the allied forces decimated a large number of Iraqi formations & units in the Kuwait Theatre, some down to 50% of their strength. Particularly successful were the attacks on Iraqi artillery, which was exposed in the open desert. Attacks against strategic targets destroyed the ability of Iraq military to wage an effective defence.

Massive air attacks neutralized Iraq's air defences and drove the Iraqi Air Force from the skies into protective bunkers which were then destroyed by deep-penetration munitions, forcing the Iraqi planes to seek sanctuary in Iran, thus ensuring that the Iraqi Air Force would play no role in the ground battle.

Deep strategic bombing knocked out key command & control centres, hindering the Iraqi leadership to control their army entrenched in & around Kuwait. Simultaneously, transportation nodes were struck repeatedly, disrupting reinforcement & resupply, and destroying morale.

The air campaign destroyed the eyes & ears of the Iraqi forces, which made possible the un-observed, rapid move of two Corps and logistic bases to positions well to the West of Kuwait.

THE BATTLE-WINNING FACTORS

Personnel. The Allies, unlike Iraq, fought with largely volunteer forces, which goes a long way towards explaining why the coalition forces had better morale than their adversary. In the US, the military underwent a major build-up in the 1980s which had a big impact on several important personnel issues. Pay & allowances were raised substantially, which enabled the all-volunteer military force to attract more intelligent and better educated recruits. Improved pay scales gave both soldiers & officers an incentive to stay in synchronization with the rest of the campaign.

Training. The greatest pay-off from the 1980s was in the area of training. Large investments were made in modern training facilities; i.e., US Air Force Nellis Air Base for mock aerial combat, the US Navy's 'Top Gun' programme, and the US Army National Training Centre where entire brigades operated in desert conditions against a force that practised 'enemy' tactics. Much of this training was made possible by the development of sophisticated training devices & simulators. Low power laser beams replaced bullets & missiles, while sensors detected 'hits'. Extensive computer networks kept track of engagement, evaluating the performance of individuals and weapons from every possible vantage point. The exercises immensely improved the performance of US forces, as reflected in the Gulf War.

Organizational. During the earlier conflicts in which US forces had been involved, theatre commanders did not have adequate control over their forces, due to the complicated chains of command that involved the individual Services themselves. This organizational muddle had hamstrung the military commander in Vietnam and was responsible for many of the operational problems that were experienced, such as in the abortive attempt in 1980 to rescue US hostages in Iran, as well as US actions in Beirut & Granada. The 1986 Goldwater Nicholas Act remedied this problem by elevating the position of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and by placing full command of all forces in the field squarely under the Commander-in-Chief in the Theatre. In Desert Shield & Desert Storm, both General Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and General Norman Schwarzkopf exercised this new authority with tremendous effect. Given broad political guidance, General Powell made the basic decisions on what the objectives of the war were to be, the strategy to achieve them, and the forces to be deployed in the field to accomplish them. General Schwarzkopf was given full leeway to develop the operational plan, to decide on its execution, and to resolve disagreements among air, sea & ground components as to which would have priority at different phase of the campaign.

Operational Concepts. The Allies had a far superior operational plan for fighting the war than their adversary. Whereas Iraqi Army planned to fight a static, defensive war of attrition, based on their perception of US forces in the Vietnam conflict, where they were compelled to be attrited, however it did not happen in the Gulf and the Allies fought a combined arms campaign of manoeuvre. Some argue that any one Service could have won the war all by itself if only it had been allowed to prosecute it in its own way. For example, that the Navy could have forced Iraq out of Kuwait simply by continuing the maritime embargo; or that if the air campaign had been allowed to continue just another few weeks, so much of Iraqi forces would have been destroyed that Iraq would have been forced out of Kuwait anyway. As it turned out, no single Service won the Gulf War; each was absolutely necessary.

The fundamental quality of war is its infinitely unpredictable nature, and the force which preserves its options against the unpredictable is the force that prevails. It was the inherent flexibility of the allied force that gave it the ability to respond to Iraq's every move and strategem. Ultimately the ability to bring multiple arms to bear on Iraq's ground forces meant that, even if Iraq had some measure of success in the early stage, its forces were bound to lose. The only question was when and at what cost.

Intelligence. For obvious reasons, much information regarding the allied intelligence and counter-intelligence activities will never be disclosed. How-

ever, it is no secret that the allied air campaign blinded Iraqi strategic command and control. Total air superiority permitted tactical intelligence acquisition by a variety of helicopter conventional and special operations assets. Intelligence support during both Desert Shield & Desert Storm was a significant plus. It was absolutely essential that allied commanders be certain that the operation would remain secure, that any change in Iraqi troops movements would be immediately reported, and that the enemy would be denied information on the location of allied forces prior to the attack. Destroying Iraqi intelligence assets in the initial phases of the air operations was therefore critical to the success of the campaign. The US Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) could see vehicles on the battlefield covering an area of 80,000 Sq Km, and pass this information immediately to ground and air commanders. The US Global Positioning System (GPS) provided precise location data for all commanders, and was essential for rapid movement over vast open tracts where map locations were difficult to determine. The AWACS units provided real time essential intelligence and battle management information to field commanders.

Technology. Superior allied military technology had high pay-offs in intelligence acquisition, battle management and effectiveness of combat-systems. It is however important to note that the allies superior technology did not win the war by itself. Training, leadership, doctrine and intelligence all played critical roles in shaping the allied victory.

LESSONS

The search for 'lessons' and their applicability to other wars has to be approached with caution. Firstly, no matter what lessons are extracted from the Gulf War, the next examiner and examinee cannot be predicated qualitatively. Second, in any extraction of lessons from a relatively short campaign in one geographical area it is difficult to identify factors which are unique to the circumstances and those which possess general applicability. Third, many conclusions will depend on detailed analysis of a considerable amount of tactical detail which may not always be complete. Fourth, conclusion will in many instance be drawn by analysts who because of the colour of their uniform or association with a particular defence field, will occasionally be inclined to select a particular lesson from evidence which many would regard ambiguous. Finally, at the heart of any 'lesson' from the Gulf War lies the effectiveness of electronic warfare, stealth technology and PGMs; there are valid national security interests for the participants to inhibit publication of such data. Having placed this caveat, the succeeding paras are an attempt to identify the major areas that need highlighting.

In international perceptions, aggression per-se is an issue, notwith-

standing the cause or justification. Witness Iraq's aggression into Kuwait as a consequence of long standing territorial and economic dispute. Whatever justification Iraq may have had, the international community and the Security Council only addressed the issue of the act of aggression by Iraq.

The UN Security Council has shown an increasing readiness to move quickly to condemn aggression and a ready will to enforce its resolutions politically, economically and militarily, reinforced by the ability of the leading industrialized states to forge unilateral economic and military sanctions into multinational decisions.

The threat of political and economic isolation by the industrialised world is a far more potent weapon than military threat. Witness President Bush's statement at the time of the attempted military putsch in the erstwhile Soviet Union.

The trend to regard internal conflict in a State as an international concern. Witness the Tiananmen square incident, the nationality issue in the Soviet Union; the Serb-Croat conflict in Yugoslavia and alleged State repression in Iraq.

The increasing influence of human rights and civil liberties groups on national decision-making in the Western countries and the impact on determining their policies towards the 'accused' States.

The targeting of a country's industrial infrastructure which can support future nuclear or missile development programme as against the earlier practice of targeting industries sustaining the ongoing war.

Use of media for propaganda during war has brought about a new relationship between military interests & wider international political considerations. Witness the effect on conduct of air operations after the CNN reports on the damage in Baghdad by Allied Airforce & cruise missile attacks. Universal understanding and acceptance of doctrines before concerted action by large forces is an indispensable element in command and an essential prelude to success. The US President set clear-cut political goals & objectives upon which a coordinated military campaign plan could be constructed. He made it perfectly clear that he would make the critical strategic decisions and designated the military commander in the person of General Powell to execute the decisions. The Vietnam-era "National Command Authority" was replaced by the 'Commander-in-Chief', himself. In the Vietnam War, the CJCS was not even in the chain of command.

The advantage of combat experience is pervasive. The May 1991 issue of the US Military Review devoted to the Gulf War starts with the observa-

tion: "Combat experience in the jungles of Vietnam was the common thread that bound all the senior US Commanders in the Persian Gulf War, from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell to General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, the US Commander in the field, to the senior Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps generals, to the colonels commanding the regiments and brigades".

High quality training is indispensable : of senior commanders in strategic & political breadth of vision; of junior commanders in professional skills : of the men in proficiency of handling advanced technology weapons & equipment.

Command of the air is the foundation upon which all other operations depend. The cumulative effort required of manned aircraft to keep a modern, hardened, well-protected & widely spread airfield out of action for a protracted period necessitates a re-evaluation of the relationship between defensive & offensive counter-air operations. Centralized command & control of all assets is essential for flexibility and coordinated concentration of force with economy of effort at the required place and time.

Computer tested and wargame 'proved' military technologies do work in battle. Not only are PGMs highly cost-effective and reduce collateral damage, the industrialised countries are willing to pay the high cost of advance technology as a trade-off for avoiding losses in human lives.

Impact of EW is critical; it creates opportunities for tactical surprise and uses to own advantage the fog & friction of high technology combat. The greater the reliance of any force on advanced technology, the greater its vulnerability to EW.

Intelligence from satellites is timely, detailed & accurate, but is weather constrained. Alternative all weather sources are essential. Similarly there is restricted value of aircraft & weapon systems which cannot operate at night & in all weather.

Locating of a static target will be the prelude to its destruction by either surface to surface or air to surface missiles. Its relative vulnerability depends on its importance to the attacker, rather than the ability of the defender to protect it.

Future Wars will be fought as an integrated battle, exemplified by highly sophisticated military strategy. It would comprise of four broad stages :-

(a) *Stage 1 - Preparatory.* Actions prior to commencement of hostilities consisting of deployment of surveillance and intelligence capabilities,

build up of forces, collection of up to date information of enemy's disposition and installations, validation of plans, allocations of targets for reduction, deployment forward of capabilities required to affect this reduction and preparation of a coordinated plan to carry it out.

(b) *Stage 2 - Preparation of the Battle Field.* Commencing with opening of hostilities, but predating the launch of ground forces. It would involve degradation of the potential of targets acquired and designated in Stage 1 by high technology force multipliers using aircraft, attack helicopters, long range artillery, surface to surface missiles and guided weapon systems. This stage would have variable time frame depending upon degree of degradation required and time to achieve it.

(c) *Stage 3 - Destruction.* Launch of the ground forces to swiftly move across the borders and destroy the degraded enemy forces. It would be of very short duration and time constrained with speed and manoeuvre as the essence. The timing for launch of this Stage will be dependent on timing of successful completion of Stage 2. If constrained to launch prematurely, the cost of heavier casualties will have to be accepted.

(d) *Stage 4 - Consolidation and Regrouping.* The actions in this stage would be heavily influenced by the postures of the International community and the political objectives of the victor.

CONCLUSION

Inferences on 'how the war was won' would be incomplete without first examining 'why the war was won'. A lurking danger in over-enchancement with lessons of the past is that it can develop tendency to fight the 'previous war'. Situations or capabilities are seldom replicated; Germany learnt it to its cost with the Schlieffen Plan. Even the war objectives cannot be the same in all cases; it is one thing for a super power to set holistic objectives against a weak adversary; entirely different when two adversaries confront in limited war at regional level, where the objective ultimately devolves down to capture of a politically important city or area. Finally, machines do not win wars; they merely help to do so. So long as the human element, the soldier, is the key player, the relevance of commanders who will lead them in combat shall remain a dominant factor; there is as yet no known substitute for their ability, expertise & leadership in battle.

United Nations and the New World Order*

PROFESSOR SATISH KUMAR**

The old order is gone. A new order is yet to emerge. The world finds itself at the cross roads. The order that existed since 1945 was characterized by the existence of a cold war between the two power systems led by the US and the Soviet Union. The power system led by the Soviet Union was revisionist and anti status quo. The loosely organised bipolar world provided the framework within which nearly the whole international system operated. But the end of the cold war (1988-91) and the virtual collapse of the power system led by the Soviet Union abruptly terminated the parameters within which the old order operated.

This was a systemic change of historic proportions. Like any systemic change, it has led to gains for some and losses for other members of the system. But the contemporary international system is unprecedentedly global in terms of its membership and the extent of interdependence within it. Any assessment of the nature of the emerging world order, must be based on a holistic view of the entire international system. It may be useful to begin by enumerating the key elements of change in the old order, before we consider the challenges to security that the world faces and the place that the United Nations occupies in the new world order.

ELEMENTS OF CHANGE

As stated earlier, the end of the cold war represents the most significant change in the old order. This welcome change, however, has created uncertainties of various kinds. The countries which belonged to power blocs have been deprived of old friends and allies whose support they can no longer take for granted. The greatest uncertainty, paradoxically, has been created for the non-aligned world. The non-aligned countries can no longer hope to rely on the support of one of the super powers in case of the hostility of the other, either diplomatically or militarily. Each country now faces the challenge, and has the opportunity to look for friends anywhere in the world, depending on mutuality of interests.

* Keynote Address delivered at the 14th All Japan World Federalist Grand Assembly, Kyoto, October 30, 1991.

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The second significant change is the collapse of the power system led by the Soviet Union. This meant not merely the disappearance of the second most important power system in the world thereby emptying a vast international space in military and ideological terms but also freeing a large number of countries in Europe and elsewhere from military domination and ideological constraints. This also meant hundreds of millions of people hitherto outside the market economy of the world now wanting to join it, and compete with the under developed world for scarce capital, technology and services.

The third change that follows from the first two is the emergence of United States as the most dominant power of the world. The resultant situation has been described as a unipolar world.¹ This development is welcome in as much as the United States stands for the values of freedom and democracy. But it becomes unacceptable when the United States seeks to achieve its strategic objectives in the name of freedom, or appropriates and misuses global institutions towards such ends.

The fourth important change is represented by the emergence of Germany and Japan as economic power centres.² It is as much a paradox as a miracle that the two defeated powers which were denied military capability after World War II are now threatening the peace of their former enemies through their economic might. While this can be regarded as a welcome development to the extent that it contributes to diffusion of power in the international system, a way has to be found to give a fair voice to these powers in the international decision-making structures.

The fifth change in the old order has taken the form of a sharper polarization between the North and the South. In the old order, the Soviet Union was perceived to be sympathetic to the goals and aspirations of the countries of the South, even though Soviet aid was provided to these countries on a very selective basis. With the collapse of the Soviet led power system, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe are driven to the West in search of massive aid, and have already given enough evidence of yielding to Western perceptions and demands on critical global issues. Their economic subservience to the West coupled with their cultural and geographic links puts the North as a whole in sharper contradiction with the South. The South, in the process, will be denied the billions of dollars of aid which will now flow to the East.

CHALLENGES TO WORLD ORDER

In the light of the changing situation some elements of which have been discussed above, we have to understand the challenges that the world faces.

The foremost challenge exists in the field of security. The world is not uniformly secure for all. Some are more secure than others. Despite the end of the cold war and dismantling of some strategic and technical weapons, the bloc mentality (e.g. NATO) has not disappeared. There is no foolproof mechanism of controlling the spread of nuclear weapons to which a few States have unhindered access. The security of small and weak States is particularly endangered.

The second challenge exists in the field of development. Despite the great strides made in science and technology, there are shameful and humiliating discrepancies in standards of life in different parts of the world. More than one billion people in the developing world live in poverty, i.e., struggling to survive on less than \$ 370 a year. Nearly half of these poor live in South Asia. Life expectancy in sub-Saharan Africa is just 50, as against 80 in Japan. Mortality among children under 5 in South Asia exceeds 170 deaths per thousand; in Sweden it is fewer than 10. More than 110 million children in the developing world lack access even to primary education; in the industrial countries anything less than universal enrollment would be regarded as unacceptable.³ Mozambique, a nation of 15.3 million people lives on God's mercy with a per capita GNP of \$ 80, while Switzerland with a population of 6.6 million enjoys the choicest blessings of God with a per capita GNP of \$ 29,880.⁴

There are other challenges like democracy and human rights, environment, drug traffic, terrorism, most of which are transnational in character. They flow from poverty. They contribute to insecurity among nations. They require global solutions.

More than 400 million people of Soviet Union and Eastern Europe are inching towards democracy. But human rights and democracy are still denied to more than half the people of the developing world. Environmental degradation has been caused by over indulgence in the North and poverty in the south. But the helpless South is being asked to pay still greater price for it. Drug traffic is being controlled by feudalistic, authoritarian, and militaristic regimes in the South in league with powerful mafia in the North. Terrorism again is a by-product of poverty, and denial of human rights. All these are problems which admit solutions only through multilateral institutions, some at the global level and others at regional levels. We have to examine the place of United Nations in this framework.

UNITED NATIONS REFORMS

Thirtysix eminent leaders and thinkers of the world were strongly echoing

the aspirations of mankind when in the "Stockholm Initiative on Global Security and Governance" issued on April 22, 1991, they said, "The United Nations System was founded at the end of a world war when people clearly saw the need and opportunity to create a system that could guarantee international peace and security However, the United Nations is today not strong enough to deal with the tasks that face it The United Nations needs to be modernized, and its organization updated".⁵

The international system of today consists of 166 countries which are members of the United Nations and nearly 10 which are outside it. It comprises nearly the whole human universe with a diversity of religious, cultural, and ethnic identities. If life in this universe has to be made happy for everyone, some order has to be established in it, an order that takes care of the interests of the whole and not of any parts. Such an order, the new world order as it may be called, can be established only if the United Nations, reformed and strengthened, is made its centrepiece. The following areas of reform demand attention on a priority basis.

SECURITY

1. *Security Force.* So far, enforcement action has been mandated by the United Nations Security Council on two occasions, on July 7, 1950 on the occasion of the Korean War, and on November 29, 1990, on the occasion of Iraq's aggression against Kuwait. On both occasions, even though action was taken in the name of the United Nations, the United Nations lacked control or influence over the course of military operations. In both cases, military operations became identified with the strategic goals of the nation or nations leading the allied effort, which were different from the goals as interpreted by other members of the Security Council. This led to divisive forces within the United Nations. In both cases, the aggressor got an opportunity to identify the struggle with one country, the United States, rather than with the international community as a whole.⁶

The Korean and the Gulf wars may not necessarily serve as parallels for the future, unless the vital interests of a major military power are at stake. Besides, there are financial uncertainties involved in sustaining such operations. Therefore the need to put them on a durable basis. Member nations must be encouraged to sign special agreements with the Security Council in accordance with Article 43 of the Charter. The Military Staff Committee must be activated in accordance with Article 47 of the Charter. Some advance thinking must be done on training, coordination, and command structure of such a Force. Some provision must be made for financial support of such a Force on an assured basis.⁷

2. *International Court of Justice:* It is a great pity that the International Court of Justice has not been adequately utilized for preventing conflicts. The UN General Assembly, vide its resolution of November 17, 1989 on the Decade of International Law, adopted at the initiative of the non-aligned movement, is committed to promote adherence to the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court. At present, not more than 53 countries have accepted this jurisdiction. In the opinion of Judge Nagendra Singh, a former President of the World Court, to ban the use of force and not to provide for obligatory settlement - preferably judicial settlement of disputes - is virtually to put the cart before the horse. It is inconsistent to outlaw war and yet maintain a system of voluntarism in the settlement of disputes.⁸ World public opinion should be mobilised to demand expansion of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court. Until then, nations in dispute must be asked to resort to advisory opinion of the Court more often.

3. *Security Council:* The present Security Council was constituted in an entirely different historical context. Two of the defeated powers of that time have now become economically more powerful than some of their former victors. The membership of the United Nations has expanded from 50 to 166. There are countries in it with populations constituting nearly one-fifth of humanity but voice in decision-making structures equal to the smallest of nations. There are members with control over 25% or more of the entire world's strategic resources like oil.

The nonaligned countries' ministerial meeting in Accra last September gave a call for expansion of the Security Council membership. While the size of the Security Council, the criteria of its permanent membership and their veto power need to be reviewed, it is also necessary to expand the functions of the Security Council. The concept of security has become much wider, with the inclusion in it of the considerations of development and environment. The Security Council must deal with threats to the security of mankind in its most comprehensive sense, taking into account the views of the Brandt Commission, the Olaf Palme Commission, the Brundtland Commission, and the South Commission.

4. *International Criminal Court:* There is a debate in international legal circles and in some NGOs that it is time to constitute an International Criminal Court to prosecute individuals charged of crimes against humanity, like genocide, torture, apartheid, drug offences, traffic in women and children, piracy, aircraft hijacking, hostage taking, etc. But world-wide official thinking in this respect is far behind enlightened non-official thinking. However, this is an important issue which deserves serious consideration in the context of building a better security regime.

5. *People's Chamber*: A large number of NGOs over the years have raised the demand that a Peoples' Chamber should be constituted as second chamber of the UN "legislative" structure to voice the aspirations of the people of the world alongside that of the states which are represented in the General Assembly. There is considerable merit in this view in as much as states, even with democratic political systems, tend to acquire an autonomous personality which quite often works at cross purposes with the people. Besides, peoples across the world have common interests which are not always reflected in the deliberations of the state-oriented General Assembly. But this question also is far from the comprehension of official thinkers at the present stage.

DEVELOPMENT

According to the South Commission, which submitted its report in May, 1990, the United Nations should be able to give higher priority to economic and social issues as the political and military tensions subside, reducing its responsibility in respect of international peace and security. "It must be an important aim of the South to secure for the United Nations a pivotal role in the management of the international economic system".¹⁰

It is necessary that the United Nations, at a high political level, takes an overview of world economic issues and monitor developments in the international economy paying special attention to the implications which significant trends and movements have for development and environment. For this purpose, a summit of leaders of a representative group of developed and developing countries should be convened periodically. A main objective of this summit should be to explore the interrelationship of the various components of the world economy, notably the monetary system, finance, and trade, their links with international political and security matters, and their impact on the development prospects of the South.

It is necessary to bring about improvement in global economic management and decision-making by reforming the voting structure of the principal multilateral financial institutions, i.e. the IMF and the World Bank. The present rules which give effective control of these institutions to the larger contributors, i.e. the developed countries, should be reviewed and modified so as to give increased weight to the South. The weighted voting system of the recently established Common Fund for Commodities should also be examined, so that it provides for a more egalitarian distribution of voting influence and is at the same time acceptable to the international community as a whole.

ENVIRONMENT

The environment question was brought on the international agenda with submission of the Brundtland Commission's report in 1987. This Commission defined sustainable development as "development that meets the

needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs".¹¹ In the last few years, the environment question has become a subject of serious academic concern, as also the one in which world public opinion is actively involved. As the world is preparing for the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development to be held in Brazil in 1992, a lot of thinking has been done by concerned people on how to enhance the role of the United Nations in the protection of environment.

The essence of this thinking is that the environmental challenge cannot be met by mere voluntary action by states acting severally. It requires a system for establishing rules binding for all, institutions and procedures to survey and control their execution, and application of sanctions against offenders. The existing institution in this respect, i.e. the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) does not possess the powers and the organs required for legislation and execution. Therefore, it is necessary to establish an autonomous organ of the United Nations, or a specialized agency to deal with protection of the environment. Such an organ should coordinate existing conventions, institutions and procedures, and fill the lacunae in fields where adequate institutions and procedures have not yet been developed. It should really be a system comprising a plenary assembly, an executive council, a secretariat, and an environmental court. The assembly should enact binding international regulations. It may be desirable to have a system of weighted voting to enable the big powers to join the system, but they should not have the right to veto as in the present Security Council.¹²

SECRETARY-GENERAL

The increasing role of the United Nations in the governance of the world has focussed world attention on the criteria of appointment of the UN Secretary General, his terms of appointment, and his authority and jurisdiction. A study conducted by Brian Urquhart and Erskine Childers, two distinguished international civil servants, with the help of the Ford Foundation and the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, points out that parochial, national, geographical, or political considerations should cease to dominate the process of appointment. If a decision is taken to make a single-term appointment for a maximum of seven years, it would do much to energize and facilitate the search and appointment process. The views of non-governmental organisations and committed citizens working on planet's major problems should also be heard on the central question of the multilateral leadership required to address those problems.¹³

While it is true that the Secretary General functions within the realities of the existing power structures of world politics, it is also true that the Secretary General can be instrumental in constructively modifying the existing power structures.

FINANCES

The financial resource base of the United Nations is precarious. It suffers from many limitations. The total budget of the United Nations is too small to meet the increasing demands in the fields of security, development, and environment. It is overly dependent on the political whims of a few big powers. The United Nations can be held to ransom if its policies do not suit the interests of those powers. If the United Nations has to be made stronger, its finances must be based on more durable and assured basis.

CONCLUSION

The United Nations cannot be strengthened if the task is left to the governments alone. The United Nations belongs to "the Peoples", as the opening words of the Charter say. "The Peoples" must assert, for their stakes are permanent, while governments come and go.

NOTES

1. The concept is theoretically weak, although it captures the reality to a considerable extent.
2. In 1989, the GDP of Japan (\$ 2,818,520 million) and Federal Republic of Germany (\$ 1,189,100 million) was next only to that of the United States (\$ 5,156,440 million). *World Development Report, 1991*, p. 209.
3. *World Development Report, 1990*, pp. 1-2.
4. *World Development Report, 1991*, pp. 204-205.
5. *Common Responsibility in the 1990s: The Stockholm Initiative on Global Security and Governance*, April 22, 1991, pp. 37-38.
6. For more discussion on this subject, see Bruce Russett and James S. Sutterlin, "The UN in a New World Order", *Foreign Affairs* (New York), Spring 1991, pp. 69-83.
7. See also *Stockholm Initiative*, op. cit., pp. 12-13, and WAWF, *A Proposal for United Nations Security Forces*, Oslo, 1989.
8. Nagendra Singh, *The Role and Record of the International Court of Justice*, Martinus Nijhoff, 1989, pp. 27-28.
9. See also *Stockholm Initiative*, op. cit., p. 38.
10. *The Challenge to the South: The Report of the South Commission*, Dar-es-Salaam, 1990, p. 263.
11. The World Commission on Environment and Development, *Our Common Future*, Oxford, 1987, p. 43.
12. For detailed discussion, see, *A Proposal for a General UN System for Protection of Environment* (by Commission of Experts of the World Association for World Federation), Oslo, 1991 (unpublished draft); *Effective Global Environmental Protection: World Federalist Proposals to Strengthen the Role of the United Nations* (by Pamela Leonard in collaboration with Walter Hoffman), WFA, Washington, 1990. See also, *Stockholm Initiative*, op. cit., p. 29.
13. For details, see Brian Urquhart and Erskine Childers, *A World in Need of Leadership: Tomorrow's United Nations*, Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, Uppsala, Sweden, 1990.

War and Peace in the Indian Ocean

VICE ADMIRAL MIHIR K ROY PVSM AVSM (RETD)

The Indian Ocean is walled off on three sides by land with the Himalayas forming a roof over it. But the vital feature which differentiates it from the other two oceans is the sub-continent of India which juts almost a thousand miles into the Indian Ocean. It is this feature that changes the characteristic of the Indian Ocean.

— Sardar Pannikar

Asians have been intrepid seafarers from time immemorial. The Sombuqs of the Arabs, Jehazi of East Africa, Baghalahs of the Gulf, Kotias, Grabs and Gullivats of India and the Fukien Junks of China were long established sailing vessels engaged in commerce, migration and piracy. Further, navigators from the Orient were also the inventors of the 'Kamal' (fore runner of the sextant) and the 'Matsya Yantra' (fish machine) leading to the later day magnetic compass which enabled mariners to sail the shortest routes across the open seas and not hug the coast.

But in spite of such seafaring expertise the littorals of the Indian Ocean failed to grasp the collateral advantages of sea force. The South Indian Hindu dynasties of Satvanhanas, Pallavas, Chalukyas, Kalinga, Pandyan and Cheras utilized the sea more for making cultural inroads into Malaya, Champa (Siam), Kambuja (Cambodia) and Annam.¹ The Cholas, Sri Vijaya and the Sailendras, on the other hand used sea communications to extend their suzerainty which was more commercial than hegemonistic over Sri Lanka, Java and Malacca. The Chinese Admiral Zheng, He, with multi-tiered cargo junks, made seven voyages to the Indian Ocean for trading but also to glorify and enrich Emperor Yung Lo than for any long term ambitions of establishing military or commercial garrisons.

SEAFORCE IN THE ORIENT

The age of Discovery saw the Europeans seeking out the exotic lands in the Indian Ocean which resulted in fierce rivalry between the maritime powers of Portugal, Holland, France and Britain to carve out areas of influence for commerce which in turn resulted in colonization and conquest.

Kanoji Angre, the Maharatta Admiral harassed the Europeans by resorting to the tactics of surrounding the adversary with numerous light craft

and then boarding the ships and scuttling them. These tactics were interestingly repeated by North Korea, centuries later when their small torpedo boats surrounded and captured the US electronic intelligence ship Pueblo.

In 1830, the East India Company's ships acquired combatant status and were renamed the 'Indian Navy'. This coincided with the introduction of steam propulsion which faster mode of transport encouraged a new wave of colonisation making it necessary for navies to protect the sea lanes of communications (SLOCs), which in turn became the genesis for convoys, blockade and contraband control. An interesting incident took place in 1883 when Captain Richard Keigwin of the Royal Navy took control of Bombay from the East India Company on behalf of the Crown to improve its administration. He restored the city back after 11 months with better finances and a more efficient management!

In 1857, with the transfer of the Company's assets to the Crown, the Indian Navy was renamed 'Her Majesty's Royal Indian Marine'. This nomenclature was changed in 1884 to the 'Royal Indian Navy' which force took part in operations in Burma, Mesopotamia and the Red Sea transporting troops under the aegis of the Royal Navy. Paradoxically no high value British ship-of-the-line was positioned in the Indian Ocean which allowed the German commerce raider Emden to sink 85,000 tons of shipping in this ocean and even bombard the Presidency city of Madras. Even so, the R.I.N. unlike the Indian army was not allowed to be expanded into a credible sea force, a maritime sinew that was reserved exclusively for Pax Britannica. And this lack of understanding of the seas around us was in a way responsible for the failure to articulate a maritime policy for peninsular India, a void that continues even today. It is therefore interesting to observe that the RIN mutiny at Bombay in 1946 in a way encouraged the transfer of power as Indian national leaders with the exception of Bal Gangadhar Tilak and Subhas Chandra Bose had rejected the military path for attaining independence. But with the liberation of 47 Indian Ocean littorals after the Second World War, the Indian Ocean became an 'object' instead of a 'subject' and was aptly described by Sardar Pannikar as 'a telephone directory rather than a historical entity'. But most of the conflicts between or within littoral states have been on land and over issues on land such as Indo-Pakistan, Arab-Israeli, Iran-Iraq, Iraq-Kuwait and so on. Therefore, the seas did not figure in the priority list either for national security nor national development.

THE NAVY'S TRYST WITH FREE INDIA

At the time of partition, 6 old sloops, 2 frigates, 1 corvette and 12 small minesweepers formed India's Navy which was miniscular compared to the battle tested Indian Army. A British Admiral however continued to be the

Republic's Naval Chief for the next 11 years. The Naval budget was Rs. 8 crores in 1950 which was 4.76% of the Defence Budget (Rupees 168 crores) out of a GNP of Rs. 9236 crores. The Indian Navy thus remained the Cinderella of the services even though the old cruiser Achilles and 6 vintage destroyers were added to the Fleet whose Flag Officer was also on deputation from the Royal Navy. Hence in a way Pax Britannica continued and India's Navy slid down the security ladder with its expansion programme dependent on the vagaries of the monsoons and the texture of super power confrontation. In 1960, with the addition of a second cruiser and 8 new frigates, the naval budget rose to Rs. 32 crores which was 12% of the Defence Budget. This percentage still persists with the gross imbalance between land and seaforces being a legacy of not understanding the spectrum of options offered by seapower.

THE LIBERATION OF GOA-1961

In 1961, the aircraft carrier Vikrant gave the Indian Fleet a vastly expanded radius of action and a more credible strike accuracy. But during the liberation of Goa, Vikrant and her recently embarked squadrons were not blooded as the older vintage of naval officers possibly considered surface ships more dependable and less escalatory for liberation conflicts with limited aims. But a void still persisted in the necessity of bringing to bear all the strike power of the three Services on the adversary which in effect "represents an attempt to advance beyond the particular to the general, to understand trees by considering the wood as a whole". Hence the joke concerning India's first Defence Minister is not all that irrelevant. Clive had no hesitation in using naval gun detachments at Plassey. Again at the siege of Ladysmith in the Boer War in South Africa, it was ship board guns which were dragged by brute force by sailors for 240 miles over land that staved off defeat.

The Indian Army, however, was allowed to make unilateral plans without taking into consideration Naval or Air power. For example, the Indian Air Force which had inbuilt advantages of location and logistics north of the Brahmaputra was not used to support the retreating Indian Army for fear of escalation which any way would not have been a lesser disaster than the rout of 1962.

In the meanwhile, several Indian Ocean colonies such as Kenya, Tanganyika, Madagascar, Maldives, Mayotte and Yemens became independent. President Sukarno articulated the change of nomenclature to 'Indonesia Ocean'. India nonetheless regarded Panchasheela as a panacea for all bellicosity until China fired home the reality. Super Power rivalry gradually spilt over to the Indian ocean with the United States constructing a base in Diego Garcia and the Soviets stepping up their ship-days in this ice free under belly

of Super Power confrontation. In India, there seemed an hesitancy to identify the responsibilities of the Navy in the expanding spectrum of maritime activities. But the United States had no such fractured thinking and used her Navy on 63 different occasions and with cost effective results. But curiously there has been no similar wavering in deploying the Indian Army, be it in Punjab, Assam, Kashmir or North Eastern States. One therefore cannot brush aside the collateral advantages of military power and instead rely on high moral values such as Panchasheela to prevent conflict. Deterrence and diplomacy will inevitably remain the two sides of the same coin for as Gurudev Tagore stated 'power has to be made secure not only against power but also against weakness.'

INDO-PAKISTAN CONFLICT OF 1965

Ayub Khan promoted himself to a Field Marshal and became the President of Pakistan for life. Hence he saw himself as an 'originator' rather than the military 'implementor' of national policy. Consequently after a brief warming up conflict in the Rann of Kutch, Pakistan proceeded to execute their master plan for using armour to cut the life line to Kashmir. The Indian Army rose to the occasion, called for air support and checkmated Pakistan's communal misadventure. Thus the IAF was incorporated into the operational plans of the Army. The Navy however remained the 'silent service' and out of sight of Delhi's policy makers. The pundits on both sides were blissfully unmindful of the common denominator of the seas that joined the two segments of Pakistan with Peninsular India being the bisector and thereby dominating the sea lanes of communications. Islamabad was equally foolhardy in maintaining that the defence of East Pakistan lay in the West and consequently ignored the Awami League's legitimate request for bases in the seafaring region of present Bangladesh.

Nonetheless, the Indian Fleet continued their exercises in the Bay of Bengal and Vikrant was allowed to languish in the dry dock even when war clouds were building up. The fleet was consequently denied the advantages of prosecuting the enemy at distances ten times that of the gun range so vividly demonstrated in the spectacular aircraft carrier strikes on the Italian naval base of Taranto and in the epic battles of the Pacific.

Therefore, even the minimum preparation for war at sea such as updating the material state of ships, embarking war outfits, reducing signal traffic, keeping ships fuelled etc let alone the formulation of specific operational plans were not given the requisite weightage. This was partly due to the 'no escalation' ethos fed by some Commonwealth members and compounded by the lack of aggression by senior Indian naval commanders who albeit had their hands tied behind their backs by bureaucratic instructions. But nonethe-

less it is the bounden duty of the sea officer to bring the enemy to battle and this naval tradition must be meticulously upheld, if required, by court-martials and deterrent action taken against those who falter in the line of duty.

The Pakistan Navy, which was equally isolated from higher decision making, sailed their vintage cruiser Babur and lobbed a few shells on the mud flats off Dwaraka more to commemorate the exploits of Mohammed Ghazni than for any operational objectives. It is interesting to note that to counter such an eventuality, the Indian warship, Trishul, with a sophisticated fire control system, had been positioned in the Gulf of Kutch. The frigate failed to sortie out to engage the enemy, ostensibly because of a machinery defect and hence lost a fleeting opportunity to give a bloody nose to the aggressor.

Pakistan was nonetheless able to detain 3 Indian merchant ships (Saraswati, Sakeela and Jalarajendra) which were in Karachi (due to absence of elementary shipping control) along with their crew and 2400 tons of cargo. As an afterthought, Pakistan issued a formal notification imposing contraband control which included all kinds of foodstuff and even personal effects. They further proceeded to off load Indian cargo from 19 neutral vessels and established Prize Courts thus dishonouring the time honoured principles of public policy - the principle of military necessity and the principle of humanity. In response, India also detained 3 Pakistani ships but unilaterally returned the cargo when a ceasefire was declared without waiting for the restoration of trade relations or a reciprocal exchange of seized assets.

In the meantime, the Indian Fleet limped back to Bombay to embark their war outfits when it was instructed by a noting on a file not to cross the latitude of Porbunder.² So much for the overall direction of war! The Navy which was kept in the dark regarding the ground missions also did not carry out even the traditional operations of blockade, mining of choke points, attacks on harbours and amphibious operations and so on. Nor did Pakistan take advantage of her monopoly of having a submarine arm to bottle up the Indian fleet as witnessed later in the Falklands conflict. In short, the Indo-Pak conflict at sea was pedestrian with both sides apparently lacking the will to exploit the potential of seapower which in hindsight had held the sub-continent captive for centuries. Nil casualties at sea is also clearly indicative of the timid handling of naval forces by comparatively inexperienced and defensive oriented commanders who were given no clear cut orders nor associated with interservice operational planning.

GUERRILLA WARFARE IN ESTUARINE WATERS 1971

The Mukti Bahini frogmen turned in a remarkable performance, an

untold story that merits a special place of honour in the saga of the liberation of Bangladesh. Commencing with an all out attack on the sea ports of Chittagong and Chalna on 15th August, 1971, the water borne Guerrillas sank the Pakistan ships, Ohmramad, Al Abbas, Al Murtaza, Imtiaz Bakash, Urmis and the foreign vessels Tevlot Bank, Berlion, Mastrostelias, Chrysovalandu and the freighter Lighting.³ They also attacked the vital inland waterway terminals of Narayangunj, Chandpur, Barisal, Faridpur and Duadkhandi and increased the toll of ships sunk by an additional 5 coasters, 6 tankers, 7 river streamers and several barges as also extensively damaging jetties, ferries and pontoons. It is therefore not surprising that the correspondent of the Daily Telegraph, Clare Hollingworth operating from out of Intercontinental Hotel at Dacca summed up the sinking of 50,000 tons of ships and the damage of an equivalent tonnage over a period of 4 months as 'brilliant'⁴. *The London Times* described these estuarine operations as 'fantastic'.

In retrospect, one has to view not only the 100,000 tons of shipping sunk/damaged with jetties and wharves immobilised and navigable channels blocked, but also take into account the large number of foreign ships that refused to enter the heavily guarded ports to embark the mounting stocks of jute, tea, rice and other traditional exports in spite of inflated war risk rates. This in itself is a fitting tribute to the Mukti Bahini frogmen (mostly students thirsting for revenge) who demonstrated an entirely new concept of guerrilla warfare in cloistered waters.

VIVISECTION OF PAKISTAN - DEC 71

Pakistan's preemptive attack on 3 Dec 1971 saw the Indian Navy responding dramatically to the lessons learnt from the previous conflict. The threat by Pakistan's long range submarine Ghazi was removed by a ruse de guerre off Vishakhapatnam on the opening day of the conflict. Karachi came under a missile attack soon after in which a destroyer and a minesweeper were sunk. The oil tanks at Keamari were also set on fire.⁵ Thus missile warfare made its debut in the international waters of the Indian Ocean as aptly described in the ditty:

"Put the missile out to sea
where the real estate is free
and it is far away from me...."

A blockade was forthwith promulgated and shipping control strictly enforced. Pakistani merchantmen were intercepted in the Bay of Bengal and Arabian Sea. India did not lose a single vessel. Vikrant's aircraft bombed Cox's Bazar, Chittagong, Khulna and Chalna ports daily which was acknowl-

edged by the IAF moving its 'bomb line' away from the coast and towards Dacca. Air attacks from moving platforms at sea was yet another milestone in this ocean conflict which was later more spectacularly demonstrated by U.S. carrier borne air operations in the gulf. The early surrender of Pakistan forces, however, prevented further missile attacks on their warships hiding behind neutral merchantships in the harbour of Karachi.

The nation lionised the Navy and a new confidence, which Michael Howard described as the 'forgotten dimensions of strategy', became the hallmark of a rejuvenated service facing the 7th Fleet dispatched by Nixon. It is interesting to note that during this sortie, the Soviets surfaced their nuclear submarines in the Indian Ocean to be photographed by the U.S. satellites in order to confirm their presence in this ocean area.

Pakistan's only success was the sinking of the frigate Khukri by torpedos more due to the over-confidence and incorrect tactics of the 'Search and Attack Unit' (SAU) deployed to hunt the Pakistan submarine, Hangor which had given away its position by a wireless transmission. Pro-submarine and anti-submarine operations were thus blooded during this conflict leading to a submarine acquisition race on the Sub-continent. This culminated in the leasing of the nuclear propelled submarine, Chakra, armed with conventional weapons to India which has since been returned back to Russia. The 1971 conflict, therefore, witnessed the entire gambit of sea warfare in all the 3 dimensions together with the innovative concept of frogmen operations in estuarine waters.

These unorthodox operations, highlighted the effectiveness of economic warfare by increasing war risk insurance resulting in a steep rise in cargo rates and the diversion of army personnel for the protection of ships and maritime installations. Paradoxically the success of these guerrilla attacks created the post of an Admiral in the eastern Sector which the people of East Pakistan had been clamouring for even since the previous conflict.

YESTERDAY, TODAY AND TOMMORROW

The Orientals with the exception of Japan paid a heavy price for not understanding the collateral advantages of utilising the seas during peace and war for both defence and development. It is therefore necessary to identify and consolidate the ingredients of maritime power be it shipping, fishing, drilling, dredging, mining or even gun boat diplomacy in the emerging relations between the Sea and the State.

In contrast, France continued to fully exploit her small naval presence in the Reunion islands, Comoros, Southern Antarctica islands and Djibouti.

The sovereignty over these islands had added 11 million square kilometers to the Exclusive Economic Zone of France thus catapulting her to the third largest maritime nation from being the forty fifth. In addition, she emerged as a major trading partner and primary weapons supplier to South Africa and the Gulf as also an important source for the transfer of technology to developing countries.⁶ Hence with a miniscule naval force comprising of a fleet tanker and 2 frigates, Paris was able to extract an out of proportion leverage primarily due to the absence of any regional naval presence in this ocean segment.

The smaller nations in the Indian ocean will perforce have to look to a friendly regional power which has the capability and capacity to assist them during national disasters, maritime boundary disputes, island grabbing, off shore exploration, human resource development and so on. But continental India had still not fully understood the spectrum of options available to a seaforce because of interlinking oceanic borders. The controversy with Bangladesh over Moore Island is yet another example of the need to be purposeful on maritime issues in the international arena.

The gradual induction of protective sea forces during the Iran-Iraq conflict was not taken into cognisance when Indian tankers including Ambedkar, Ras Viswamitra, Varuna and Jalpari were hit by missiles.⁷ New Delhi's reluctance to escort her unarmed merchantmen to enforce the right of innocent passage during the Gulf conflict was further exposed when the Shipping Corporation vessels transporting refugees and foodgrains with the approval of United Nations were stopped, boarded and searched on the high seas in flagrant violation of international norms. Even so, not a whimper of protest was heard from the South Block. A sad testimony to the taxpayers investment in a highly demonstrative navy which is but a tool of the nation just as the hammer is a tool of the carpenter. It is therefore required to be used deliberately and purposefully both in peace and war.

The flash points in the Indian Ocean however continue to simmer in Sri Lanka, Mynamar, Cambodia, Malagasy, Gulf, Horn of Africa and Pakistan. In the lower league of contentious issues one must add religious fundamentalism, China's weapon export diplomacy, leverage of the cheque book powers of Japan and Germany as also poaching, smuggling, narcoterrorism and environmental degradation on a tri ocean scale. To this on must also add the seepage of nuclear 'know how' due to the brittleness and improverishment of the C.I.S. (Russia). The possibility of even small scientifically backward States being able to acquire atomic weapons by paying cash over the counter cannot be ruled out.

Non-provocative defence should therefore take into consideration the forces and factors that help or hinder India's maritime capacity of being a credible policeman on the beat especially during the twilight period of super power retrenchment due to the ending of the cold war. Conversely the regional navy should have the maritime and economic sinews to deter or defuse the factors that attract the attention of external powers to intervene against a littoral's national interests. This emerging relationship between India and the Indian Ocean in which maritime forces will perforce be the major performer may well influence the very texture of strategic, economic and environmental security in the Indian Ocean which in turn will effect global security. It will therefore be opportune for India's Navy, sandwiched as it were between a new Economic order and an emerging world order, to develop into an adequate sea power in order to play its rightful role in the 21st Century and not continue to remain becalmed in the 'Ocean of Destiny'. So to conclude with the Sanskrit motto of the Indian Navy which is applicable both in war and peace:-

'Sam no Varunah'

(May the seas be auspicious to us)

NOTES

1. Rear Admiral K. Sridharan, 'A Maritime history of India' (Delhi Publication Division) GOI 1982) p. 33.
2. Admiral S.N. Kohli, 'we dared' (Lancers' International) Prologue - Pages 1 to 3.
3. Lloyds Casualty List - London Nov. 1971
4. Daily Telegraph 28 Oct, 1971
5. Admiral S.N. Kohli - 'We dared' (Lancers International)
6. Jyotsna Saksena, 'France and the Indian Ocean (Lancers International Delhi) p. 67
7. Sreedhar and Kapil Kaul, Tanker War (Delhi, ABC Publishing House 1989) p. 81.

Foreign Policy Options for India During the 1990s*

WING COMMANDER SC SHARMA, VR C

INTRODUCTION

India's foreign policy has remained fairly steady throughout the past forty years. However, far-reaching changes all over the world in the recent years have necessitated a review of our established policies and to reorientate them with the changed scenario. But, we cannot lose sight of the fact that over the years India's foreign policy has been guided on the basis of certain basic postulates and any sudden digression from them would not be without the loss of a certain degree of our credibility in the international relations. It is, therefore, mandatory that we put these postulates in the correct perspective, carefully examine the need and degree of shift from them before exploring options within the new frame-work.

An attempt has been made in the succeeding paragraphs to study the options available with their accompanying merits/demerits within the acceptable framework of principles. The entire study has been sub-divided under the following heads :-

- (a) Objectives
- (b) Basic principles
- (c) Synopsis of current international scene
- (d) Super-powers
- (e) Middle-East
- (f) Eastern Europe
- (g) Western Europe
- (h) SE Asia
- (i) Asia-Pacific rim
- (j) Relations with neighbours
- (k) Role in the UNO
- (l) Summary
- (m) Conclusion

* This article has won the first prize in Group A of the USI Gold Medal Essay Competition for 1991.

OBJECTIVES

Since there are no permanent friends or enemies but only permanent interests in the international relations, it would be apt to lay down broad objectives (permanent interests) for our foreign policy which serve our national interests for a foreseeable period of atleast next ten years i.e. the turn of the century. The objectives themselves are a function of our technological and economic status and internal/external security environment besides a host of other tangible/intangible factors which are beyond the scope of this essay. The following should be our objectives for a time-frame of next 10 years:-

- (a) The policy should actively aid continuous updating of our technological status through transfer of technology as well as through growth of infrastructure/institutions which would help in the ultimate aim of self reliance through indigenous technology appropriate to our needs.
- (b) The policy should help in mitigating India's problem of resource crunch for development purposes i.e. it should help secure greater foreign investment and help capital formation so that our development plans stay on rails without compromising our plan ideology or sovereignty.
- (c) The policy should aim to develop special relationships with identified members of OPEC with a view to obtain stable supplies of petroleum products at favourable terms of trade till indigenous capabilities are developed.
- (d) The policy should seek containment of Pakistan's influence in the areas of the world which could be a source of enhancements of her military strength both present and potential. Also, we should be able to undermine her international status to such a degree that she finds herself at a definite diplomatic and military disadvantage vis-a-vis India; a condition, ideal for India to reach a negotiated settlement to all outstanding disputes with that country.
- (e) The policy should reiterate India's resolve to adhere to Panchsheel principles with the neighbours while clearly projecting our determination that it cannot be a one-way traffic. Within the Panchsheel framework, policy must actively create conditions for regional trade and development with mutual benefits.
- (f) The policy should provide the flexibility of choosing any nation, organisation, group or area for any type of relationship we deem best in our national interest.

(g) The policy should continuously cultivate relationship with countries which could be useful to India now or in future from the point of view of sale of technology, manufactured goods, export of man-power, import of cheap raw-materials, turn-key projects etc.

(h) Option to go nuclear at the time of choosing.

(j) To obtain a leading status among third world countries and create a lobby to effectively counteract ulterior economic designs of the developed countries.

BASIC PRINCIPLES

Right at the time of independence, the architects of our foreign policy laid down ground rules based on which we would manoeuvre. These were :-

(a) Non-alignment with any military block or ideological group.

(b) Panchsheel principles.

(c) Propagation of peace and that all international disputes should be settled through negotiated settlement or peace-talks.

(d) Basic humanism i.e. opposition to colonialism whether political or economic and apartheid etc.

SYNOPSIS OF CURRENT INTERNATIONAL SCENE

The major international changes that have a bearing on our foreign policy are as follows:-

(a) Sudden downfall of communist governments in the countries of eastern Europe eg Hungary, Poland, Checkoslovakia and Rumania.

(b) Warsaw-pact turning defunct - world turning unipolar.

(c) Unification of Germany.

(d) End of Cold War

(e) Perestroika and Glasnost in USSR.

(f) Defeat of Iraq by the USA and its allies.

(g) Rise of Japan as the economic power.

(h) Prospects of new regional arrangements in the Middle-East.

(j) Movement for democracy in China.

The above developments have led to marked changes in the international power equations with varied impacts on nations. For example, unification of Germany has produced apprehension in the British minds; the end of cold war has created new security apprehensions among the nations who banked on super power balance. The emergence of Japan as an economic super power is forcing USSR to rethink on her earlier aloofness to Japanese sensitivities. The post-victory UN resolutions forced on Iraq herald the emergence of USA and the UK in a new role of unchallenged supremacy in the Middle-East; thereby, virtual control of a vast portion of the world's oil resources. This could have far-reaching implications on the developing economies like India's wherein their pace of development could become hostage to the western good will. The collapse of Soviet economic system has certainly aided the break-down of her political stranglehold over most of eastern Europe. The nations of eastern Europe today stand despondant with shattered economies and lack of capital for development, albeit with a moderate technological status. They look up to West with its vast resources and technological prowess to bail them out of the present crisis. In short, an international situation is obtained where-in West seems to hold all the trumpcards; economic, political and military. However, West must still tread with caution with Japan and China. For the time being, China seems content with buying time for development and Japan with her economic prosperity. But this could change if Japanese trade poses serious problems to West's economic interests and in reaction the West begins to use her oil monopoly card to throttle Japanese trade advantages. An unrealistic price hike of oil or oil squeeze under Western pressure could seriously affect Japanese economic interests.

Therefore, in the final analysis the following salient points must be kept in mind by India's foreign policy planners for the next decade:

- (a) There is increasing monopoly of the Western nations over the oil resources of the world; main actors being the USA and the UK.
- (b) With 20% of the World's population and the 80% of the world GNP, West would continue to enjoy economic supremacy and consequent leverages on World Bank and IMF etc.
- (c) The USSR will be reluctant to actively antagonise West in the interest of her internal economic and political crisis.
- (d) China presently has moderate technological level with paucity of capital. She is also isolated in the international relations. She banks heavily on the aura of her nuclear weapons to project the image of a military power. But, she certainly lacks the economic strength or technological level to support that image. Besides, she also has a simmering movement for democracy and unresolved border problems with Viet-

nam, India and the USSR. Her state-controlled economy may well go the Russian way in the years to come. She may then begin to cultivate Japan for help.

(e) Germany is sure to emerge as a major economic power by the end of the century although she is not likely to be a major military power in this period. She may begin to pursue a more independent policy like France if her efforts at Pan-Europeanism fail.

(f) With greater economic, political and military power getting concentrated in West and lack of determination on the part of China and USSR, the UNO may pass only those resolutions which the Western nations deem best, notwithstanding the UN charter.

(g) The countries of Eastern Europe with moderate degree of technological status but in dire need of hard currency, may be ideal partners for joint ventures, technology transfers and export of consumer goods.

(h) There is a general cooling off of Western tilt in favour of Pakistan vis-a-vis India in the wake of end of cold war, withdrawal of USSR from Afghanistan and the availability of adequate bases in the Gulf and the Middle East for the US forces there. Also, the decisive advantage Pakistan enjoyed for her geographical position in the context of Afghan crisis is no longer there. However, Pakistan continues to receive military and financial support from several Arab nations by successfully playing the Islamic card.

(j) Following the fall of Congress (I) Govt in 1989, there has been considerable improvement in our relations with Nepal, Sri Lanka and Bangla Desh.

(k) Following the disappearance of Soviet threat, the role of NATO is beginning to be questioned. Therefore, in the next ten years NATO may become only a historical reality with no common goal. Europe would then return to pre-war (WW II) political situation. The UK may then stand isolated from Western Europe; France and Germany may forge closer alliance and a strong competition may develop among the USA, UK, France, Germany and Japan. This may, however take longer than 20 years.

OPTIONS

Having understood the present international scenario, objectives and guiding principles of our foreign policy, we may now examine the options within the present framework as applicable to specific areas/nations. To begin with, we may review the basic validity of the guiding principles in the present circumstances.

Non-alignment. The concept of non alignment was the most unique and basic element of our foreign policy when evolved in 1947 in the aftermath of WW II. The world was then sharply divided between two ideological and military blocks and hence the uniqueness of non-alignment. It has served us well and always stood the test of time. But the world now is not so sharply divided between two clear cut ideologies or military alliances. One system has capitulated and if any clear divide remains, it is only on the basis of economic development of various nations. Such a divide is a function of technological, military and economic power rather than any ideology. Therefore, under the circumstances, the concept of non-alignment needs to be reoriented to the new situation. We may now serve as a bridge between the erstwhile blocks. Also, we may pursue with renewed vigour the goals of third world nations which also happen to be mostly poor. A leading position among the poor nations of Africa and Asia would help us creating a lobby against economic exploitation by the rich nations. In effect, the updated concept of non-alignment would mean "not aligned to the rich nations exploiting the resources of the poor". However, another significant point is that while the Soviet block nations (including the USSR), themselves are wooing West for capital and technology, we would be naive not to seek a stronger relationship with them.

As regards other basic principles of our policy, there is really no need for a shift. In fact, there is need to pursue them with renewed vigour as we have violated them to our detriment in the recent past e.g. IPKF in Sri Lanka. These principles are indicative of basic humanism and serve as an effective counter against developing an image of arrogance in view of our growing military power and sheer size.

Relations with super-powers. Traditionally, India has enjoyed excellent relations with the USSR but one of mixed fortunes with the USA. Our irritants with the USA have primarily been borne on two counts. Firstly, due to her special relationship with Pakistan and secondly due to her deep suspicion of India's relations with the USSR. It may be quite possible that the latter was the cause of the former. The USA has never truly accepted India's non-alignment. She has maintained a borderline relationship with India just to obviate the possibility of losing India altogether. However, since 1989 there is a perceptible shift in the policy of both countries. The USA's stand on Simla Agreement of 1972 coming clearly only in 1990 is a significant pointer. Similarly, her insistence on proof of not going nuclear from Pakistan or face curtailment of aid. On the other hand India's relations with the USSR are not what they used to be; mainly due to internal developments in the USSR forcing it to withdraw from her external commitments. Finally, since the US-USSR cold war has come to an end, there is hardly any need to view India's

relationship with the USSR with suspicion. Thus, the root cause of all irritants is thawed.

Therefore, in brief it may be surmised that there is a great opportunity now in India's way to strengthen relations with the USA with a view to obtain two main benefits;

- (a) Containment of Pakistan's influence and accompanying military support to Pakistan by the USA.
- (b) Seek American capital investment and technology in the priority sectors of our economy.

However, we must continue to maintain our traditional bonds of friendship with the USSR through increasing trade of primary products e.g. food products, leather and tea etc which satisfy the basic needs of USSR. In return, we must seek contemporary military and other technology on soft terms or pure barter. With the Russian economy opening up, there may be tremendous demands for our consumer goods there. India is well placed to take advantage of such a market.

Relations with the Middle East. The relations with the Middle-East are of great importance to India due to following reasons:-

- (a) The area produces 80% of the World's oil.
- (b) It is a major source of monetary and military support to Pakistan.
- (c) Its an area with high capital resources and low technological base and has been a major source of foreign currency remittances.

The region is still in a fluid stage with USA's proposed new security arrangements not clear. But certainly the USA and the UK are bound to play a more dominant role in this region; both on the diplomatic and the military front. The only nation that challenges their presence in the region is Iran. One factor which is the source of greatest instability here is the Palestine issue. Another factor for policy consideration for this region is that Islam plays a dominant role.

In the above mentioned scenario the only useful option for India is to use Islam and pro-PLO stand as instruments to further our foreign policy objectives. Our pro-PLO stand has already brought us considerable advantage in this region. We have, however not used Islam card perhaps for fear of damaging our secular image. This needs to be changed. We must project India vigorously as a great centre of Islamic culture with a 1000 years of historical background of Muslim rule which nurtured Muslim scholars, archi-

ture, sufis, saints and poets. This may be done ostensibly for tourism promotion among the Arab tourists. But slowly and steadily we should be able to project India's image as that of an ancient nation with world's second largest muslim population which has now adopted modernisation under the impact of science and technology like Turkey under Kamal Atatürk Pasha and follows secularism as an offshoot of Koranic teachings of Common Brotherhood and egalitarian social system. Such a campaign would also help in neutralising anti-India feeling in Pakistan. While India's politicians have done enough to woo Muslim population of India for votes, they have done virtually nothing of the sort outside India. This would remove that anomaly. In the ultimate analysis we must be able to present a credible dilemma to Arabs in their attitude vis-a-vis India and Pakistan. Also, we must be able to put Arab rulers in a frame of mind where they would listen credibly to India's argument that Pakistan's military strength is to be used against whom? Against a friendly great Islamic cultural centre i.e. India? In any case it has never been of any use against Israel or any other anti-Islamic/anti Arab nation.

Having neutralised the Islam factor, India with her inherent technological superiority over Pakistan, would be able to contain her in the Middle East. Also, she would then be better placed to seek Arab oil, turn-key projects, sub-contracts and Capital on more favourable terms besides manpower export.

As far as a stable source of petroleum product is concerned, if India can establish even a slightly favourable balance of trade with one of the OPEC nations, it would be a major achievement. The most likely nations, are post-war Iraq, Nigeria and the UAE. Therefore, these need to be cultivated vigorously. What we need to bear in mind is that merely being able to purchase crude/petroleum products at international prices is not good enough achievement of our foreign policy. What we should be aiming for is a policy which can obtain a favourable balance of trade with the supplier nation as this alone helps Indian economy.

Relations with Eastern Europe. The salient factors affecting foreign policy consideration for this region are:-

- (a) The transition from socialist to capitalist system is still not fully stabilized.
- (b) The nations enjoy a moderate technological level.
- (c) Due to long period of Communist rule the good quality consumer items are in short supply.
- (d) The nations are in urgent need of foreign capital.

In such a scenario India's foreign policy in respect of this region has to be guided primarily by economic considerations. Since, there are no ideological, political or military differences, our relations have to be friendly and commercial. These nations are in the process of building a market economy. Therefore, we should be continuously on the look out for opportunities to develop greater awareness among these nations of our technological growth under democratic system so that they are in correct frame of mind to accept Indian manufactured goods and machinery. In short, our policy should successfully build an image of a modern, technology-oriented nation with plenty of scope for mutual cooperation in trade and technology exchange.

Relations with Western Europe. The salient factors of this region are :-

- (a) Developed economies with high GNP, per capita income and consumption.
- (b) Great believers of capitalism, market economy and open-door policies.
- (c) High technological level.
- (d) Prospects of combined European market by 1992.
- (e) Growth of unified Germany.

We already enjoy excellent relations with Western Europe. But these nations still suspected our close economic and military relations with the USSR. This nagging doubt is shifting into background with the end of cold war. From the European point of view, India is a vast market for their industrial surpluses. From Indian point of view the region has a very high consumption capacity thereby a great source of earning foreign exchange. Sooner or later we are bound to arrive at an equation with Western Europe in which they export to India high technology items and know-how while we supply them low/moderate technology items due to our inherent advantage of cheap labour and consequently price. Also, there is a tremendous potential for export of India's cotton garments and other handicrafts as the population has very high purchase power. Besides, with fairly well developed technological base and availability of cheap labour India is an ideal partner for joint ventures for export to third countries.

Unification of Germany is one of the greatest event of post world war period. She is bound to grow into one of the most powerful economies of the world. Perhaps she would be next only to Japan in another 20 years. Our foreign policy with her should specially aim to strive at satisfactory balance of trade and cultivate long term relations.

Relations with SE Asia. The salient factors affecting this region are :-

- (a) Most of the nations are maritime but with very little naval power.
- (b) There is no regional military alliance. A regional economic alliance in ASEAN has not really grown in strength.
- (c) Three most populous nations are Indonesia, Philippines and Vietnam.
- (d) Vietnam is the strongest military power of the region and nurtures a border dispute with China.
- (e) The nations are mostly free from super power influence but share a common colonial past.
- (f) There are a large number of Indians settled in Singapore, Hong Kong and Malaysia.
- (g) India has had historical links with the region.
- (h) There is tremendous scope for exports of consumer items and setting up of industrial projects.

In the light of the above factors, India's foreign policy options here would be to:-

- (a) Cultivate strong ties with Vietnam.
- (b) Develop strong trade links with Indonesia and Malaysia; possibly with joint ventures.
- (c) Examine possibilities of investment in India by companies leaving Hong Kong on ceding of same to China in 1997.
- (d) Seek greater naval/maritime cooperation with these nations and create opportunities to convert our naval superiority into commercial profits.

Relations with Asia-Pacific rim. Japan is turning into an economic super power. At the moment her GNP is three fifths that of the USA but she is likely to catch up with her by 2004. Also, her share of the world market is 37% as against 30% of the USA. Of late, there have been trade disputes between the two but they were successfully negotiated. However, there is a strong possibility that their trade interests would clash with greater severity in future. One possibility is that the West may exert its influence in the Middle East to make export of oil difficult to Japan. But it is unlikely to work. Sooner West accepts that Japan has "arrived" as an economic and

technological giant, the better it would be. However, such an understanding would mean open competition which the West may not be able to sustain against the Japanese onslaught. Ultimately that would lead to polarisation of Japan away from the West. There are subtle indicators already of the Soviet and Chinese acceptance of new power of Japan.

Another factor in this region is the economic growth of Korea though not of the same magnitude as Japan. Also, there are moves by Japan to seek closer relations with Korea (public repentance by Japanese emperor of the subjugation of Korea by Japan).

Under such a scenario, the region is of vital interest to a developing nation like India which is also a huge market, basically on following counts:

- (a) Seek Japanese capital investment and technology to expedite the growth of indigenous technological level as well as exports.
- (b) Use Japanese trade terms as a bargaining power with the West when negotiating purchase of technology/contracts, in addition to the factor of our huge market i.e. we must build relations with Japan and the West such that we could effectively use the identical capabilities of each as a countervailing factor in addition to the common factor of the size of our market.
- (c) India may examine the possibility of Japanese collaboration in India's Oil exploration programme through capital and technology investment on mutually beneficial terms. A long term stable source of petroleum supply would be of immense interest to Japan. At the same time Japanese Capital and technology on favourable terms could sufficiently hasten India's oil exploration resulting in large savings of vital foreign exchange.

Relations with neighbours : India has small and large neighbours all around her. We have boundary disputes with two, viz China and Pakistan. Given the history of our wars with China and Pakistan and consequent military expenditure in our burgeoning economy, it is of utmost importance that we contain their military threat through diplomatic means as best as possible. However, it is easier said than done. Unfortunately world continues to listen seriously only to nations with a strong military back up no matter what the forum. Therefore, it would be naive to overlook this dictum. A strong military base vis-a-vis Pakistan and China, therefore, would have to be the cornerstone of our foreign policy otherwise negotiated settlement with them would remain a distant dream. However, the success of our diplomatic containment of these nations would serve as the pulse for the updating/purchase of new

military equipment by India. Hence successful diplomatic containment of military threat can save us crores of dollars of military purchase. China continues to be in occupation of about 24000 sq km of our territory in AKSAI CHIN area. She seems keen to maintain the present status quo. India has already adopted a pragmatic policy of normalising relations with China pending solution of boundary question. Three factors would affect our bargaining power with the Chinese;

- (a) Closeness of our relations with the West especially USA.
- (b) Our military strength and,
- (c) Isolation of China in the international relations. Considering all three factors at present, we must press China for greater urgency in solving the boundary question so that this last impediment in our relations is removed. The above three factors would also contribute substantially in obtaining greater security against a possible Chinese mis-adventure.

With regards to Pakistan, there is need for a slightly more aggressive posture than now, particularly in the light of her covert/overt support to secessionists in Punjab and J&K. She has been successful to a certain degree in achieving her military objectives through internal subversion though a decline in her achievements seems to be on the cards. One shift in our stand could be by threatening to repeal Article 370, leading to changes in population distribution of J&K. Secondly we may begin to describe POK more aggressively as fruit of aggression by Pakistan with India reserving the right to take appropriate steps to restore her rights. There may also be veiled threats to use Sindhis and Pakhtoons. In any case, we must be able to neutralise Muslim card of Pakistan in Kashmir by highlighting the treatment received by Bengali Muslims, Sindhi Muslims and Pakhtoons from the powers in Pakistan. On the whole, our foreign policy vis-a-vis Pakistan should encompass vigorous measures to contain Pakistan's support in the West, Middle East as well as fire seeds of ethnic nationalism among various groups in Pakistan in order to counteract Pakistani onslaught in Punjab and Kashmir. In addition, we should build a strong relationship with Afghanistan with clear overtones of military exchange and cooperation among other things.

India's relations with other neighbouring countries besides China and Pakistan must bear ample testimony of our basic principles of Panchsheel, non-violence and the spirit of SAARC. We may have to go more than half way in order to prevent an image of regional hegemony or arrogance. But at the same time our attitude in South Asia must clear all doubts among nations that any action on their part which adversely affects our security interests would be detrimental to our national interests i.e. they should be made

sensitive to our national interests. Within such a framework we must strive for trade with mutual benefits.

Role in the UNO. The Iraq chapter has proved that the UNO can be twisted to suit the needs of few. The UN becomes a menacing force when the interests of USA or UK are hurt but one of quiet deliberations when its resolution on PLO issue is not implemented. However, even if the organisation is used to perpetuate individual nation's policies, the very fact that it needs to be manipulated to prove the correctness of the action, it retains certain degree of moral value. A few nations cannot continuously undermine the opinion of a large number of poor nations of Africa and Asia without losing their prestige. Our commitment to the charter and spirit of the UN has a strong historical background which needs to be reiterated. However, India has generally preferred bilateral talks for her own disputes after the lesson she learnt from referring the Kutch border dispute with Pakistan to an international tribunal. This policy holds good and must be continued. However, if possible, we should get our bilateral agreements ratified by UN body e.g., Simla Agreement, if ratified, by the UNO, would have been infinitely stronger than otherwise. Beside that, we must continue to uphold our neutrality and impartiality at the UN as far as possible. On contentious issues, where a clear stand is binding on us, we should examine the short term repercussions of our stand as we can ill-afford adverse short term repercussions in favour of long term repercussions. In addition, we should try and build a lobby of very large number of Afro-Asian nations where we have natural advantages in achieving a leadership role e.g., identity of poor masses, colonial past and anti-apartheid policy. Such a lobby could substantially enhance India's international status as well as role in the UN.

SUMMARY

In view of the recent developments in the world and our national interests, we should re-orientate our foreign policy through the following concepts:-

- (a) We must maintain our non-aligned policy among the rich and the poor nations of the world with certain tilt in favour of Western ideals of democracy and market economy. This is also in keeping with the development of greater market economy within India.
- (b) Project India's image in the Arab world as that of a great centre of Islamic culture and learning to neutralise the advantage of Islamic card to Pakistan. Thus, ultimately contain Pakistani influence here.
- (c) Follow a more aggressive posture with Pakistan till she withdraws support to secessionists in J&K and Punjab.

- (d) Step up the pace of negotiations with China on boundary issue while normalising relations otherwise.
- (e) Undertake vigorous steps with the other neighbouring nations to make them sensitive to our security interests and strengthen SAARC within that framework.
- (f) Build strong trade and diplomatic relations with Japan and South Korea with a view to seek greater access to their investment, technology and joint ventures. Also, to use them as counter-veiling factor with Western Europe for trade negotiations.
- (g) Build a strong lobby of Afro-Asian nations within UNO through leadership of Third World countries outside UNO.
- (h) Undertake vigorous campaign to rebuild India's image of dynamic but non-violent, humanist country following principles of Panchsheel in letter and spirit.
- (j) Build strong ties with Vietnam in all fields e.g. trade, cultural and military with a view to obtain future stronghold in SE Asia as well as to contain Chinese threat.
- (k) Examine short term repercussions for stand on the contentious issues in the UNO.

CONCLUSION

India is a developing country with widespread poverty; social and economic developments are her urgent needs. Therefore, she can ill afford a large military expenditure. However, she cannot shy away from the demands of national security and integrity. The aim of our policy should, therefore, be to achieve rapid economic growth with honour and national integrity. This is not possible unless we continuously remain alert to changes occurring around us and take appropriate steps with the ultimate objectives always in view.

Initiatives to Normalise Indo-Pak Relations as a Result of New Detente Between US and USSR*

MAJOR R BHANTI 17 RAJ RIF (SWAI MAN)

INTRODUCTION

India's role in the sub-continent in future will be influenced by anticipated changes in several variables at global, regional and sub-regional levels. One of the variables representing change at global level and likely to effect India's foreign policy is the New Detente between the two Super-powers. It has given a new thrust to nuclear disarmament as represented by the INF treaty. Also, there are pointers towards disarmament at the level of conventional weapons.

Another facet of the New Detente is the understanding among great powers to resolve regional problems. East and West Germans are being united as one country. France and Germany the historic enemies of Great Britain have forged a common market and a common parliament. Both NATO and Warsaw Pact are dismantling their war machines. The last 2-3 years have seen unprecedented peace initiatives by the Soviet Union resulting in extremely sudden and unexpected reduction in East-West tensions. Some of the developments have been truly spectacular. There can be no doubt that a similar approach in the Indo-Pak context would result in tremendous mutual benefit. However, too close a parallel cannot be drawn. Any Indo-Pak rapprochement without a settlement of the J & K imbroglio would remain tentative and fragile. Concession by either side on this sensitive issue is likely to be construed as a 'Surrender' and would meet with tremendous domestic opposition. This is particularly so in the case of Pakistan. Under the circumstances, can there be any possibility of a settlement between India and Pakistan? To address this question one needs to analyse, the current situation as existing between the two countries, what impact will this new Detente have in re-shaping the Indo-Pak relations and what measures could be initiated to solve these complex differences. It is only then that Indo-Pak relations can be more cooperative than conflictual.

Dr Richard Haas, Special Assistant to President Bush and senior director for South Asian Affairs at the US National Security Council has rightly

* This article has won the second prize in Group I of the Chief of the Army Staff's Gold Medal Essay Competition for 1991.

stated that "Many key regional pairs - India and Pakistan, Israel and her Arab neighbours, Iran and Iraq would do well to adopt many of the arms control and confidence building measures regimes developed by the United States and the Soviet Union".

AIM

The aim of this paper is to suggest measures, in the context of reduced East-West tensions, that could be initiated to normalise Indo-Pak relations which could result in mutual force reduction besides other benefits.

PREVIEW

I intend covering this essay in the following parts:-

- (a) *Part I* Two Nation Theory, a historical insight.
- (b) *Part II* Current Indo-Pak problem areas.
- (c) *Part III* Pakistan's Strategic Compulsions.
- (d) *Part IV* Pakistani Perception about Changes in Eastern Europe.
- (e) *Part V* Measures/Alternatives to Resolve Indo-Pak Tensions.
- (f) *Part VI* An Utopian Solution.

PART I : THE TWO NATION THEORY; A HISTORICAL INSIGHT

The Khilafat movement (1919-1922) for the restoration of the title of the Caliph or Khalifa (the religious head of Muslims the world over) to the Sultan of Turkey, abolished by the British, after Turkey's defeat in the First World War, which won Gandhiji's active support had brought about a cataclysmic change in the attitude of both Hindus and Muslims to each other. The earlier Congress League Pact at Lucknow (1916), through which separate electorates had been conceded to the Muslims, with weightage in the minority provinces, had already cemented the Hindu-Muslim relations and it appeared that the British would find no excuse, nor the Muslim or Hindu diehards, to cause tensions and delay India's Independence. Mr M A Jinnah was being acclaimed as the messiah of Hindu-Muslim unity and Mahatma Gandhi the harbinger of a new dawn.

But, Khilafat was abolished by the secularist Kamal Ataturk, new President of the Turkish Republic and the Indians, both Hindus and Muslims, were shocked to find that they had been fighting for a non-issue. Hindu-Muslim rioting started breaking out in full fury in many places and the nationalist leaders of the stature of late Lala Lajpatrai began preaching through the Press and platform that the two could not live together and must separate.

Most of them entered the legislative Councils and the central Assembly. Tasting power, however limited, they craved from more blood of the others. Divisions of the spoils of office on the basis of religion (caste and sub-caste are a post independence phenomenon) became the main issue. Independence, not total but within the British empire (or, dominion status) became the goal of everyone, and the British type of parliamentary democracy and the rule of law, favouring the haves, the means to divide the spoils of office. Civil disobedience or mass action, so dear to the heart of Gandhiji was anathema to Jinnah and his nascent Muslim League. Jinnah had even stood aloof from the Khilafat agitation, calling it obscurantist and extra-territorial, which it really was. Gandhiji was isolated and Jawaharlal, bubbling with new socialist ideas was too young to influence decisions.

Three Round-table conferences, several unity conferences and other confabulations did not bring Hindus and Muslims any nearer nor the Simon Commission (1930) nor the Nehru report (1929). And that was not because the Muslims wanted to secede from India, but wanted a few extra seats at the Centre, a little more powers for the provinces. Upto 1940 when the resolution for Pakistan was passed at Lahore, no one had even asked for separation. Jinnah, in fact, scoffed at the very idea, when Rahmat Ali's pamphlet "Now or Never", was presented to him in early thirties. The British seized upon the situation and through Ramsay MacDonald's "Communal award" (1932) gave the Muslims what they wanted in the provinces, but the question of the Centre remained hanging. The Congress rejected the idea of a Federation, with the princes holding the balance of power at the Centre. Perhaps, its acceptance at that juncture would have kept the country together. We would have sorted out the question of princely representation, later. But nationalist India wanted all, or nothing, at the momentous hour.

To cap it all, the Congress boycotted the war-effort and to thwart it further, started the Quit-India movement. The British were in desperate need of India's total participation in war and were searching for allies on all sides. They could find no one better than Jinnah and his Muslim League, on the assurance that when India is granted freedom, the Muslim case for freedom, especially of their majority provinces, would not be ignored. Lord Linlithgow gave this assurance publicly (1940). A united India had thus become a distant dream. The Cripps Mission (1942) was ignored by the Congress. In 1946, an attempt was made by the British Cabinet Mission to keep India united with powers of the Centre being limited and the provinces enjoying the maximum autonomy (a demand being voiced by various Indian States now), but the Congress rejected the scheme and opted for partition on the basis of Muslim majority areas seceding from India and forming an independent state. It was thus a mutually agreed settlement, the high scale violence accompanying it

notwithstanding. Initially, there was indeed a sigh of relief on both sides, having got out of a messy situation with as little a price as possible. The unity of India was no longer the main ideal.

But we had counted our gains a little too prematurely. Not only the colossal question of refugees on both sides, (which no one had anticipated at that scale) but the enormous size of the Muslims left in India (now 10 to 12 crores) stared us in the face. The question of the Muslim-majority Kashmir, even after its accession to India (with the concurrence of the Maharaja as well as the popular Kashmiri Muslim leadership, led by Sheikh Abdullah) was allowed to hang fire. On the one hand we (unwisely) went to the UN, protesting against Pakistani aggression, and on the other agreed in a fit of idealism (again unwisely) to a plebiscite. We did not allow Hindu and Sikh refugees to settle in Kashmir, and Kashmir remained a festering sore. At Simla (1972) we agreed again with Mr Bhutto's idea that the Kashmir problem had still to be resolved! Every time after winning the war with Pakistan, as in 1965, we returned the areas of Pak-occupied Kashmir to Pakistan.

The miserable economic condition of the Indian Muslims coupled with their lack of education and continuous rioting and tensions generated over various issues (the most volatile being the Ramjanambhoomi - Babri issue) kept the kettle boiling. Pakistan takes advantage of this unrest and in the interest of its own political validity and stability, always keeps the future of the Indian Muslims in the fore-front in Pakistan. Both India and Pakistan spend a staggering amount on arming against each other, including lately with nuclear weapons. Both are, therefore, in the debt-trap and the economic conditions of both are in the doldrums. Pakistan is fishing in troubled waters in Punjab and Kashmir, realising fully well that if, by any chance, Kashmir secedes from India, the plight of the Indian Muslims will become intolerable. And if the Indian Punjab secedes, Pakistan has as much to fear from its domineering zeal, as the rest of India (after all, Pakistan till a century ago, was Sikh territory)! And will the people of India, whatever the Government's hue, ever allow this to happen? On the other hand, we could defeat Pakistan, but not keep its proud people under our heels for long. And the cost will be really heavy. It will be a fight to the finish on both sides. Is there not a way out? Let us examine the various differences, Pakistan's Strategic Compulsions and the initiatives required to improve Indo-Pak relations.

PART II : CURRENT INDO-PAK PROBLEM AREAS

GENERAL

There had been a remarkable improvement in Indo-Pak relations

between Dec 88, when Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto came to power and Jun 89. But the Kashmir imbroglio has showed that no matter how quick was the pace of normalisation of relations, it has the power to disrupt the entire process. In an interview to Ashis C Ray, South Asia Correspondent of London-based Independent Television News, Mrs Bhutto, stressed for a peaceful solution to all problems but stated that "this could not come about unless the basic issue of tension, which is Kashmir, is not resolved".

Some of the Major factors affecting the relation between the two countries are discussed in the succeeding paras.

PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS

Pakistan belongs to that category of state the very legitimacy of which is in doubt, in a sense. It was formed to protect and further Islam. At the time of its creation, there were many within Pakistan, itself who believed that provincial autonomy was one thing but that partition was absurd. In fact, the number of doubters have increased after the creation of Bangladesh. Today, there are more Muslims living in India than in Pakistan; Millions of Muslims are happy to live in India where they attain positions of responsibility in every walk of life. This questions the very basic concept of Pakistan as a homeland for "the persecuted Indian Muslims". This raises secret moments of self-doubt: was Pakistan a political error? Would the Muslims have been better off within an undivided independent India where they would have formed a powerful voting block?

ETHNIC AND LINGUISTIC FACTORS

Pakistan's society is complex and divisive, with four major ethno-linguistic elements. Ironically, Pakistan's national language, Urdu, is not the language of any of these four elements. Apart from this, Pakistan's population contains the world's largest tribal society. International boundaries were drawn by colonial powers without consideration of the realities of geography or race. The result is that all of its population belongs to linguistic or ethnic groups that have cultural affiliations with people in the neighbouring countries. This results in unstable borders, demands for realignments, safe sanctuaries for dissidents and difficulties of administration.

THE GEO-POLITICAL FACTOR

The British exit from South Asia in 1947 left the subcontinent divided into two countries, India and Pakistan (East and West). It also left India the potentially strongest power in South Asia. This situation encouraged India to evolve a concept of 'order' for South Asia based on the principle of avoidance

of extra-regional intervention. Indian perceptions of its role outside South Asia revolved around two concepts: the vital interest of preventing great power interests from intruding into South Asia and the general interest of playing a major participatory role in global affairs. India opted for non-alignment: India's stand of keeping the cold war out of South Asia implied an avoidance of extra-regional intervention. India rejected the balance of power doctrine. The search for peace was to be based on a dual policy: non-alignment and negotiation to tackle the social, economic political and psychological roots of a conflict.

But Pakistan's perceptions were different. Its geographical, social, cultural and ethnic links with South Asia were matched by a fear of India. This created the need for Pakistan to look to extra-regional links like the South East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) or the Baghdad Pact (later CENTO), and also to China. At the same time, Pakistan had an Islamic dimension to its identity; many Pakistanis see themselves as descendants of militant conquering religion. Geographically located in South Asia, Pakistan belongs to West Asia by religion and to South Asia by culture and tradition; Pakistanis see themselves as products of two antagonist: western imperialism and the insidious Indian cultural system. Their neighbours to the west are Afghanistan and Iran, both Muslim countries with large ethnic groups allied to Pakistan. Afghanistan has always been the north-western gateway to the plains of India. Hence Pakistan though located in South Asia is more tilted to West Asia, a muslim Majority area.

RELIGIOUS AND CULTURAL FACTORS

The exploitation of the Muslim world by the Mullahs started soon after the first century of Islam. In every age thereafter, the Ummah (Community) has been guided by its men of God who renewed the religion, read the Quran with inspired understanding which met the challenges of the time, suffered for its courage and was denounced by the Mullahs, The list of imams, scholars, sufis and others who have been imprisoned, whipped, poisoned, tortured and executed is long and comprehensive. But such persecution was only possible as long as it could be supported by the establishment. From the 19th century till today, attempts have been made to reconcile Islamic tradition with modernism but these have never been successful. Islam continues to be controlled by a theocracy that has never been challenged successfully by any break-away reformism.

However, with the growth of secular ideologies after the two World Wars, the Mullah began to loose his predominant position. The challenge of change was most apparent in West Asia where the main responses to the challenge of modernisation can be discerned. Kamal Attaturk's secularism was confined to Turkey, but Nasser' Arabism was intensely ethnic and at one

time seemed destined to unite the Arabs. The stunning defeat of Egypt by Israel in the six day war (1967) saw the decline of Arabism and the rise of two other streams; one secular and leftist, and the other a revived rightist commitment to Islam.

The Islamic path leads Pakistan to look to its Muslim neighbours. However, attempts to forge Islamic solidarity with Iran, Afghanistan, the Gulf and Turkey to the west have been disappointing. To the east, Pakistan avoids looking too closely at Indian Muslims -- it raises dangerous doubts of the need for creating Pakistan.

Moreover, Pakistanis would like to believe that the Muslims of India are oppressed and in search of liberation. Further east lie Bangladesh, Malaysia and Indonesia all with their own brands of nationalism overlaid by their respective cultures which do not suit an orthodox outlook.

ECONOMIC & SOCIAL FACTORS

Pakistan's economic history can be divided into five phases. In the period 1948-58, the economic record was miserable. In the Ayub decade (1958-68) economic management improved and massive restructuring of society carried out. Power was shifted from the hands of civil bureaucrats who had largely migrated from India to hands of middle class landowners and intelligentsia in Punjab and NWFP. The Yahya period (1969-71) was an inter-regnum of no economic consequence. Between 1971 and 1974, Mr Bhutto nationalised all basic industries which led to a flight of business and capital from Pakistan to Africa and West Asia. The country's dependence on foreign aid increased dramatically. President Zia's rule saw sustained economic growth and consolidation. In this, the President was aided by unusually favourable weather and higher remittances from West Asia. Now during Mrs Bhutto's regime a number of new initiatives have been taken to make the country economically better.

THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY

Pakistan, which was established to set up an Islamic State, is finding it difficult to evolve a national ethos and socio-political objective. During the last 43 years, Pakistan has faced two military coups d'etat, two quasi-military coups and five attempted military coups. The military has been deeply involved in Pakistani politics almost since the creation of the state. Even now with the democratic set up the Pakistani army generals play an upper hand to mould any foreign/defence policy.

NATIONALISM VERSUS ISLAM

The Pakistanis, 43, years after Independence, are still debating the basis

and character of their nationhood? Is Pakistan a Muslim Nation or a conglomerate of four nationalisms? Some argue that the concept of a Muslim Nation does not exist anywhere on earth. Islam is a universal faith, and all its main institutions are multinational which cannot be confined within narrow national and geographic limits. Any attempt to do so would be tantamount to undermining the spirit of Islam.

Pointing out the anomalies in describing Pakistan as a Muslim nation, it is argued that if it is a Pakistani nation, then it has its boundaries. But if it is a Muslim nation then it becomes a transcendental one. In other words, Muslims from any corner of the world, be they Afghan, Iranian, Indonesian, Bangladeshi or Arab - can claim equal rights with a Pakistani as part of that Muslim nation. Yet, Pakistan is not even prepared to admit the Bihari Muslims of Bangladesh who claim to be Pakistanis. In fact, the emergence of Bangladesh is a direct consequence of the "Muslim Nation" concept in the garb of which political and economic rights were initially denied to the people of East Pakistan and attempts were made to destroy their historical identity.

THE AFGHANISTAN FACTOR

With the withdrawal of the Russian troops from Afghanistan, the importance of Pakistan being a front line state has reduced to an extent that the US administration is slowly changing its stance from that of pumping arms to peaceful negotiations. However, Pakistan is keen on keeping the situation alive so as to maintain the flow of arms from US which actually are being used against India and by the infiltrators sent to India by them.

THE BALUCHISTAN FACTOR

It would be myopic to ignore the fallout of the Afghanistan problem on Baluchi nationalisms. Even in 1975, Mr Bhutto, as Prime Minister, had charged the Soviet Union and Iraq with fomenting Baluchi separatism. Mr Bhutto denounced the Baluchi nationalists as feudalists expropriated landowners and spread the administration into the interior. Yet, the problem remains. There is a pro-Moscow group among the Baluchi nationalists and a section of the Baluchi leadership had reacted favourably to Soviet action in Afghanistan.

THE SIND FACTOR

The developments in Sind also throw an ominous shadow over Indo-Pak relations possibly for two reasons. Firstly, because of the fear that India will stoke the fires already burning in Sind and manoeuvre a second East Pakistan type situation resulting in the loss of Sind and possibly the NWFP

and secondly, to divert the Pakistani people's attention from the critical internal situation by constantly bringing up the bogey of an "imminent attack" by India on Pakistan to dismember the country once more.

THE CHINESE FACTOR

Though Pakistan has no legitimate border with China, the occupied territory of Gilgit provides an entry into Sinkiang via the Mintaka and Kunjerab Passes. The roads, which have been built over these passes are not commercial but serve a military purpose. These indirectly help Pakistan to defend the occupied North-Western territories of J&K against an Indian threat.

MILITARY ROLE IN WEST ASIA

Since Iran and Afghanistan crisis, the United States has been trying to shape a US RDF to implement its Gulf strategy and since then Pakistan which has assumed a key position in US global strategy. The induction of arms into a neighbouring state affects India deeply. Also presence of extra-territorial forces affects the regions long term interests.

THE NUCLEAR FACTOR

Till today, there is no credible peaceful explanation that fits Pakistan's various nuclear programmes as there is in the case of India. However, from various foreign news reports that appear time and again, it is amply clear that both Pakistan and India are capable of making nuclear bombs and that they are likely to have it in the basement is no surprise. The pressure for Pakistan to match India's peaceful nuclear capabilities is very compelling. This factor acts as a deterrent for any one country starting a war which may turn into a nuclear one.

REGIONAL COOPERATION

This cooperation fostered to some extent by SAARC, which though excludes bilateral and contentious issues, gives an opportunity to the two leaders to meet and discuss informally any such issues. Also, talks at various levels, whenever there has been an increase in tension between the two countries, has helped in initiating a dialogue.

FEAR OF INDIAN HEGEMONY

It is evident that the enormous difference in size and power between India and other constituents of South Asia arouses misgivings amongst its neighbours. Pakistan finds it difficult to reconcile itself to India's pre-emi-

nence in South Asia. Its policy makers emphasise that Pakistan can never accept such a situation.

THE KASHMIR PROBLEM

Lastly, the question of Kashmir. There is no need to argue the validity of Kashmir's accession to India. Whether legally, morally or as a matter of present international reality, India's case is irrefutable and non-negotiable. The only Issue that may be addressed is Pakistan's continued illegal occupation of a portion of that state. Pakistan's present strategy of extensive support to the terrorists without as yet getting directly involved, is a low cost, low risk military operation with most of the fighting being entrusted to the local terrorists whom it trains and infiltrates into India. It will of course, attempt to remotely fine tune the operations and it has much experience of this from Afghanistan. The intensity of terrorism will be allowed to wax and wane depending on the prevailing situation and the political impact desired. It appears that the Pakistani leadership has at last taken heed of Zhou en Lai's advice before the 1965 operation Gibraltar when he had strongly advised against this adventure and emphasized that to achieve success a political base should first be prepared in Kashmir before infiltrating the guerrillas.

THE SIACHIN ISSUE

The root cause of the problem is the non-demarcation of the line of control (LC). After the Karachi Agreement in 1949 the Cease fire Line was demarcated only upto a map point NJ 9842. Again in the 1972 Simla Agreement the LC was demarcated upto, the same NJ-9842. The Indian understanding of the LC is based on terrain configuration, which runs along the Saltoro Ridge line upto Sia Kangri. Pakistan claims that LC to be in a direct straight line joining NJ - 9842 to Karakoram Pass North of the Indian Daulat Beg Oldi Outpost. The Karakoram Pass is however accepted by Pakistan to be part of India. The Pak claim is illegal and illogical as it does not relate to the naturally accepted principles of demarcation of frontiers. This cuts across the river valleys of Nubra and Shyok of Indian Ladakh claiming 10,000 Sq Km of Indian territory.

AN ASSESSMENT

The fair and free general elections in Pakistan in Nov 1988 followed by the appointment of Ms Benazir Bhutto as the Prime Minister by virtue of the majority of her party, the PPP, commanded in the National Assembly, heralded a democratic setup. It was expected to begin a new era in Indo-Pakistan relations. Benazir was regarded by many well wishers as Pakistan's last hope. These expectations were strengthened by the Rajiv Gandhi-Benazir Bhutto summit talks in Islamabad on Dec 31, 1988.

However, there were several doubting and knowledgeable critics, who cautioned against excessive optimism in the light of past experience. Their view point was prompted by the many imponderables, the unresolved disputes between the two neighbours. No less important were the strong domestic pressure especially those exercised by the defence forces. The past sequence of events in Pak has confirmed the fears of the cynics. It is becoming clear that Benazir's initial heart warming pronouncements denouncing Gen Zia's policies and her professed intentions to bring about a radical transformation in the scenario in the subcontinent have lost their shine.

THE HARSH REALITIES BEING:

- (a) Pakistan has not abandoned its militarist approach even after Mrs Benazir took over the reins;
- (b) The army Generals still have the final voice in all vital matters, especially purchase of military equipment and also on foreign policy issues;
- (c) Ms Benazir has little choice on important questions and is bound to keep herself on the right side of her country's defence forces.
- (d) Ms Benazir's compulsive actions, whether taken under pressure or with her tacit consent, are likely to make an adverse impact on India-Pakistan relations.

PART III: PAKISTAN'S STRATEGIC COMPULSIONS

Pakistan has created its strategic policy on the following four pillars:-

- (a) Endeavour to challenge India.
- (b) Pursue a strategy of nuclear Ambivalence.
- (c) Support separatist movements in India.
- (d) Foster Islamisation

CHALLENGE INDIA

US policy is to go on supplying sophisticated weapons to Pakistan thereby consolidating the US-Pakistan military relationship and yet improve relations with India. To achieve this objective, the Americans use the traditional carrot-and-stick tactics. The carrot is the offer of hi-tech, including military technology to India. The stick is very lethal, and includes not only the transfer of conventional weapons to Pakistan but the rattling of the Pakistani Nuclear Bomb. The Americans say that Indo-Pak confrontation can be

dispelled by a comprehensive treaty between India and Pakistan which would take care not only of US arms supplies to Pakistan but also of mutual nuclear concerns.

STRATEGY OF NUCLEAR AMBIVALENCE

Given Pakistan's security threats, possession of nuclear weapons for deterrence is a very attractive proposition for it. The Pakistan Government is following a three-fold strategy. First, it will keep denying that it is planning to acquire a nuclear weapon capability. At the same time it will plead for cooperation from India to stop the arms race. Lastly, it will permit reliable sources make "indiscreet" disclosures that Pakistan has a nuclear capability. The aim is to adopt a posture of ambiguity by creating a strong impression of Pakistan's capability through vehement denials of it. Pakistan will not explode a nuclear device for the present; it will however, build up a nuclear arsenal and is capable of stockpiling about 1000 operational A-bombs by the end of the nineties.

SUPPORT SEPARATIST MOVEMENTS IN INDIA

Where Pakistan is unable to balance her strength against India it will lose no opportunity to support separatist movements in India and bring in external powers in one way or the other in the hope that this will offset the natural advantage that India's size, resources, and potential give it.

At the same time, Mrs Bhutto has never given up her country's right to add fuel to the fire in the Punjab, interfere in Kashmir, and to meddle in Indian affairs by claiming to be "protector of the Indian Muslims."

FOSTER ISLAMISATION

The Government endeavours to subdue internal upheavals sponsored by militant leftist and rightist Muslim groups by mixture of suppression and cosmetic Islamisation.

The Islamic bomb and its tilt towards West Asia are pointers in this direction.

PART IV: PAKISTANI PERCEPTION ABOUT CHANGES IN EAST EUROPE

Many influential Pakistanis appear to derive satisfaction from the wave of democratic reforms sweeping over Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union and the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. They argue that this was a defeat for atheistic communism and the Soviet withdrawal a victory for the

orthodox Mujahideen. Some leaders go as far as to see an analogy between the Eastern Europe situation and Kashmir. Once again one sees apathetic self delusion based on total misreading of the historic realities just as happened in 1947 (when they dreamt of Balkanising India by asserting the right of Princely states to stay out of both dominions) or in 1965 (when Field Marshal Ayub Khan and Mr Bhutto envisaged a victory). What is happening in Eastern Europe is the triumph of pluralism over rigid, stifling ideological orthodoxy. When that wave spreads, rigid religious orthodoxy will be swept away and replaced by pluralism and secularism. In Europe, nationalism has triumphed over ideological universal dogma. Similarly, elsewhere in the world similar universalist dogmas, both ideological and religious are bound to be overwhelmed. More the essence of the spirit of Islam is neglected and rigid, orthodox dogmatism is emphasised, it is bound to result in a backlash effect and fragmentation of orthodox and dogmatic clergy dominated Islamic states into components asserting their sectarian, nationalist and linguistic identities. This is the lesson of Eastern Europe which sections of Pakistani elite overlook.

India can deal with the Kashmir problem in its internal dimensions as it dealt with similar problem in Tamil Nadu, Nagaland, Mizoram and earlier in Kashmir. As demonstrated in Punjab, the externally supported terrorist campaign cannot overthrow the Indian state. Nowhere in the world a campaign of terrorism has succeeded in overthrowing the state. The problem facing the Indian security planners is not Kashmiri secession. The Pakistani military and sections of political leadership are taking Pakistan towards the edge of precipice with their Afghan policy, the Kashmir policy, permissiveness in regard to drugs, their religious orthodoxy leading to sectarian tensions and their politics resulting in subnationalist tensions among Mujahirs, Pathans and Sindhis.

Pakistanis are puzzled and angry at Yasser Arafat not supporting them. But they do not seem to have grasped the basic fact that the Palestinian cause was about different communities living amicably in a secular state. The two nation theory was espoused by the Zionists and the Pakistanis were only putting forth a thesis, with much less justification, analogous to that which led to the foundation of Israel. The Jews were separate People tracing their origin over several millennia. Jews rarely proselytise. According to the Pakistani two nation theory which advocates, a person by changing religion, acquires a new national identity. In that sense the Pakistani two nation theory position is more extremist than the Zionist one. Most of Islamic states have vulnerabilities in regard to assertion of separate identities of their minorities. Lebanon is witnessing a sectarian civil war. Iraq has its Kurds problem and Shia-Sunni issue. The Alawites in Syria, though in power are in a minority

and a few years ago the sectarian problem led to massive use of force against certain areas. Saudi Arabia has on one side Wahabi-Shia division and on the other, a significant Yemeni minority population. Iran has Azeris, Tajiks, Baluchis, Arabs and Kurds as minorities. The Gulf emirates have all Shia-sunni divisions. Afghanistan has Dari population Pushtuns and Tajiks. None of these states can encourage a minority secessionism without its recoiling on themselves. The Soviet Union and China have Muslim minority regions. They cannot afford to support any separatism based on religious ground.

Within the subcontinent Sri Lanka and Bangladesh have Eelam and Chakma problems arising out of minorities professing different religions. Nepal has its Terai population as a minority. The Pakistani ruling elite does not appear to understand the basic realities of the modern day international system. In the present international system application of self-determination is limited to colonial territories and to areas forcibly occupied such as Western Sahara. The case of Baltic States are marginal cases since they had a brief independent existence between the two world wars. Kashmir has not been a sovereign state for last several centuries. its accession to India was on the basis of principles laid down by Mr Jinnah and the British. While the cold war rivalry lasted, the US need for bases in Pakistan and the then British establishment's objective to Balkanise India helped Pakistan in pursuing its untenable case in the UN in the forties and fifties. Today the situation has completely changed. No major power of the world is interested in the Kashmir issue. The cold war is over. The new generation British politicians and bureaucracy have no interest in Balkanising India.

The international system does not easily permit secession and break up of nations. Biafra could not break away from Nigeria, nor Azerbaijan from Iran, nor Katanga from Zaire, nor Timor from Indonesia, nor Eritria from Ethiopia. The Turkish Cypriot separatism is not internationally recognised, nor Tibetan aspiration for sovereignty is strongly supported though there is a lot of sympathy for the Tibetans. Of all nations of the world the most fragile one is Pakistan itself. The Pakistan elite is playing with fire as they did in 1971, this time with far greater risks to themselves.

PART V -- MEASURES/ALTERNATIVES TO RESOLVE INDO-PAK TENSIONS

GENERAL

In the context of the Indian subcontinent, a historical example of how nations divided on religious grounds (the emergence of India and Pakistan as two nations amounted to a tacit admission of such a reality) can coexist peacefully, is the case of Holland and Belgium. The latter, pre-dominantly

Catholic Christian, won its freedom in 1830 from the former with a concentration of Protestant adherents.

What are the implications for Indian policy? It would be necessary, I believe, to follow a two-track policy. On the one hand, various measures are feasible to minimise the actual level of tension prevailing at any time. A certain amount of compromise is always possible, as when India agreed in 1965 to transfer territory to Pakistan following international arbitration. Bilateral agreements such as those arrived at on the occasion of the 1988-89 SAARC summit, and multilateral arrangements through SAARC summit can have some positive effect. Better communications coupled with measures to prevent the escalation of tensions would help; for example, agreements not to conduct simultaneous military exercises near the border: perhaps even the creation of a demilitarised zone along the border.

It is not as if the state of relationship must always follow a downward spiral and periodically result in conflagration. There are many ways that this slide can be arrested and relations between the nations improved. There are certain pre-conditions for that. First, a resolution of the Kashmir question based on the spirit of the 1972 Shimla Agreement and without greatly altering the existing status-quo. Second, serious efforts at removing mutual misperceptions through extensive people to people contacts. Third, addressing questions of economic cooperation and removing other minor irritants that exist. Fourth, introducing confidence building measures simultaneous with other activities in matching pace with them. Lastly, address reduction of military forces and evolve strategies for mutual security. While some measures for reducing military tensions can be discussed earlier, substantive progress in this area will have to await development on other issues.

RESOLVING KASHMIR PROBLEM

The present Kashmir problem is not and should not be an issue between India and Pakistan. Unfortunately given the unstable nature of Pakistani polity the politicians of various hues and the military in Pakistan are attempting to fish in the troubled waters of Kashmir, after having significantly contributed to making it so, in their internal struggle for power. It is to be earnestly hoped that they understand the limits of the Pakistani mischief India would tolerate.

It will be seen that it is the line of control of December 17, 1971 which has become sacrosanct. The agreement emphasises that neither side shall seek to alter it irrespective of mutual difference and "legal interpretation."

The stress here is on the face of 'legal interpretation' which includes various interpretations being put up by Pakistan on the two UNCIP resolutions relating to plebiscite. The true meaning of the Shimla Agreement which

is a binding agreement currently in force as accepted by both sides, is that the December 17, 1971 line of control should ultimately become the international border between India and Pakistan subject to such modification which is bilaterally agreed upon under the same agreement. It is very unfortunate that for 18 years neither Pakistan nor India thought it fit or proper to pursue negotiations under the Shimla Agreement towards this effect although it is true that it is because of this agreement that there has been no Indo-Pak war for 18 years.

The question of safeguarding the distinct Identity of Kashmir and Kashmiris is real. It cannot be brushed aside. The Kashmir valley has always had a distinct identity of its own. All through history it has been either a separate state or a separate province of the Maurya, Mughal & Ranjit Singh Empires. It was wrong to keep it linked with Jammu & Ladakh after link of the common Dogra crown was snapped in 1947.

It is never too late to mend Kashmiris distinct identity. It can be safeguarded by separating it from Jammu, Ladakh and the Uri Titwal belt and giving it the status of a full fledged state of the Indian Union with full internal autonomy. It can have equal status but no special status. Article 370 has done no good to Kashmir. It has created a psychological barrier between Kashmir and the rest of India. This barrier must go.

No matter how much we struggle to improve Indo-Pak relations, there is going to be no peace without a solution of the Kashmir problem. It is unfortunate that for 18 years neither Pakistan nor India thought it fit or proper to pursue negotiations under the Shimla Agreement.

SOLUTION FOR SIACHIN IMPASSE

It is clear that there can be no military solution in an all out war, wherein one of the two sides succeeds in capturing the lifeline to Siachin. Such a possibility is far fetched. It is therefore imperative that both nations work towards a political solution for immediate de-escalation. The political pressures prevalent in Pakistan due to humiliation suffered by its Army do not allow its leadership to accept a status quo. The Pak leadership continues to look for a spectacular victory to appease its public. Such a victory, even if it was possible, could only redeem lost prestige without any material gains and at considerable cost. It would therefore, be prudent to accept status quo and demarcate the LOC along the line actually held by troops at present. This has been the normal method of demarcating the LC in Jammu & Kashmir since 1949. There is no reason why the same mode should not be followed in Siachen. There exist an urgent need to mobilize public opinion in both countries to force the leadership to take immediate steps to resolve the issue.

There is no requirement to shed blood over a piece of barren land which has no significance for the security of either country. Good sense rather than provocative slogans is the need of the day.

CLEAR CUT NUCLEAR POLICY

It is pertinent to recall Mr ZA Bhutto's assertion of a 1000 year war to regain the Indian part of Jammu & Kashmir and his further assertion that the people of Pakistan were prepared to eat grass in order to match Indian nuclear weapons capability if required; slogans that have oft been repeated to whip up a war hysteria against India.

Though Pakistan has officially denied the existence of nuclear bombs, even responsible US officials, including the CIA Chief, have testified about Pakistan's nuclear weapons capability.

India has, over the years evolved a strategy of confronting its actual or potential adversaries in terms of conventional warfare. However, it has, as yet, not evolved a viable strategy of neutralizing a nuclear threat. One fears that India's nuclear diplomacy in that field might also end up the way its Indian Ocean Peace Zone diplomacy has. Not only has the maritime threat to Indian security increased over the years but India is also getting increasingly isolated politically when confronted with diplomatic moves like the creation of a nuclear weapons free zone or the balanced force reduction in South Asia. It is time that India evolves either a warfighting doctrine in the context of nuclear weapons or an effective diplomacy tailored to the requirement of nuclear weapons in the immediate neighbourhood, lest India is unilaterally forced to enter into a costly nuclear missile programme.

MISSILE TECHNOLOGY AS AN ALTERNATIVE

Conventional warfare, as we know till recently, is going to lose its "Deterrence" value. That is true not only of the wars fought between the developing countries like Iran and Iraq which reached a military stalemate even after years of fighting but also of wars in which great powers had confronted a determined opponent in the South, as in the Vietnam and the Afghanistan conflicts. However, since deterrence per se would remain a crucial variable in international relations, some alternative to these conventional weapons will be found.

Missile technology is likely to provide such an alternative. The "Agni" launched recently has demonstrated the basic technological capability. To be able to provide the necessary options in future, it is necessary that its development and testing be continued so that a reliable, capable and operational system can be deployed at an early date.

How to bring about in a concrete form a state of co-existence between India and Pakistan? An amicable solution to the territorial dispute with regard to Kashmir, perhaps, by carrying on negotiations to effect some adjustments on the LAC in a mutually advantageous manner and in a spirit of give and take, could be tried. Any attempt on these could, perhaps lead to a mutually recognised international boundary.

However, one limitation in this arrangement could be the absence of a natural and defensive border. This is true also of the rest of the Indo-Pak border, especially in the trouble torn Punjab, where villages and fertile farm lands have been divided under the artificial Radcliffe Award to effect the Partition Plan of British India. In fact the absence of impregnable border land areas between Pakistan and India has contributed in good measure to the free play of the "foreign hand" escalating the terrorist activities in Punjab. The frequent border incidents in Kashmir's western border, resulting in exchange of fire between the paramilitary forces of India and Pakistan in the wake of infiltrations are also due to a porous border. So the search should be for a fresh look at the alignment of the entire Indo-Pak border from the Rann of Kutch to Ladakh in order to hit upon natural frontiers or in cases where this is impractical, at least the anomaly of a village or a cluster of houses being centrally divided should be done away with. No man's land, perhaps deliberately made barren and inhospitable, should be the reference point for a redemarcation of the border.

India and Pakistan can hopefully chart their future course in a mutually advantageous and friendly manner duplicating a US-Canada, A Norway-Sweden, or an Australia-New Zealand type of relationship in this subcontinent.

MILITARY PREPAREDNESS AND DETERRENCE

The recent and current arms acquisitions by Pak must, of course, be seen in the light of the massive build up of the Pakistani military which has taken place since 1972, more so in qualitative terms since the US arms aid started flowing in after 1980. This has provided Pakistan with the confidence to launch its low intensity low-cost proxy war in Kashmir with its distinct possibility of escalation to a regular war. From all account, law and order is being progressively restored in Kashmir and as the fear and threat of the fundamentalist terrorist start receding, the Pakistani leadership is likely to face the serious dilemma : to accept the realities and consequently de-escalate the support to sub-national separatism, or to escalate the confrontation and conflict. Pakistan's domestic political compulsions and deeply cherished visions may push the country towards escalation.

At the first stage, which we may shortly be entering, the irregular conflict would shift from the valley itself towards the periphery with increasing pressures on the line of control. This would also prepare the ground for further escalation because it would be easier to blame India for escalation in the ensuing fog of war. Indian response will need to keep these issues in mind. Our primary strategy should seek war prevention and only when it fails, implement a successful war winning strategy. We must continue to seek diplomatic and political avenues to support the prevention of a full-scale war and the termination of the low-intensity proxy war. However, this in itself may not be adequate. We, therefore, need to ensure adequate military preparedness, especially for essentially a long duration conflict, which may have short periods of intense conflict. Deterrence at all levels is an important ingredient of war prevention. It is also necessary to look for ways and means to control the potential of conflict along the line of actual control in Kashmir. This at the minimum level, requires minimising the potential of infiltration and skirmishes. Besides the curfew, it may be necessary to explore the feasibility of using mines to both, deter as well as minimise infiltration. On the face of it, this may appear to be a drastic step. But as the lesser evil compared to conflict itself, it should be seen as a useful firebreak in the potential escalatory process which Pakistan, based on its massive military build up, may be tempted to follow. Other countries, which have an interest in peace and stability in the region, will need to carefully go over their policies to see that, if anything these enhance stability rather than increase the potential of greater conflict and instability.

PROCESS OF DISARMAMENT AND DEVELOPMENT

That disarmament and development have close linkages need not be laboured now that the world community has already accepted it. Yet it bears re-statement of the mutual relationship. The relationship between the two derives in part from the fact that both compete for the scarce resources at national as well as international levels. Since the armament syphons away massive resources, the pursuit of development plans to the optimum levels suffers.

It follows that reduction or slow growth in military spending of armament will release resources and ease the present resource constraint both in the developed and the developing world. But the development cannot wait for the release of resources.

Disarmament can promote development by positively affecting the global economy, creating conditions conducive to promoting economic and technological cooperation and to pursue the objectives of a new international economic order.

To infer from this that disarmament will yield quick result and trans-

form the human psyche will be equally wrong. The process of change from the present heights of arms amassing to disarmament is bound to be slow and time-consuming. But it is imperative if humanity is to be saved from the holocaust of yet another war. Now the question will not be, as in the past wars, as to who triumphs but who survives. As already stated, the big powers have recognised this stern reality but the hurdles in their way are many and arduous. The first step, has already been taken but much more remains to be done in this long journey.

The pace can certainly be accelerated if peace-loving nations join their hands together and bring pressure to bear on the super powers to continue the pursuit of disarmament already initiated by them. India has already given the lead in the matter and hopefully will continue to enlist more and more cooperation of other countries till the goal is achieved.

The aims of our government have already been stated by President R Venkataraman that "On our part every step that is taken by Pakistan we are ready to match with two in the interest of reducing tensions and promoting our relations on the principle of non-interference in each other's affairs".

SAARC : MAKING IT MORE MEANINGFUL

During visit to Maldives the then Prime Minister, Mr VP Singh gave special emphasis to the development of SAARC as a "peace community". he suggested, "The SAARC nations cannot afford the luxury of feeding old antagonisms and letting them become roadblocks in the evolution of the region into a community of prosperous nations at peace with themselves and with the world".

Conceptual and empirical evidence suggests that there is a common social morality in South Asia which can help in containing instability and conflict if ideological and political impediments are removed and there is a freer flow of ideas and information across the subcontinent. The SAARC Parliament can help bring into prominence regional problems and also give voice to different interests who feel stifled in the existing circumstances of centralised political control. A regional legislature has greater freedom to work for reconciliation and peaceful settlement of social and ethnic conflicts since it can take advantage of a larger vision that encompasses the entire region and does not have to cater to chauvinism, which can devalue objective criteria when explosive national impulses are evoked on the floor of a national legislature.

A modus vivendi on an issue like Kashmir is certainly possible between India and Pakistan, but it is rendered more difficult in the absence of a regional legislature. Whether it is the military bureaucratic politics in Pakistan or it is the different cognitive influences on Indian and Pakistani military

and non-military engagement, their national legislatures cannot act as catalysts for peaceful change on heavily polarised issues. With the acute conflict for power between Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif it is hardly possible to take steps which are needed to move matters in the direction in Kashmir as envisaged under the Shimla process. Similarly although the Indian Parliament is an effective channel for political pluralism yet no Government in India can extend the concept of democratisation to result in the secession of Kashmir.

SAARC SPONSORED MILITARY FORCE

The question of a SAARC-sponsored military force to respond to calls for military peace keeping roles from member states, as in the case of the IPKF in Sri Lanka and the token Indian paratroops force in the Maldives need careful evaluation. It should not be India's or for that matter Pakistan's prerogative to veto such an idea or concept. It certainly has its merit and could well be the harbinger of a joint military command that could 'police' the Indian ocean and safeguard the maritime and regional interest of member states. This step would, to a considerable extent, dispel mutual suspicion between traditional belligerents such as India and Pakistan and also set the minds of smaller nation states such as Sri Lanka and Maldives at rest.

PART VI: AN UTOPIAN SOLUTION

Politically, today, we may be two different people, but culturally we are one. In language and literature, in music and mythology, in food and dress habits, even in our superstitions and in the secret love and affection we bear for each other, our common historical past - all these and more make us a single people. When a Pakistani talks of his past, rooted in Mohanjodaro, the Buddhist relics, Guru Nanak, Waris Shah and Baba Farid how can he forget that it is also the common heritage of India and Pakistan. Urdu is as much theirs as ours. So are the monuments of Shah Jahan and Akbar. But we refuse to trade, even talk to, or visit each other. We could visit any country in the world but India and Pakistan. Indian films are smuggled surreptitiously into Pakistan and we in India go crazy over the Pakistan ghazal singers.

Can't we forge a confederation, if not, a Federation between the two sister nations to have a common Defence and Foreign affairs, remove all trade and open our borders without a visa to each other. The release of economic resources this way will not only eradicate our proverbial poverty altogether in the shortest possible time but also generate such an emotional and cultural upheaval that the world would see a new civilisation emerging. Let us say no to war and "yes" to peace and togetherness. Otherwise, we will destroy ourselves through mutual slaughter, and doom the future of our children. With the breakup of the Soviet Socialist bloc and the cold war between

the super-powers taking a back-seat, no one will come to our rescue, if we again grapple with each other. Neither America would be interested in Pakistan being its ally in the non-existent cold war, nor the Soviet Union will care to veto us out of our troubles with Pakistan. All the West European powers will be investing in the future stability of the newly emerging democracies in Eastern Europe, not in Asia or Africa. The balancing acts of the non-aligned powers will become irrelevant. The common defence policy would result in massive reduction in armed forces and arsenals as major portion of the both countries armed forces are deployed against each other. This will also bring about tremendous mutual benefits in terms of release of economic resources which may enable us come out of our debt traps. Not only that, but a common combined effort by us (like the European Market) would be a matter of envy for all. Once the Hindu-Muslim differences are patched up the two countries could then move towards a federation.

CONCLUSION

Relations between the two countries since 1971 have not changed in any substantial measure as compared to the earlier periods. Though the Shimla Agreement offered a unique opportunity for the countries to begin afresh, this opportunity was not seized by Pakistan. Like in the earlier period, the division of the country seemed to cast its shadow upon the perception that Pakistani leaders seemed to hold about Indian intentions in any political equation in Pakistan, the anti-India stance has gone down well with the military and the fundamentalist groups who, despite having very little popular support, have organised themselves extremely well to control the political process in the country. Pakistan cannot damage Indian integrity or unity without its splintering into Sind, Punjab Baluchistan, Pakhtunistan and other component parts. This is not because India wants to do it but any encouragement to secessionism will have such a backlash effect on Pakistan. The history of last three wars is before them. India does not want war. India considers a stable, strong, and united Pakistan in its vital national interest as the Indian Foreign Minister proclaimed in his address to the Karachi Institute of International Affairs in 1981 - a sentiment Pakistan is loath to reciprocate. If however Indian integrity is threatened, India will do everything necessary to safeguard it. Let not Pakistan make a fourth disastrous mistake.

The world is in for cataclysmic changes. If we do not march along with the new trends in world's polity, we shall only have to thank ourselves for our mounting miseries and dark and dismal future. The intellectuals on both sides should therefore, speak up, whatever the cost to their reputations. For, to remain silent now will be suicidal. Both East and West Europe have given us a timely warning and a miraculous lead, which we cannot afford to ignore.

Civil-Military Interaction: New Perspectives*

RAJESH RAJORA

INTRODUCTION

The Role of the armed forces, as laid down at the time of independence, is to defend our borders against external aggression and to assist the civil authorities in the maintenance of internal law and order when called upon to do so. When diplomats fail to preserve the peace, the soldiers have to go to war to re-establish peace. And when the civil administration fails to preserve order, the soldier is called upon to restore order. As the nation's final safeguard, the army must not fail in either circumstances.

(a) India today is on the threshold of taking and accepting new international responsibilities in the fastly changing world scenario.

(b) The problems faced in the building of the Indian nation-state are many and complex. Although the country is united by the concept of civilization and culture; religious, regional, linguistic, caste and ethnic differences often become a cause of emotive collective activity guided by political motives; frequently such movements get out of hand.

The above two circumstances have forced us to think of a strong army which requires cooperation of civil administration for its strength. But in our country we have always paid a lip service to cooperation within and between the defence and civil services. In fact this is very important element or fuel for running of the national security structure. We do not have the reputed type of organisational and institutional processes that bring forth co-operation which is actually required either within defence services or between the defence and civil services.

Various reasons for the lack of cooperation and the non co-operation of suitable and appropriate institution/organization for this purpose are:

(a) The ignorance about national security by the bureaucracy and the politicians because of the lack of empirical knowledge about the conduct of war which in fact is an extension of nations foreign policy, in conjunction with a nation's economic capability.

* Reproduced from *The Administrator*, Journal of Lal Bahadur Shastri National Academy of Administration, Mussoorie, Jan-March 1991,

- (b) Total lack of political aim and direction in regard to an integrated long term strategic policy.
- (c) The non-existence of mechanism for coordinating military instruments of national policy with other government agencies, responsible for making and carrying out national security policy.

Over the years, the above factors and some others have helped in developing a distinctive pattern of relationship between the politicians, the bureaucrats and the defence services as far as national security is concerned. The deliberate traditional isolation of the armed forces from the rest of the country—a colonial legacy—has prevented the people from deep involvement in the security affairs of their own country.

The enlarged role of the defence services to certain extent may raise the question of its effect on the traditional concept of civilian control, as the architects of national policy matters will be more dependent on professional military advice than before. And never before has it been so important for civilian leaders to carefully develop goals and process and to make sure that they are clearly understood by the national and military leaders. Civilian control is meaningless and possibly even dangerous without civilian controllers being capable of intelligently interpreting security strategy and competent enough to make wise decisions at the right time, in the proper manner, and with the skill to direct their effective implementation by the armed forces. Civilian and military roles are not only interlinked but are also complementary. The answer lies in finding the best means for coordinating their strength towards a common and dynamic end. This can best be done by effectively balancing restraint and imperatives, pros and cons, civil and military, foreign and domestic and a host of other multifaceted priorities.

CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION IN THE PAST

Civil administration and military forces have worked together in the past. The cooperation which occurred was on almost an adhoc basis relating to crisis management. District administration broke down in many districts because of tense and unmanageable circumstances during 1947-48. Military officers came to the rescue and virtually administered the district. During 1962 Chinese aggression and in 1965 and 1975 Indo-Pakistan wars, the military and the civil authorities coordinated and helped each other. Military is aiding north-eastern states civilian administrators in development works like building roads, bridges etc, and in welfare works like providing medical facilities etc. for last many decades.

The situation has become so out of control in Jammu and Kashmir and Punjab that they are literally ruled by police or para-military or military

forces for last many years. This holds true for most of North-Eastern States too. Communal riots, caste wars, uncontrolled student agitations etc. become unmanageable and soldiers have been called frequently to maintain order. Besides, certain operations, vital for nation's integrity, like Operation Blue-star, require close contact between the two. During natural calamities, military have to be called out for rescue work. The excellent work done by military in Bihar and areas in Terai region, inflicted with earthquake in 1988 cannot be forgotten. Grave flood situations in many parts of the country have called for participation of the armed forces in relief operations time and again.

Innumerable situations had occurred in the past which required close working of civil and military forces. But most of the time it used to be temporary. No inclination has been shown by the policy framers to formulate a better civil military interface system on a long-term basis.

WHY IS THE INTERACTION BECOMING INEVITABLE

Circumstances are compelling the civil and military authorities to work together.

SECESSIONIST MOVEMENTS AND INSURGENCY

In case of insurgency, the insurgents seek and are prepared for a direct military confrontation with the government forces. Post-independence India has seen 3 main trends of insurgent attempts in geographical location, political inspiration and some organisational characteristics, but having common strategies and aims. First was in Kashmir in 1947 and 1965. Second was tribal insurgency in Nagaland, Manipur and Mizoram in 1956 and 1966. Third was Maoist extremist activity started in Naxalbari in West Bengal in 1967. All these insurgencies are still intact. J&K, Andhra Pradesh, Bihar and the North-eastern States are facing secessionist movements in the form of Kashmiri infiltration, Naxalbari movement and tribal insurgency. As violence is a common phenomenon during such activities and civil administration is unable to cope with them, hence civil-military interaction becomes inevitable. In most parts of these states army is keeping constant vigil and coming forward to help civil authorities wherever situation demands which occurs very often.

TERRORISM

Terrorists seek to avoid direct military confrontation. Their strategy is to hit the innocents to create terror. They also believe in violence. The problem of terrorism in Punjab has taken grave dimensions. Foreign based Sikh terrorist organisations are controlling and guiding these activities. Naga,

Mizo, Naxalite, ULFA and Bodo extremism is also spreading like wildfire. The armed forces have always lent helping hand to the civil administration in fighting terrorism.

RIOTING

In recent years, the frequency of rioting has increased tremendously. PUDR reported 55 communal riots between October-November, 1989. With rise of fundamentalism and disrupting social fabric, the incidents are becoming commoner day by day. These communal riots are well planned and involve lots of sophisticated weapons. Newer areas, where these type of riots never occurred, are also facing the problem. In almost every major riot need for army presence has become a must. Delhi (1984), Ahmedabad (1986), Meerut (1987), Bhagalpur (1989), Gonda (1990) riots etc. could come under control only with the active support of the army. Caste wars and violent student agitations need military aid to be controlled. Frequent occurrences of this kind have developed a semi-permanent civil-army interface.

NATURAL CALAMITIES

Floods and Droughts are very common in Eastern and Northern India. Army's help is required by the civilian officers to maintain order. Terai regions which are prone to earthquakes and landslides also need army help off and on. Tornado prone coastal districts also ask for military aid.

DEVELOPMENT WORKS

Army is involved in numerous developmental projects in northeastern states. They have been aiding civil authorities in desert areas of Rajasthan and Leh region of J&K in welfare and development works.

MAINTENANCE OF ESSENTIAL SERVICES

Nation-wide Hartals, Bandhs, strikes are becoming a common feature. In these circumstances, maintenance of essential services become very necessary. Army helps in tiding over such crises.

INFILTRATION IN BORDER ZONES

Constant infiltration from across the national borders is becoming commoner. Terrorists, drugs and arms smugglers, extremists and other anti-national elements pass through the border. This makes the vigil in border districts very important. District civil servants take the help of military officials to deal with such problems. For instance, when military is asked to seal the fence, then close civil-army interaction is required

DRUG TRAFFICKING

Drugs produced in certain parts of Afghanistan especially those that are under direct control of the central authority in Kabul and also in some parts of NWF province of Pakistan began to be routed via India. Drugs bring in illegal money, inflow terrorism and disrupt social amity and order. The dangerous parallel regional and international nexus of drug trafficking not only poses a serious threat to domestic peace, security and stability but also leads to heavy expenditure in peacekeeping and anti-terrorist operations. Civil-military interaction makes the ability to combat this menace more effective.

INCREASING DEFENCE EXPENDITURE

The expenses relating to defence are generally non-plan expenditure, which increasingly cause decrease in the share of development and welfare expenses. This is not healthy for the growth of the country. Civil military interface not only cut expenditure in defence but provide developmental perspective to army officers. Defence production may become effective if bureaucrats, army officials, scientists and managers help each other.

LONG TERM SECURITY PERSPECTIVE

National security planning and perspectives and coordination with internal security, intelligence, planning, commerce, production and technological development is at present fitful and adhoc. Hence long-term security perspective and guidelines are not possible. Civil military interface, in the form of national security committees, would make that possible.

FORMULATION OF FOREIGN POLICIES

The degree and levels of interaction between foreign policy and security has been clearly inadequate. World scenario is changing every minute. One of the tragedies of the Indian system is that foreign policy is made primarily out of political dictates and not strategic compulsions. Military counsel rarely if ever guides our foreign policy. Army officials and civil servants formulating foreign policy, when interact, would result into more crystallized and pragmatic foreign policies.

DEFENCE PRODUCTION

Defence production and defence science too could be more closely integrated with public and private sector industry (other than purely ordinance items) and with the national laboratories, universities and other research centres and agencies. This is important considering technological

complexities, managerial complications and confusion and escalating cost over them. Cooperation of army and civil officials would make the task efficient.

CIVIL MILITARY INTERACTION

There is a broad area of handling of civil military interface in respect of both central and state governments including the work involved in land acquisitions, cantonments, pensions and other ex-servicemen benefits etc.

FINANCIAL MATTERS IN DEFENCE MINISTRY

Impartial professional body consisting of representatives of these services civilian professionals including financial experts who must carefully examine these alternatives and decide upon the best one under the prevailing circumstances. At the moment there is no such institutionalized body. A cadre of trained civil servants, specialising in defence matters has unfortunately not been built up so far. The politicians and the bureaucrats, who have the responsibility of deriving such equation, have proved to be woefully unequal to this task.

Because of all the above reasons and many more, the civil military interaction has become the demand of the time.

PRESENT CIVIL MILITARY INTERACTION

At present, there is no interaction at lower level and defence services and civil services are compartmentalized in such a way that they are considered to be antagonistic to each other. There has been no direct or regular interface of military professionals with the political executive and bureaucrats in policy planning, decision making and overall management of the defence forces.

At the highest level of policy making, three bodies exist - Political, Bureaucratic and Military, in descending order of their importance in hierarchy.

CABINET COMMITTEE ON POLITICAL AFFAIRS

This is the highest policy making and decision making authority on defence matters. It is presided over by Prime Minister. Permanent members of the committee are Defence Minister and Secretaries of the concerned ministries. Chiefs of three services are seldom required to attend the meeting. CCPA can over-rule any bureaucratic or military body's proposals.

COMMITTEE FOR DEFENCE PLANNING

This is an apex body to integrate planning for defence and national development. It acts as a channel between CCPA and COSC. Cabinet Secretary is the chairman of the Committee. Prime Minister's Secretary, Defence Secretary, Foreign Secretary, Finance Secretary, Defence Production Secretary and Secretary of Planning Commission are permanent members of this committee.

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE (COSC)

This is the highest policy making body within the purview of defence forces. The three chiefs of staff are the members and the seniormost service chief is the head of this committee.

Two way communication is usually absent in above three committees. Most of the time they are at logger heads. The bureaucratic body has occupied a place of extraordinary importance. No proposal, whether it is the brainchild of the service chiefs or the Minister can see the light of day unless it is duly processed by the bureaucracy. The speed with which it is processed is also dependent on them, often determined by their own perceptions of its importance and urgency. This has given rise to the expression "bureaucratic control", a situation which the services resent.

Even service headquarters is not a part of Ministry of Defence. In Cabinet Committee meetings at the highest level, the services are represented by the Defence Secretary, an IAS officer. There is no integrated approach between the service headquarters, the bureaucrats of finance and MOD; there is triplication of work. The same subject is first examined by the originating service HQ, then in the MOD and yet again by the financial adviser. So there is red-tapism, the line of accountability gets blurred and in the end the decisions taken often compromise the very objective of the proposal mooted.

Civil servants of Defence or Finance Ministry, bureaucrats all, they naturally lack the military perspective or proper appreciation of martial matters. While they sit in judgement over technical and professional proposals, they bear no responsibility for implementing their uncanny decisions in the field area. Whatever harm accrues out of executing such decisions is the headache of the services for which they could even be blamed.

At the apex is the Defence Secretary to look after the needs of the three services. For this he has to interact with the service chiefs, who though senior to him in appointment, have often to consider his convenience and availability. Then there are two additional secretaries and seven joint secre-

aries. For the air force there is only one joint secretary to process all cases with the government. As against this there are six principal staff officers in the rank of Air Marshal and a number of officers in the rank of Air Vice Marshal whose cases would require examination at Joint Secretary level. Since there are just two officers at Director/Deputy Secretary level to assist the Joint Secretary, with a few Under Secretaries and Desk Officers to assist them, an "overload" condition at MOD and a "queue" situation at Air Headquarters is inevitable. The position of the other two services is somewhat similar.

On the ground of primacy of civil authority over the military, the system has degenerated into a stifling bureaucratic control over the armed forces.

STRUCTURAL CHANGES IN THE SETUP

The prevailing ignorance or limited knowledge about martial matters is hardly surprising, for the points of real-life contacts between the military and the civil population are confined largely to ceremonial occasions. Similarly military officials are thoroughly ignorant about civil matters. Certain structural changes, proposed below, will be able to counter this civil-military alienation.

ON JOB TRAINING

At present no systematic training is being given either to the Defence personnel to appreciate the working of the various agencies of the civil government or to bureaucrats and politicians into the working of the Defence services. Both these bodies need to be educated about each other.

Foundation course for probationers of civil and military services should be jointly held. At the start of the career they would be able to grasp civil and military perspective very well. Subjects related to civil and military should be taught. Director of the course should be a civil servant of the rank of Additional Secretary or a military official of the rank of Lieut. General. Joint and deputy directors should be selected from efficient civil servants and military officials. Case studies and situations of emergencies where civil and military officials have to work in very close supervision, should be exercised at length. Academic inputs in the form of modules regarding important issues in civil and military matters should be imparted by experts in those fields. Objectives of the training to the foundation course should be common. Emphasis should be on development of officer-like qualities like discipline, courage, cooperation etc.

After the foundation course, probationers should interact in friendly atmosphere. Conferences related to matters of civil and military services

should be organised with their participation. Village visit, trekking, mini-expeditions etc. should be conducted commonly.

Field training of civil servants should include 3 months attachment in Army, Navy and Airforce headquarters. Border postings should be a part of the input. Field training of military officials, should be conducted in the district. One and half month with D.M. (for administration), one month with S.S.P. (for law and order) and two weeks at foreign Ministry headquarters should be earmarked as a part of their field training.

IN SERVICE DEPUTATION

As far as the Defence services are concerned, there is some theoretical training in various courses of instruction. At various stages of their service, officers of the rank of Major onwards should be deputed to serve with various ministries, institutions and agencies on the civil side. Ministries of Home, Transport, Civil aviation, External affairs, finance, shipping, petroleum, industrial development etc. would be very beneficial. On the other hand, civil servant within 7 years of joining their service should be attached to a military organisation and should be given a brief training at National Defence College, New Delhi or Defence Services Staff College.

SEMINARS AND CONFERENCES

Regular organisation of seminars, conferences etc should be considered. Topics which are relevant to both services should be included.

JOINT TRAINING MODULES

Special courses of a week or a fortnight duration should be organised. Simulation exercises involving real life situations of interaction should be taught. Latest developments in civil-military interface and cooperation should form part of the module. Increments in their pays should be linked with their participation in such modules.

MID CAREER SHIFT

All the military officials like to continue upto the normal retirement age of 58. On the other hand, the military has to maintain a young profile and the ages of retirement are related to the rank achieved. It is possible to meet these two contradictory requirements only by lateral movement from the armed forces to civil services. Technical hands in military can be employed in equivalent trades of engineering, communication, medical services, transport and so on. Officers can be transferred to general administration in accordance with their training and experience.

UPSC should conduct an examination for military officials who are inclined to shift to civil services. They should be given 6-9 months of training and should be allotted "Defence Cadre". All the difficult administrative assignments, like in J&K, Punjab, NE states, border districts or troubled districts, can be given to them. They can be appointed at different posts in Defence ministry. Similarly IAS officers can be shifted to Military services through a proper examination, if they intend to do so.

POST-RETIREMENT REHABILITATION

In 1984, the government announced that it was considering automatic placement of ex-servicemen in civil careers till they reach the age of 58 and appointed a Secretaries Committee to examine the matter. Post retirement rehabilitation continues to be a major pre-occupation and produces behavioural patterns. It is possible to minimize both flattery and feudal behaviour by giving stability of career. Competent ex-servicemen should be taken into civil services and should be given assignments which the government thinks suitable for them.

LIAISON OFFICER

Defence and civil headquarters should be very near to each other. Military liaison officers in relevant civil headquarters and vice versa should be created. It would smoothen the functioning.

CHANGES IN MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

There is no reason for the MOD to setup sections duplicating various segments of Army, Navy and Air Headquarters and analyzing proposals all over again. Service HQ should be constituted as departments of the government and delegated power to take final decisions on departmental matters within the financial allocations already made in the budget.

Cadre officials, deputy secretary upwards who would serve in the MOD for the rest of their careers should be made to acquire expertise through training and experience. Civil servants role in the MOD to be made participatory with the uniformed specialist. They would be associated with formulation of proposals at all stages and not confine themselves merely to their scrutiny. Their role would undergo a major change in the ministry with responsibility for financial management and coordination with other ministries.

FORMATION OF NISC

A National Internal Security Committee should be constituted as a body to provide advice to highest decision and policy making authorities like

CCPA/NSC on internal security matters. Home Minister should be the Chairman of the NISC. Home State Minister, Home Secretary, Director of Intelligence Bureau, Military representatives, representative of para-military forces, representatives of IPS and DG-PPs should be permanent members. Members from other central ministries and state governments should be called when need arises.

REVIVAL OF DMC (DEFENCE MINISTERS COMMITTEE)

This would play a coordinating role. Defence minister to become the Chairman. Defence Secretary, three service chiefs and financial adviser (defence) to be permanent member of the committee. Staff of the Committee should be from military wing of the Cabinet Secretariat.

REORGANISATION OF CCPA (CABINET COMMITTEE ON PARLIAMENTARY AFFAIRS)

Inputs from Planning Commission and various intelligence agencies should be included. The Chiefs of Staff should be invited to attend meetings related to defence matters. It should be provided with adequate staff from military wing of Cabinet Secretariat.

FORMATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL (NSC)

A coherent long term national policy based on national design and consistency of purpose so that each successive government operates with a shared decision making process in the light of complexities of a changing global scenario all geared to protect our national interests. It should be composed of various military/civil officials, besides specialists/experts and academicians co-opted from time to time. It would have number of committees like Action and study, Review and Verification groups, Coordinating boards, etc. Various intelligence agencies and research institutes inputs should be provided. It should only act as an advisory body. Prime Minister should be the Chairman. Ministers and Secretaries of Home, Defence, Foreign, Finance Ministries, three Chiefs of Staff and Chairman of Joint intelligence Committee should be permanent members.

NATIONAL COMMISSION

A national commission may be appointed with statutory provision that its recommendations will be implemented. It should suggest changes to bring about civil military interaction.

IMPACT OF ABOVE PROVISIONS

India has the 3rd largest army and 4th largest airforce in the world. Its

Navy though considered smaller, is the strongest in the region. Thus India is emerging as regional superpower. Since independence armed forces have grown tremendously and have been progressively modernized. Situations demand civil military cooperative interaction. Above structural changes would have direct impact on morale, organisational efficiency and operational effectiveness. The structural reforms are by no means comprehensive nor can they be implemented in a short period. What is required is that the government should pay urgent attention to these problems.

IMPACT ON STYLE OF FUNCTIONING OF ARMY

An atmosphere of servility and sycophancy prevails in our society. The military is better suited to meet this menace which dampens initiative, makes a mockery of loyalty and stifles leadership. The 'Army style' of functioning emphasises accessibility, free discussion at the planning stage, initiative, fairness and loyalty—qualities that run counter to sycophancy. Such style of functioning is also meant to encourage the development of leadership qualities. This style of functioning would definitely affect civil services in a positive way.

DEVELOPMENT OF OFFICER-LIKE QUALITIES

Qualities of initiative, cooperation, courage, discipline, diligence and professional competence are inculcated in army officials. Civil servants would be able to adopt these qualities.

BETTER CRISIS MANAGEMENT

At the times of crisis, the cooperation and understanding between army and civil officials would prove handy. Normally, lots of confusion with complexities arise between military and civil administration. Smooth functioning, would make it organisationally efficient and operationally effective.

LONG TERM SECURITY PERSPECTIVE

A major flaw at the national security level is the manner in which our defence policy is evolved. Long term realistic planning for defence (10-15 years) is required. It needs its own institutional infrastructure at the highest level with all the information inputs. Above structural measures would help us evolving a long term security policy.

BETTER DEFENCE MANAGEMENT

Cooperation like inputs for problem identification, evaluations of options available, selection of best course, command and control and commu-

nication (execution/implementation and finally the review process). Thus Defence management would become better.

BETTER UNDERSTANDING IN CIVILIANS ABOUT MILITARY

Though military is always at the back of mind of the civilians when they think of national security, yet civilians have no exposure to army and army officials. Hence they have developed unjustified stereotypes about them. With contact of civilians with army officials, things would change. They would also have more participation in making opinion on defence matters of the country.

REMOVAL OF STAGNATION IN ARMY

The military has to maintain a young profile of the officers. On the other hand rank achieved decides the retirement age. These contradictory statements could be met with above structural changes. Besides civil services would get services of competent experienced and disciplined officers.

INTERNAL SECURITY PERSPECTIVE

With information and infrastructure of civil administration and operational expertise of military, better management of matters relating to internal security is possible. All the threats to national integration can be thwarted.

Various negative impacts are also possible. These measures may promote civil control over the military and if result in deterioration of the quality of the officer corps, then the very steps become counterproductive. Alternatively, there is a possible danger that a demotivated, disgruntled and unprofessional officer corps becomes the nursery for political activities.

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No Medals for Moral Courage

BRIG N B GRANT AVSM, (RETD)

War is basically the domain of danger, exertion and suffering. To weather these untarnished, courage is the prime and time honoured requisite for a warrior-leader. Indeed, courage is the most admired of human virtues in all societies and in all walks of life -- to be a man, is to be courageous. Courage is no less in the higher than in the lower levels of command, but the greater the responsibility and higher the rank, the emphasis shifts from physical to moral courage -- a much rarer quality, rare, but essential to higher leadership.

Moral courage implies -- quiet resolution, the hardihood to take risks, the will to take full responsibility for decisions, the readiness to share its rewards with subordinates, and equal readiness to take the blame when things go adversely, and the nerve to survive storms and disappointments and to face towards each new day with the score sheet wiped clean, neither dwelling on one's success nor excepting discouragement from one's failure. Although the above appears as if it were a paraphrase of the 30th sloka of Chapter III of the Gita, actually, it is a quote from Gen Marshal's (of the US Army) text on 'The Officer as a Leader'.

Our three wars with Pakistan, Op Blue Star in Punjab and Op Pawan in Sri Lanka, one with China, have amply demonstrated the superb physical courage of the Indian officer, specially at the junior and middle level -- there has never been any doubt on this score. The moral courage side contiguous to higher leadership, has not however been demonstrated to the same extent, at least visibly. In this respect perhaps, a clearer definition of the Indian army officer's credo would be more meaningful. This credo as inscribed at the Indian Military Academy's (IMA) Chetwood Hall reads as under --

"The safety, honour and welfare of your country comes first, always and every time;
The honour, welfare and comfort of the men you command come next;
Your own ease comfort and safety come last, always and every time."

The main ingredient of the above credo is 'Courage' and 'Self Sacrifice'. However, what Lord Chetwood had in mind when he wrote those lines, was not just the physical aspect of safety, ease and comfort as is normally expected of the junior and middle level officer in the combat zone, but more so to its moral significance in the decision making zone, whereby higher level

leadership places the larger aspect of the safety and honour of the country, before its own mental ease and career interest. Whereas, the former, that is physical courage, is easy to see, and the officer concerned is rewarded with a medal or an award, in the case of the latter, namely, moral courage, where the officer at times has to sacrifice not only his command but his entire career, seldom comes to public notice, and is never awarded a medal. I think Chetwood was also referring to the kind of training to be imparted at the IMA, wherein leadership would not be allowed to reach a mental and moral state, whereby the officer will not be willing to stick his neck out to safeguard cherished principles and values, in the interests of the country's safety, and the army's honour.

Perhaps the moral courage interpretation of Chetwood's inscription could be better understood, if I can illustrate this with two examples from his own country, UK. During the initial stage of World War II, a controversy was raging in Britain regarding the French defensive tactics of the Maginot Line, and the part the British Expeditionary force should play in it. The controversy reached breaking point between the then CIGS, Gen Ironside, and the then Secretary of State for Defence, Mr Hore-Belisha. Gen Ironside made up his mind to bring the matter to a head by having it out with his political boss. He approached him with the following words: "Mr Belisha, you must have realised that this controversy between us is harming the nation and the war effort, and in the interest of the country one of us must go. However, I am also of the firm opinion that, again in the best interest of the country and the war effort, my views on this issue are the correct ones and must be accepted." History says, that, Gen Ironside stayed, and Mr Belisha was forced to resign. A rare display of moral courage on the part of CIGS to stand up to the Secretary of State for Defence his political superior.

Another instance which comes to my mind is the controversy and bitterness which prevailed during the last stages of the German Blitzkrieg on France, when Mr Churchill was of the view that, Britain must send its air force to France to stop the German onslaught. Air Marshal Dowding, the then AOC-in-C, Fighter Command, was however of the opinion that, whereas the battle of France was a forgone conclusion, the battle of Britain was about to begin, and as such, all its air force should be concentrated within the home country. He expressed his views to the Air Secretary, who told him that he would not be able to do anything in the matter, but that if he felt so strongly about it, he would have to speak to Churchill himself. When the case went up to the Prime Minister, the latter told Dowding, that he had committed himself to the French Government, and as such the RAF would have to go to their assistance. The Air Marshal thereupon told Churchill in the now famous words: "Mr Prime Minister, either the RAF stays at home, or I go home".

The RAF did stay at home, and under the leadership of Dowding, won the Battle of Britain. These are only two instances, where these officers had the moral courage to sacrifice their career, profession and personal interest, for the security and honour of the nation.

Whereas it is not difficult to narrate such examples from British, American or European wars, on which so much has been written and critically analysed, unfortunately with us, due to our obsession with a false sense of security, and more so due to our sycophant culture of adulation of personalities, very little literature exists or allowed to be recorded. Even official reports have not been allowed to be published, even though half a century has passed since the event, and when almost all the actors in the drama have ceased to exist. However, if examples of moral courage, or the lack of it, have to be analysed and useful lessons drawn from them, then we must do so without regard to the reputation of the government in power or personalities involved. From what little information is available, let us examine a few cases in respect of our army since Independence.

The 1961-62 conflict with China was perhaps the most demoralising era for the Indian Army. The fact that we suffered a military defeat was only one part of this sorry episode. The more important aspect was its exposure of the moral tone of higher leadership. A commission of enquiry under Maj Gen Henderson-Brooks was set up by the Government to enquire into the 'China Affair'. Although 40 years have since passed, the report has not still been made public. History shows however that, the 1962 debacle was the direct result of the failure of our foreign policy, but for which Krishna Menon, the then Defence Minister, paid the political price. It will be recalled that, Lt Gen Biji Kaul tried to vindicate himself through his book "The Untold Story" followed by Brig John Dalvi's factual account in his "Himalayan Blunder". No matter what the Henderson-Brooks report reveals or conceals, there is now no doubt that, it was a political fiasco of the worst order; the military debacle only lay in its acceptance of that fiasco, and in its lack of moral character to oppose it. Military honour dictated that, rather than jeopardise the safety of his troops and the prestige of his country, the then COAS, Gen Thapar, should have at that time threatened to resign. To my mind, him not having done so, was the real Himalayan Blunder, and why he did not do so, is the only Untold Story.

On the other hand, let's take Gen Thimayya's initial resignation as an example of moral courage. In my opinion however, he took the correct action to resign, but unfortunately for the wrong reason. Instead of resigning on the grounds that his political boss Krishna Menon, was interfering with his purely administrative duties, if Thimayya would have put in his papers on

the ground that, the security of the country was threatened by the DM's interference, the nation would have seen to it that, Krishna Menon left at that period of time, and possibly the 62 incident could have been avoided.

Coming to recent history of the last 10 years, a lot of criticism has appeared in the press and questions asked in the Lok Sabha, regarding the military fiasco and high rate of casualties which took place in Op Blue Star in the Punjab and Op Pawan in Sri Lanka. Speaking at a recent function organised by the Unity International Foundation, Field Marshal Sam Manekshaw, while releasing a book 'IPKF in Sri Lanka' by Lt Gen Depinder Singh, former IPKF Chief, has solely blamed the government for launching a military operation on that Island in a hurry, without a clear mandate, adequate intelligence or necessary resources, which concluded in a military fiasco with heavy casualties.

What the Field Marshal has said may be cent per cent correct, however, no General can vindicate his loss in battle claiming that, he was compelled to do so against his better judgement. If he has to execute a lawful (but stupid) order that leads to defeat and endangers his command, then the only course open to him is that of resignation or even disobedience, but for which he must be prepared to pay the price with his head. It reminds me of the British Admiral Fisher, while reporting on Admiral Jellicoe's failure to destroy the German fleet at the battle of Jutland, saying that, "he has all the qualities of Nelson, save one; he does not know when to disobey". I guess an analysis of Op Blue Star would also fall in very much the same category.

On the other hand, like the ultimatum sent by F M Montgomery to Churchill on the timing of the Alamein offensive Op Lightfoot, stating that, "if the operation was launched on 22 Oct, he would personally guarantee success, but if pressurised to do so earlier, he could not do so", Field Marshal Manekshaw did exactly the same, by giving an ultimatum to Mrs Indira Gandhi, by insisting on the postponement of the Bangla Desh Operation by one month. Both examples of moral courage at its best.

So far, we have been discussing moral courage confined to war and battle situations. Lot of articles on motivation have analysed the reasons which induces a soldier to make the supreme sacrifice in battle. However, the fact remains that, no war (in India atleast) has so far lasted more than 20 days, but the period of peace in between wars, has been as much as 20 years. In the heat of battle, when the nation is in danger, or a cause is at stake, when bands are playing and flags flying, and when the soldier is made much of, one can always muster physical and moral courage for a short period of time. However, to maintain the same type of moral courage for 20 years or

more in peace, when life is routine and the soldier is just a normal citizen, is a very different matter, and more difficult. Difficult because, unlike in war, in peace decisions cannot be excused under the guise of uncertainties, fog of war and non-availability of time. In peace, although such decisions are not based on matter of life and death, nevertheless, they pertain to the prestige, morale and the honour of the army, and the sustained confidence of the troops on the moral courage of higher leadership -- factors which ultimately manifest themselves in war. A few examples will illustrate this better.

On gaining our independence, the question arose as to who should be appointed the Commander-in-Chief of the Indian armed forces after the British hand over command. The obvious choice was General (now Field Marshal) CM Cariappa who was then the seniormost Indian officer in the army. However, politically, Gen Rajinder Singhjee, the second most senior officer was more acceptable to the then government, and an offer was made to him to assume command. Gen Rajinder Singhjee refused the offer, and told the government that this would be incorrect and would set a bad precedence specially so coming immediately after independence. A rare example of moral courage, wherein the man placed the prestige and dignity of the military system over his personal career and self interest.

To conclude, although implicit obedience of orders is the very crux of military discipline, for a military commander the dilemma to obey an order against his better discretion and if insisted upon to resign, is very great, and calls for the highest form of moral courage. Either course may be hazardous to his reputation, and even life. It is possible that, the compliance of an order may lead to a disaster without the commander paying the penalty for it, while on the other hand, the commander may have to pay the extreme price for its disobedience, in accordance with military discipline.

It is not for one moment being suggested that, our Generals should oppose every action if their views differ from those of their political bosses, or to tender their resignations at the drop of a hat. Far from it. However, to date, we have had no one who has refused to obey an order, or has resigned, wherein the security of the nation, or the lives and morale of the troops, or the honour of the Army was at stake. Any resignations that have taken place so far, have all been on administrative or personal grounds, mainly supersession.

While physical courage can be developed through sports, adventure training, battle inoculation and such other means, moral courage, I guess, is a reflection of the national character, the home environment, and the value systems of the officers family, his school and the society in which he grows

up. It is difficult to inculcate this at the latter part of an officers career, and specially so today, when the officer joins the army solely for career reasons, unlike his predecessors of the pre-Independence era, to whom military service was a calling -- a mission. In any case it is mainly at the top that moral courage has played or failed to play such a dominant role on the course of a war, as physical courage has had its effect on the outcome of a battle.

At the top echelons of command, the bait of a second career after retirement, is, I believe today to be a major factor which ensures that the officer always keeps on the right side of the political authority, even at the expense of his moral conscience. What is then the answer? Perhaps if we can have a rule, mandatory or traditional, to the effect that, an officer above a certain level, would not be eligible for any government or semi-government job after retirement (including an embassy or a governorship), possibly he would be able to stand up to external political or even military pressures, enabling him to act within the bounds of his military conscience, and display the kind of moral courage expected of higher leadership, by always placing the security and interest of the country, before his own career interest. He finds it difficult to do so, because in this game there are no medals for display of moral courage, and specially so in peace time, where the officer spends more than 90% of his career life. He thus serves the country in the best way to further his own career.

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The Hazards of Early Parachuting in India 1941-43

COLONEL F G NEILD L/RAMC (RETD)

(ONE-TIME RMO 153 GURKHA PARACHUTE BATTALION)

Parachuting in India started from scratch in the cold weather of 1941, was largely self-taught, there being no specialist point of reference such as RAE, Farnborough, and was supported by very thin medical cover. For instance, after my first night in the BMH Delhi, 30 November, I was informed that their assessment of risks in parachuting was to order two coffins for the mortuary. Calling later on the DMS in India's office, I was told that nothing was known about the medical aspects of parachuting and it was up to us to find out. I was then a lieutenant with nine months' service.¹

The Air Landing School (ALS) on the Wellingdon aerodrome consisted of a flight of three Vickers Valentias - troop carrying planes built in 1923, twin engined with a top speed of some 90 mph, whose pilot and observer sat in an open cockpit. The chief landing instructor RAF and a number of Army jumping instructors had come from Ringway, each fortunately bringing a statichute, as on arrival they were the only ones in India. Most statichutes were used twice a day, this without any proper hanging facilities for maintenance.

The jumping course of 30 lasted three weeks and five jumps were needed to qualify for wings. The first week entirely of PT took place in the 50 Indian Parachute Brigade cantonment and the last fortnight at the ALS. Near the latter were two sheds, one for the packing and maintenance of parachutes and the second for the experimental packing for dropping small arms and equipment in containers. Packing was an art in itself, as the static line had, when the jumper had fallen 40 feet, first to pull at the rigging lines and then the canopy. This was the critical moment - if the panels were sticky or if the rigging lines became twisted by a faulty exit, that terrible accident - the Roman Candle - might occur when the canopy flutters uselessly over the jumper's head.

The ALS course began with air experience - simple flights in an aircraft. At that time, many Indian troops had never been in an aircraft nor had some even seen one flying. Communications, too, were not easy as most Indian troops knew no English and the jumpmasters no Urdu. Then came aircraft drill. This consisted of emplaning, working on swings to achieve

correct landing positions going both forwards and backwards, and exit drill. For this the fuselages with a four foot clearance from exit to the ground were mainly used. This was not very satisfactory and even dangerous. Due to the short drop, when jumping a quick stick, one's main pre-occupation was not to jump on the man below, nor to be jumped on by the man behind. This was unfortunate, as it had been found in England that rupture of muscles caused by sudden extension of the head on leaving the aeroplane, and injuries to ankles and knees, were of frequent occurrence so that special instruction in the exercise and development of the appropriate muscles and in the correct methods of landing and falling were necessary.²

Jumping was done, in sticks of ten sitting on the floor of the aircraft with the static lines attached to strong points on either side of the central hole, onto the dropping zone at Palam, part of the sunbaked scrub-covered Indian plain. There was an instructor with Tannoy for controlling the landings but with no direct communication with the aircraft other than a Verey light. He was accompanied by a medical officer and nursing orderly with ambulance. An additional hazard was to jump with an arms container, released halfway through the stick, so that the possibilities of injury were endless. On looking back, when one considers what modern operational apparatus is necessary, one is surprised not that there were accidents but that there were not many more. However, paratroop trainees invariably made little fuss over the injuries and this did not assist in the detection or diagnosis of latent spinal injury.³

Parachute training with limited facilities progressed slowly. But in September 1942, three quick deaths brought it to a halt. Meanwhile, the ALS, now renamed 3 PTS, moved north to RAF Chaklala, near Rawalpindi, to be followed by 50 Brigade to Campbellpore sixty miles further on. Aircraft still consisted of a flight of Valentias to which had been added a flight of Hudsons and a squadron of Wellingtons.

This was again an unhappy time for jumping. It had been stopped in Delhi because of fatalities and had only just been restarted. But fatalities now succeeded one another regularly, nor did it seem to make any difference what type of aircraft was used. At first it was said that the jumper must have made a bad exit and so twisted his rigging lines, but when experienced jumpers fell to their deaths, this explanation wore a little thin.

In February 1943, India Command, because the incidence of fatalities in recent weeks had reached one in every four or five hundred jumps and, in the course of fifteen thousand descents, seventeen men had been killed,

requested the Commander of the PTS at Ringway to flyout to advise. He had to fly 13,000 miles via West Africa and the Middle East to arrive and find Chaklala in the depths of despondency. He stayed three months, reorganised the preliminary training, lengthened the time of the course, increased the qualifying jumps from five to seven, improved the parachute servicing facilities and ensured much closer liaison between the RAF instructors and their Indian Army pupils.⁴

From that time the incidence of fatalities and general accident rate rapidly dropped. Figures from 3 PTS⁵ over the period January 1944 to June 1945, then considered low, were :

Table 1 - Consolidated Accident Statistics

<i>Total No. pupils</i>	<i>Total No descents</i>	<i>Deaths</i>	<i>Death rate</i>	<i>No of injuries</i>	<i>Inj rate</i>	<i>Injuries incapaci- tating for 7+ days</i>
11,898	66,408	12	1: 5534 (0.018% (descents)	178	1:373 (1/26% descents)	113

Table II Comparative Accident Rate - Ground Training and Jumping

<i>Total No accidents</i>	<i>No of ground accidents</i>	<i>Percentage</i>	<i>No of jumping accidents</i>	<i>Percentage</i>
178	55	30.9	123	69.1

Table III - Analysis of More Common Injuries - Long Incapacity

<i>No of pupils</i>	<i>Total No accidents</i>	<i>Lower limb injuries</i>	<i>Upper limb injuries</i>	<i>Vertebral injuries</i>	<i>Concussion</i>
11,898	178	60	8	20	2

Unfortunately, there are no comparable figures for the early days of parachuting (November 1941-February 1943) other than the death rate. This

was 17 deaths after 15,000 descents, equivalent to a rate of 1:882 (0.113% descents) compared to the later figure of 1:5534 (0.918% descents), a sixfold improvement. Perhaps by extrapolation of this last figure, it is possible to obtain earlier figures for the general accident rate.

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UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION OF INDIA

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The Fall of the Last Emperor*

LT GENERAL M L THAPAN PVSM (RETD)

This book examines the causes of Iran's 1978-79 revolution. The Pahlavi state, under Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, was believed to be strong enough to withstand all attempts at subversion, from both external and internal agencies. Not only was this view held by the lay outside world; it was endorsed by a CIA Report in August 1978 that "Iran is not in a revolutionary or even a pre-revolutionary situation." In the September of that year, the US Defense Intelligence Agency projected its belief that the Shah "would remain actively in power for at least another decade."

What was it then that brought about the sudden collapse of the authority of the Shah? Throughout his reign, he faced three centres of opposition: the ulema (scholars learned in Islamic Sciences), guerrilla organisations and political parties and members of the intelligentsia. He greatly underestimated their challenges to him and the autocratic nature of his rule blinded him to realities. Mehran Kamrava traces the fall of the Shah with meticulous detail, examining all the factors which contributed to his downfall.

He begins by examining differing theories as to the causes of revolution. After a learned discourse on the views propounded by social scientists and other distinguished scholars he concludes that a successful revolution requires the development of necessary set of political and social conditions. Politically, the powers and authority of the ruling elite must be weakened significantly by internal or international developments. Socially, society must be receptive to revolutionary changes. This implies that opposition groups must have the means to establish contact with the popular masses - in Iran this was done through the ulema, the Islamic religion being a great binding force - and that there must exist general dissatisfaction with existing living conditions. The author gives us an interesting insight into the working of the Imperial Iranian Government. The State had three principal foundations. At the apex was the Shah himself, the fountainhead of power, on whom all other institutions were dependent. The second centre of power was the administrative network; comprising the cabinet, the Rastakhiz Resurgence party, (the country's sole legal party), the Majlis (a bicameral Parliament comprising of a lower house (Majlis) and an Upper House, the Senate (Sena); and the bureaucracy. The armed forces and the infamous SAVAK (the State Intelligence and Security Organisation), constituted the third pillar of the State.

* *Revolution in Iran - The Roots of Turmoil* by Mehran Kamrava (Routledge, 11 New Fetter Lane, London EC4P 4EE, 1990) £30.00 p.174.

The personal character of the Shah and his attitude towards political power typified that of an absolute monarch. Though shrewd, intelligent and a hard worker, because he had ascended to the throne at a comparatively young age (22), he remained distrustful of older and more experienced politicians, and felt that they intimidated him. The Shah personally made all ministerial, military and ambassadorial appointments; none of the appointees were consulted or informed prior to their selection. All military commanders were answerable directly only to him. The postings of officers above the rank of Second Lieutenant required his personal authorisation. Promotion to higher ranks were made in an arbitrary manner; at the Shah's whim, any officer could be demoted as rapidly as he was promoted. No military plane could land or take off from an airport without the Shah's express permission; no deviation was permitted once an itinerary had been approved. Overall military strategy was devised solely by him. The effect of this was to stultify all initiative and this, combined with the special privileges and favours which military officers received, resulted in the armed forces becoming soft and ineffective. All this, notwithstanding the acquisition of military hardware, of great sophistication and modernity.

In parenthesis, I recall a high ranking Iranian officer addressing the United Service Institution in the late fifties; standing to attention and bowing every time there was a reference to this Imperial Majesty, in the text of his talk.

In what was basically a monarchy, the cabinet had no power to make policy decisions. The functions of ministers were mainly administrative, routine and ceremonial. In creating the Rastakhiz, the Shah was motivated by the belief that by dissolving the only two legal parties, he would, through eliminating opposition, solicit the aid of all capable political personalities to engender a national civic spirit. This was not to be. Members of Rastakhiz were soon identified with the Establishment, the people regarded its formation as undisguised regimentation, and an attempt to mould their minds into political mobilisation. The aim of the Pahlavi dynasty - Shah Mohammed Reza and his father Reza Khan before him - was to modernise Iran, to build an industrial infra-structure, and to transfer educational, administrative, judicial and health systems from the control of the Ulema to secular states. For this, an extensive bureaucratic network was set up. The ruler placed great reliance on this apparatus, in preference to the military, so as to counter the image of a despot. Mehran Kamrava observes with perspicacity that "Corruption is a characteristic that is common to most modernizing bureaucracies", and this is exactly what happened to the Iranian model. The bureaucracy was thoroughly discredited.

Another factor which led to the weakening of the Shah's position was the change in the attitude of the United States. Till 1953, when Prime

Minister Mossadiq was overthrown in a coup engineered by the CIA, Iran was the playground of Britain and the Soviet Union. After Mossadiq's departure, Iran became heavily dependent on the United States. Its strategic location made it a valuable asset in the cold war against the Soviet Union. In consequence it received generous financial, military and technical assistance from the United States, culminating in the Nixon-Kissinger Doctrine when such support was almost *carte blanche*. However, with the election of President Jimmy Carter in 1976, US policy underwent a sea-change, in that "support for our more authoritarian allies was to be combined with the effective promotion of human rights within their countries." This compelled the Shah to institute reforms within his administration, but since these were largely cosmetic, they made no significant impact on the structural inadequacies of the system.

Anti-Government demonstrations were held in as many as thirty urban centres, including the town of Tehran, Tabriz and Qom in 1978. The one at Qom was of particular significance, as it brought into prominence, Ayatollah Khomeini. In the early seventies, this religious leader had outlined his grand theory of an Islamic system of government, to replace the monarchy, which he termed as 'blasphemous'. His system would be headed by a 'Khalif' (one learned in the religious sciences) where the community would be governed by Islamic judicial and financial laws, where "governance is only that of God. The 'Khalif' or 'faqir' would lead the Islamic community until the return of Imam Mahdi. He would not only be an administrator, but also a legislator, a judge and an army commander." This astonishing pronouncement serves to explain the Ayatollah's megalomania, the goal that he had set for himself, and perhaps his issue of the death sentence to Salman Rushdie, after the fall of the Shah. Oddly enough, the monarch dismissed Khomeini as 'a frail and crazy old man,' and only when all had been lost, did he realise that it was the ulema who were the main centre of opposition, and that it was Islam and not communism, as propounded by the guerrilla fighters and the intelligentsia, that the Govt had to contend with.

This is a work of great scholarship and painstaking research. It deals with a fascinating subject; that of revolt in society and the part that religion and dogma play in fanning the fires of revolution. It should also serve as a warning to administrators elsewhere, not to be complacent about their security in office. Sycophancy leads to detachment from reality, and retribution is inevitable. Monarchies alone are not intrinsically unstable, other forms of government too, are toppled when the rulers lose touch with the people over whose destinies they preside. The replacement of the Shah's dictatorship by that of Khomeini, is commented on by Mehran Kamrava sagely, in these words: "Political actors make little difference, what constitutes a political system is its institutions".

Story of an Aviator General*

AIR MARSHAL HK OBERAI PVSM, AVSM, VM (RETD)

General Carl A Spaatz is regarded by many, as the most outstanding American airman of World War II. He earned his Wings in 1915 and saw some action in World War I, where, he was credited with two kills. In the next decade, he became one of the leading pursuit experts of USA Air Corps. In 1929, he assumed command of a Bombardment Group and strategic exploitation of the bomber, now became his speciality.

After the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour on 7 Dec 41, General Spaatz took over the Combat Command of USAAF which immediately converted into VIII Air Force and redeployed in England with the principal task of strategic bombing. In Jan 43, General Spaatz was moved to the Mediterranean as Eisenhower's air adviser and commanded the North-west African Air Force which had a predominantly tactical role. In Dec 43, he returned to England and headed the newly formed US Strategic Air Forces. After the fall of Germany, he was moved to the Far East and headed the US Army Strategic Air Forces, whose task included the dropping of atomic weapons over Japan.

He was the Commanding General of USAAF with effect from Feb 46 and in Oct 47, was appointed the first Chief of Staff of the newly formed USAF. General Spaatz retired on 30 Jun 48.

Despite this awesome background, the author has done well in describing General Spaatz's personality in a well balanced manner. It may surprise quite a few, that notwithstanding the worldwide acclaim he received, General Spaatz would have found it difficult to stand the test of modern approaches to leadership. He was taciturn and his performance during training and in various courses was no more than mediocre. His style of leadership, bordered the laissez-faire, but his strength lay in unimpeachable integrity and a quiet but deep belief in his mission and principles. He had the capability for self appraisal and was not prone to promise, more than he could deliver. Coupled with this, the situation as it existed during the war, made him the leader, he undoubtedly was.

As a strategist, he has been credited with an unerring sense of judgement. His selection and maintenance of oil installations as the prime target

* *Master of Air Power: General Carl A. Spaatz* by David R. Mets (Novato Presidio Press, 1988)
\$22.50

for gaining air superiority vis-a-vis the rail network for disruption of supplies, though debatable at that time, was later concluded to be the more appropriate option. He had an open mind and was capable of taking new decisions. He accepted new tactics for exploiting strategic forces and introduced new procedures for the conduct of joint operations.

The author is being unnecessarily protective of General Spaatz in so far as his views on area bombing (cities in Germany) or the dropping of nuclear devices over Japan are concerned. At the time, these were unequivocally accepted as legitimate targets/weapons by the General and his Command. The burden of consequences of such an acceptance, must rest with the entire chain of command, including General Spaatz.

General Spaatz was an active and early supporter for an independent Air Force in USA. With the advent of the bomber, he held the view that a strategic element had become available, which, when deployed against the vital sinews of the enemy could destroy his hostile will and ultimately bring him to defeat. It is obvious from the events as they unfolded during the War, that such a belief was only partially true. Air campaign alone could not have won the war. It had to go hand in hand, with a land campaign.

Young students of military aviation will benefit from this book. It is a fitting tribute to an unassuming man, who rose to become the high priest of American air power and whose service life forms an integral part of USAF history.

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Mineral Resources and US Security*

COL R RAMA RAO, AVSM (RETD)

In his Foreword to this useful book Vice Admiral J.A. Baldwin, President, National Defence University (USA) points out that "Ensuring adequate supplies of strategic materials has long been a national concern" (in USA). United States Congress had taken note of the problem as far back as 1880. In 1939, USA had established a critical materials stockpile, which shows the wisdom and foresight of national planners. However, Kessel, in his admirable review of Key mineral resources of countries rich in such resources, points out that there is no need for USA to be frightened that it may, at some time, be unable to obtain, in sufficient quantities, some of the critical materials needed for defence purposes or for maintaining its industrial growth.

A country may be dependent on one or more countries for its imports of some materials, but dependency is not vulnerability. Exporters may be equally dependent on exporting their mineral resources as importers may be, to buy them. Further, from the importers' point of view, there may be alternative sources for obtaining the item(s) or substitutes may be available.

USA is considered to be "heavily dependent on imports of key minerals used in the production of strategic items, avionics, ships and tanks, artillery and space vehicles".(p.3)

During the period 1900-1929, USA produced almost ninety percent of all the minerals it needed, for its industry. The position changed significantly since 1939 because of USA's rapid expansion of its production base, as it was the main supplier of weapons, equipment and industrial products to its Allies during the Second World War.

USA is well endowed with mineral and other natural resources. It has adequate reserves, which can be exploited economically in all but 12 out of 71 minerals which are in demand world wide. Of the twelve, in respect of three, namely chromium, cobalt and manganese, it has resources exploiting which may be uneconomical at today's prices, but could be produced at higher costs, should the need arise. USA produces and processes more than ninety metals and non-metals. Much of the production consists of twenty (20) high value minerals which account for 90% (ninety percent) of the total value of its minerals production. This makes excellent business sense.

* *Strategic Minerals : US Alternatives* by Kenneth A. Kessel (Washington DC: National University Press, 1990) pp. 293, Price \$12.50.

Even so, USA for strategic reasons wants to have the option of importing some key minerals. In 1973, the National Minerals Commission in its Report to the President and Congress had said:- "...the interest of national security will be served by maintaining access to a reasonable number of diverse suppliers for as many minerals as possible."

This undoubtedly is a cautious, perhaps over cautious approach since the USA is well endowed with natural resources. Yet the nation can ill afford to be short of critical materials in an emergency. An official of USA, who seeks to be anonymous (see p. 2.1.) had noted - "If the whole continent of Africa (US imports many critical materials from Southern Africa) from Libya in the North to Cape Town in the South sank beneath the waves, life would go on here just the same".

US planners have identified the platinum group of metals, and alusite asbestos, especially spinning grade chrysotile asbestos, columbium, antimony and bauxite which are available in only a few countries, particularly South Africa and Russia and the new Republics into which the Soviet Union has been split up. There are other critical materials too, such as platinum, cobalt, manganese and chromium which are found in only a few countries. However, while some are vital, many can be replaced by substitutes. Further by recycling wastes, a good portion of materials in short supply can be recovered although the process could be tedious and expensive. Above all, powder metallurgy techniques can reduce the consumption of critical materials and also enable the use of more easily available metals in place of those in short supply.

Indian readers of the book could well ask "What lessons have all these for us in India?" The most obvious ones are, first, what are the materials, metals, alloys and non-metals that India needs to ensure national self reliance for defence production and industrial development? Second, among these, what can we readily produce in the quantities we need today and are likely to need tomorrow. Third, what alternatives can we devise for substituting in place of these that are not easy to come by, or are very expensive. Fourth, what are the materials with which India is well endowed for example, manganese, and which can be produced in larger quantities than at present, provided better prices can be secured.

Hopefully, our Scientific and Industrial Research Organisations will be providing the needed guidance to our national, including defence, industry.

China in the Year 2000 AD*

MAJ GEN D BANERJEE

One of the most intriguing issues in international relations today is the direction that China will take by the year 2000 AD. Will it maintain the momentum of its economic progress that began in 1978 with the introduction of the Four Modernisation programme? Will it then be a more benign China? Will this have a more positive impact on the world? These questions have been addressed in numerous seminars and articles around the world and also in the Book "China's Global Presence - Economics, Politics and Security" by the scholars of the American Enterprise Institute. A set of eight articles by the Institute's scholars were presented at two seminars held in March 1987 at Singapore and Seoul, which discuss such diverse questions as political, economic, industrial and security issues concerning China in the year 2000 AD. In addition to the articles, comments and discussions after each session are included. The objective of the Book is quite clear. It is to put across the conservative US view of China to the scholars of two like minded institutes. Thus biases show all too clearly and contrary views are not to be expected.

The Book was published in 1988 and it is already dated. This is the pitfall of all futurologies, but in this case it is also a consequence of rigid thinking based on preconceived ideas and inflexible mind sets. It is surprising that a year and a half after the emergence of Gorbachov, the experts were unwilling to concede the possibilities of his 'New Thinking' and the dramatic changes that this would introduce in international relations. The contradictions that had arisen in China's modernisation and which would result in the explosion at the Tiananmen Square in mid 1989, also receive little attention. Having said this, one has to accept the many other positive contribution that this book makes.

Daniel Lampton identifies a few of the problems of political liberalization in China and quite correctly links it with the contradictions in economic reform. The student demonstrations of Jan 1987 (that was to be the precursor of the 'Pro-democracy' movement of June 1989), and the consequent dismissal of Hu Yaobang are noted as a key challenge to the system. Albert Kiedel analyses the prospects of China's economy in the year 2000 AD, and concludes that it will exceed the planned target of a four fold increase from 1978 by the year 2000 AD. He predicts that there will actually be a five fold

*"China's Global Presence :- Economics, Politics and Security, Ed. by Daniel M Lampton & Catherine H Keyser, Washington DC, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1988 p.237.

increase. In spite of the hiccup caused by the events at Tiananmen and the resultant curbs introduced to contain the earlier over-heating of the economy, his analysis may well be more correct, notwithstanding present pessimisms. What this would mean to the world and in particular to China's neighbours merit closer attention.

Two articles on China's Electronic and Aircraft and Airline Industries present somewhat of a more pessimistic picture of its performance and potential in these areas. The chapter on US - China trade towards the year 2000 AD underestimates China's potential and dynamism. In 1986 China had a favourable balance of trade with the USA of US \$ 2.134 billion. Barely five years later it is likely to be around \$ 12 billion. This will have serious implications on Sino - US relations notwithstanding President Bush's recent decision to continue the 'most favoured nation' status to China.

The more important chapters are the last two, which discuss the impact of China's Modernisation and their implications on the Big Powers and Southeast Asia respectively. The first article concentrates mainly on China's nuclear capability and strategy. It highlights once again how the West considers the acquisition and development of a nuclear weapon capability by a 'friendly' power as acceptable. Therefore the modernisation of this capability by China, as long as the weapons remain directed towards the Soviet Union, is not a cause for concern. The question is what is US policy in the present radically altered international environment? More than a nudge is required now to move China on the path of nuclear disarmament. The second article approaches the question of the implications for East and Southeast Asian security from the perspective that a strategic consensus existed between the USA and China. This had surely changed by 1986 and is in any case quite different today. China's approach is much more balanced and independent now and it is unlikely to consider US military presence in the region as necessarily stabilising. There is bound to be a certain uneasiness in Southeast Asia, less Singapore, in regard to China's growing capabilities in spite of the substantial improvement of China's relations with the region.

Where is China heading by the year 2000 AD? Two issues will largely determine this. One is the nature of the new set of leaders that will surely emerge soon after the passing away of Deng and his compatriots and lead the country to the end of this millennium and the manner that this transition takes place. What will be their orientation, attitudes and biases? Will they be able to introduce the necessary changes while maintaining internal stability? The other issue is how the contradictions of a slowly developing market economy will be resolved without political pluralism. There is not much reason to doubt the accretion to China's political, economic and military strengths by the year 2000 AD. The question is how will these newly acquired capabilities be directed.

Book Reviews

Waging War : A Philosophic Introduction. By Ian Clark *Oxford, Oxford University, 1988, p. 154, £ 17.50 ISBN 0-19-827325-8.*

By the time one finishes reading this book one tends to question its theme. Should it not be: "Can wars be fought philosophically?" For, can there be a set of paradigms (or, practical body of guidelines) based on ethics, morality, right and wrong, for a war? Intellectually yes; perhaps, philosophically also yes but it is far dissociated from the actualities of war. If the aim of all wars - both of the older states and the present day nations - were to win and 'enhance their status among other nations; as is being contended in the book, then everything conceivable would have been done by the belligerents to win. That would naturally include Kautilya's strategy of success sam (conciliation) dam (reward) dand (punishment) bhed (dissension); Niccollo Machiavelli's statecraft; and the Clausewitzian principles of war.

— Brig C. B. Khanduri

Arms Control, Disarmament and International Security, 1987 : Annual Bibliography Edited by Richard Dean Burns, *Regina Books, Claremont, 1988, Pages 184, Price \$ 26.95. ISBN 0-941690-28-8*

This initial volume for 1987, is a precursor of annual bibliographies to be sponsored by Centre for the Study of Armament and Disarmament, California State University, Los Angeles and the Arms Control Association of the USA.

An extremely well brought out and printed reference book which would be useful to researchers in disarmament, Nuclear, CBW, SDI and other weapons systems. It is heartening to see that several Indian writers have been referenced.

— Maj Gen Pratap Narain

Handbook of War Studies. Edited By Manus I. Midlarsky. *Boston, Unwin Hyman, 1989, p. 372, £ 35.00 ISBN 0-04-497055-2.*

This book consists of several studies on theories of international conflicts by various eminent writers and experts. A book, as the contents itself would convince the reader is the result of the research and detailed analysis the authors have painstakingly put together on empirically based theories of wars.

The chapters vary from structure based theories, minimally dyadic theories to state central theories of war. The studies are also concerned with the impact of structure on the system and relate its influence on wars. The theories on the periodicity or the cyclic theories of global wars will be of interest even to a lay reader.

This book should be of great value to research scholars and serious students of theory of wars.

The book illustrates that there are many possible ways to study the conduct of war based on scientific evidence and reliable data. Though the scope of the study here is global, it may well point to a certain "cyclic" phenomenon in our wars with Pakistan.

— Maj Gen Afsir Karim AVSM (Retd)

New Weapon Technologies and the ABM Treaty By Herbert Lin. *Virginia, Pergamon - Brassey's. 1988, p. 95, £ 10.50 ISBN 0-08-035964-7.*

The fate of nations and civilization has often been determined by a differential in the technology of warfare. The twentieth century witnessed major innovations in technology and thus the rise of nuclear weapon as symbol of power. The possession of these weapons by the Americans to deter Soviet attack in the wake of cold war, also resulted in many Arms Control Agreements, of which the ABM Treaty of 1972, represented the offensive domination in the US-Soviet strategic relationship.

Hubert Lin, in this book, not only traces the political aspects of the ABM treaty, but focusses on the technologies, both emerging technologies including ASAT's (anti-satellite), ATBM's (anti tactical ballistic missiles) and laser beams. He further discusses the possible changes to the treaty regime that would reaffirm the original purpose of the treaty and thus gives various solutions.

He concludes his book, by saying that, in order to preserve the treaty, political will of the nations play a very important role and the absence of this will erode the treaty.

After reading this book, one can say that, in the technical sense, it is a very useful tool for a thorough knowledge of ABM Treaty.

— Ms G. Sathyawati JNU

Rising from the Ashes, "Development Strategies in Times of Disaster" By Mary B. Anderson & Peter J. Woodrow. *Boulder Westview. (Paris, UNESCO), 1989, p. 338, French Francs 170 ISBN 0-8133-7828-1*

Despite man's advances in science/technology, we still are at mercy of natural calamities or worse, those man-made ones. Disasters strike at a very short notice, therefore there is little time to prepare for them. Often lack of foresight and preventive measures aimed at minimizing damage to life and property, plays havoc with the local infrastructure.

The authors have developed analytical framework aimed primarily at long term development in times of disaster, thus the main theme of the first part of the book is not short term measures that require attention, but taking into account the long-term development strategy despite the disaster, with the implementation of such measures, the affected area should stand on its own feet sooner than one usually expects. The second part of the book supports this argument by showing the various case studies done in places devastated by both natural and man-made disasters.

The most important factor is not getting to disaster area and distribute supplies, but the various components in the complex web of development, Non-Governmental Organizations, the government concerned and the people affected are to work and extend full cooperation and faith to each other. This is repeatedly expressed in this book and without them, none of the relief programmes discussed in this book would have succeeded.

— Shahram Sepahi JNU

Sea-Power in Global Politics, 1494-1993. By George Modelski, William R. Thompson, Washington, University of Washington, 1988, p. 380, \$ 35.00 ISBN 0-295-96502-9.

Sea Power in Global Politics 1494-1993 treats its subject from a different perspective which unmistakably bears the professional stamp of its two authors. Only the well honed combined skills of a political scientist and a political analyst could present such a complex mathematical model with such clarity. The book uses a theory of long cycles of world leadership in which every single preeminent world power has also been seen to have been preeminent sea power. This is due to the sea being a higher order medium for achieving global reach. The authors lay down the ground rules and explore the limitations that can be used in quantifying the essential features of sea power and long cycles in developing the thrust of sea power in global politics from a scientific perspective.

The authors assertion that innovation is an important causal factor for change gives me the liberty to innovate well known Cromwellian adage which could be applicable in the event of failure of deterrence or at the non-deterrence level of regional powers, today as in the past.

"Trust in long cycles but keep your naval powder dry".

A book well suited to the libraries of the institutions dealing with politics and international and foreign affairs and of higher military learning as providing yet another window to let the light through.

— Commodore RP Bhalla (Retd)

The Nuclear Debate : Issues and Politics. Edited by Phil Williams, London, Routledge, 1984, p. 81, £ 4.95 ISBN (Chatham House Special Paper) 0-7102-0313-6.

The Chatham House Special Paper prepared under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs first published in 1984, consists of four chapters written by Phil Williams, Lawrence Freedman, Christopher Coker and Gina Cowen - all having undoubted credentials and repute in the realm of research in international relations. The paper prepared in the background of the collapse of the Intermediate Range Nuclear Force disarmament talks in Geneva in November 1983, tries to bring out the issues related to it which loomed large over the then East - West relations and the political environment in Europe, particularly in most sensitive countries such as Britain and Germany. The impact of peace movements in Britain and Europe for nuclear disarmament, has also been analysed.

Although the paper may no longer be considered topical in late 1991, it nevertheless presents an insight on the issues and political forces which impinged on the stances adopted by USA and USSR, NATO and Warsaw Pact alliances in 1983-84 with one super power working for a new nuclear balance and the other striving for maintaining the existing nuclear symmetry. Despite the stupendous changes in erstwhile USSR in 1991, initially withdrawal of its nuclear forces within its European borders and unilateral disarmament measures announced by Presidents Bush and Gorbachev, subsequent dismemberment of USSR and transformation of a part into a loose Commonwealth of Independent States and later uncertainty and controversy over command and control of its nuclear forces, the Chatham House Paper may not be deemed to have lost its relevance. The paper helps us to understand the impetus behind the vertical proliferation by major nuclear powers, particularly of USA and its inclination to freeze the nuclear asymmetry in its favour today faced with uncertainties in strategic decision making in the successor states to the USSR with their weakend command and control structure.

— Gautam Sen IDAS

Security with Nuclear weapons? Different Perceptives on National Security.
Edited by Regina Cowen Karp, *Oxford, Oxford University, 1991, p. 396 ISBN 0-19-827839 X*

The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) in their latest publication of 1991 have examined different political perceptions of having nuclear weapons within and between three groups of states namely nuclear, non-nuclear and threshold states.

The book has covered the evolution of nuclear weapons and their role in national security planning as also relevance of maintaining nuclear capability in the contemporary world. An analysis has also been made in the book of options available in achieving national security through nuclear deterrence vis a vis diplomatic means. Since nuclear weapons are unlikely to be used, the question arises, if they really provide security through deterrence.

The interesting coverage in the book pertains to rationales of the non-nuclear weapons states as also nuclear powers, other than the super-powers, aspiring to or continue to possess nuclear capabilities. The analysis is fully upto date covering the ramifications of the final end of the cold war between the two super-powers, on the nuclear programmes in USA and USSR. However, a noteworthy void exists in the book with regard to treatment accorded to Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) which was meant to render all 'nuclear weapons impotent' as part of President Reagan's dream. There is also a grey area with regard to missile proliferation which has obvious linkages with nuclear weaponry.

In the final analysis, Dr Regina Cowen Karp, a German scholar with SIPRI, has tackled the subject creditably well. Chapters on nuclear perceptions of India, Pakistan and China are of particular interest.

— Maj Gen MM Walia, SM

Warship 1989. Edited by Robert Gardiner. *London, Conway, 1989, p. 255 £ 20.00. ISBN 0-85177-530-6.*

Warship 1989 is an excellent collection of articles by different authors on the design, development and service history of naval vessels including auxiliaries and craft of para military forces, naval use of merchant ships and ship board aviation.

The book will be of interest to those who may be carrying out research and should find a place in all naval libraries.

— Captain RP Khanna AVSM (Retd) IN

Life on the Line : Stories of Vietnam Air Combat. By Philip D. Chinnery. *New York, St. Martin's 1988p. 256, \$ 17.95, ISBN 0-312-02599-8.*

American experience in Vietnam from August 1964 to 1973 will remain in history as a harrowing and tragic failure of her World Power status, her strategy and the advanced technology at her disposal, pitted against ill-equipped, and bare-footed hordes. However, like any military conflagration, the war in VIETNAM is replete with deeds of gallantry, daring, professional skill and human excellence, on the part of "the man behind the gun" and that's what the book - "Life on the Line" is about.

Philip Chennery, an experienced aviation author and journalist, has collated first-hand accounts by the 'actors on the stage' - the airmen, navigators and gunners flying their challenging and sometimes impossible missions. His effort to reach out to these dispersed heroes or to dig out old documented accounts of others battle actions, is commendable. At the same time the author, by aptly situating and time-framing these events, builds up a clear chronology of the progressive unfoldment of U.S.A.'s air effort in Vietnam.

The book offers the reader a most enjoyable and invigorating fare.

— Maj Gen SK Talwar

The Security of South Asia : American and Asian Perspectives. Edited by Stephan Philip Cohen, *Urbana, University of Illinois 1987, p. 290, \$ 29.95 ISBN 0-252-01394-8.*

Stephen Philip Cohen, Editor of the book under review, is an acknowledged expert on South Asian Region and is of international fame. Currently he is professor of Political Science and co-founder of 'Program in Arms Control, Disarmament and International Security' at the University of Illinois, U.S.A. He is an authority on the armies of India and Pakistan, having authored two works on the subject after diligent research. Earlier he had been on the panel of the State Dept. as an adviser.

The book is a unique combination of views of American strategists with 'an eye-opening dialogue between military leaders and scholars from both India and Pakistan' - quote from dust jacket.

Prof. Cohen's compilation is excellent source material. Its readership is a must for strategic analysts and policy makers of the sub-continent. The general reader will also gain insight into the several facets effecting relations between the South Asian countries and the U.S.A. There is in the Editors own contribution brief reference to S.A.A.R.C. Regionalism in inter-state affairs is the new trend-witness the European Community and its current dynamics, especially of the market forces. Is it a vain hope that S.A.A.R.C. may also become relevant?

— Brig Ramesh Chandra

The Pacific: Peace Security and the Nuclear Issue Edited by Ranginvi Walker & William Sutherland. *London, Zed Books, 1988, p. 249, £ 8.95 (P/B) ISBN 086232-814 4.*

A conscious attempt is made to touch upon the various non-military aspects of peace and regional security. Asia-Pacific nations have come to account for 16 percent of the World total GDP. Tokyo threatens to surpass New York as one of the worlds financial capitals. Success in the dynamic markets of the Pacific is important to the US economic growth estimated at 50 billion dollars of imports. In the light of the growing economic and strategic significance of the region it is suggested that the US military forces be redeployed from Europe to the Pacific.

Rarotonga Treaty is the regional nuclear free zone. US maintains that it will use force if necessary to assert its customary navigational rights. New Zealand has moved decisively away from the Nuclear weapon strategies. The degree to which threats are effective and thus potentially useful, will depend on the degree to which they are credible to the other side. For a threat to be credible it is not necessary for one Government to convince another that it can fight such a war. It is only necessary for it to convince the other side that it thinks it can.

— Maj Gen BD Kale (Retd)

The Afghanistan Conflict : Gorbachev's Options. By Amin Saikal. *Canberra, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National University, 1987, p. 78, \$ 2.50 ISBN 0069 - 0104*

The author has to his credit an exceptional research credit and a thorough version of the subject. He has attempted to bring forth an exhaustive and comprehensive view of the problem and its likely solution. The paper has been published when the conflict was at it's peak and the fore-thought towards suggestive solution has proved its worth in subsequent years.

The fighting in Afghanistan lasted for almost 10 years when Soviets decided for a unilateral withdrawal in consonance with Gorbachev's policy of 'Perestroika'.

While bringing out the facts of its background the author has critically and sequentially brought out the salient reasons for its commencement starting from the era of cold war of mid 50's to secure "Southern flank zone of security and interests" in relation to US influence in West Asia culminating into expansion of Afghan-Soviet ties and deteriorating Afghan-Pakistan relations.

Finally the author's analysis of Soviets options at this stage is logical. Options available to Soviets were either to create war or to end it with unconditional withdrawal immediately or to seek a political compromise without sacrificing its protege regime while maintaining future influence. The third option which the author perceived to be the best, finally come to stay with Soviet's withdrawal from Afghanistan in early 1989. The discussion of pros and cons of the options available to Soviets has been dealt with in great details.

-- Col AK Sethi

The Soviet Union and the Strategy of Non-Alignment in the Third World.
By Roy Allison, *Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1988, p. 298, £ 30.00 ISBN 0-521-35511-7.*

Roy Allison has long association with the subject to have laid bare the threads of the topic "Soviet Union and the Strategy of the Non-allignment in the Third World."

Notwithstanding the allurements by the Soviets, these nations recently unfettered from the shackles of colonisation, were psychologically eager to break away from their erstwhile masters, demonstrating their pride and propounding their principles.

Off and on there have been attacks on the philosophy and ethos of non-aligned nations by both the sides. Once it was stated that non-alignment is a philosophy and not a diplomacy to exploit the maximum from the international contradictions. In particular Harare resolution was criticised vehemently. However, slowly, maturity prevailed in the views of these nations to evolve a tripartite strategy ie no escalation, reduction in tensions and disarmament.

The latest phase of "Glasnost" by Gorbachev has given a shot in the arm so far as non-aligned nations are concerned. He says that, these nations have a great role to play in the future world affairs. It is, however, certain that non-aligned nations are not going to be swayed unduly by this praise and they would continue to follow their autonomous course dictated by their philosophy and national prerogatives.

-- Maj Gen TP Singh

Gorbachev's Third World Dilemmas. Edited by Kurt M Campbell and S Neil MacFarlane, *London, Routledge, 1989, p. 270, £ 35.00 ISBN 0-415-00487-X*

USA and USSR have followed an antagonistic course since the end of World War II. Soviet Russia pursued a policy of supporting, to varying degrees, revolutionary movements in Asia, Africa and Latin America while the USA followed a policy of containment of Russian influence. By the end of 1970s, Soviet Russia was the largest supplier of military weaponry to the Third World. USSR had pursued the Brezhnev Doctrine which pronounced their commitment to use force in order to keep Marxist governments in power. The climax of rivalry between the Super Powers was reached when the Russian troops marched into Afghanistan in 1979. And then, the situation started changing dramatically especially after the demise of Brezhnev.

The change in Soviet policy is the result of numerous internal and external factors. The book provides a well researched systematic examination of the strategic, political, economic and ideological criteria which have shaped the new trend of Russian policy in the Third World. A useful book which throws light on the changing pattern of the Russian policy.

— Maj Gen LS Lehl PVSM (Retd)

Afghanistan : The Great Game Revisited : Edited by Rosanne Klass, *New York, Freedom House, 1987, p. 519 ISBN 0-932088-15-5*

A collection of well modulated and concise essays by different authors in a kaleidoscope of events and analysis, on a continuum stretching from the period of Abdur Rahman the 'Iron Amir' through the Suar Revolution, to the intervention by the Soviet Army.

A country, so deeply rooted in past culture, with a fiercely independent nature of its people, unyielding in their sense of loyalty and clan Kinsmanship, if exposed to an alien ideology can plunge into an unending internecine conflict. There can be no better example of metamorphosis of political cohesion, whether revolutionary or counter-revolutionary and is well illustrated, as in these essays.

The collection has immense factual information, with a survey of all facets of the War, and the harrowing effects of this on the civil population, albeit overly weighted by the American point of view. The glossary and the chronology of historical events at the end adds to the richness of material.

— Maj Gen APS Chauhan

Chekisty : A History of the KGB. By John J Dziak *Massachusetts, Lexington Books, 1988, p. 234, \$ 17.95 ISBN 0-669-10258-X.*

The author who holds a doctorate in Russian history from the Georgetown University is now with the US Defence Intelligence Agency. He is a member on the faculties of the Georgetown and Washington Universities and has authored a number of well received publications.

The book under review is the result of extensive research and offers a glimpse into the mysterious network of the KGB, the internal security and foreign intelligence arm of the Communist Party and the Government of the USSR. The KGB is the successor of the original 'CHEKA' and their operatives continue to be referred to as the Chekisty. The book illustrates the ubiquitous nature of the organisation of the KGB; it penetrates all segments of the Soviet society including its military - in fact, it even operates its own armed forces.

Of special interest to military readers are the organisation of partisan movements and the operation of their specialised units, the partisan units, the Spetsnaz

units, special detachments, the extermination battalions and the Hunter units. The Soviet counter intelligence efforts also met with significant success. The MAX Case 1941-45, a major deception operation involving an agent network allegedly working in the USSR kept supplying the German Abwehr with several thousand radio messages relating to Soviet military matters, strategic and tactical. The gullible Abwehr and the German General Staff believed these, with the result that Germans invariably confronted more Soviet troops than what was anticipated/estimated. Another example was Op Scherhorn, an elaborate deception plan in which a captured German, unit some 2500 strong, under Obersleutnant (Lt Col) Heinrich Scherhorn was depicted as trapped behind Soviet lines. The Germans expended considerable men and material including scarce air resources in their vain attempts to rescue them. Hitler even promoted Heinrich to Oberst (Col) and conferred on him the Knight's Cross.

The book goes on to examine Krushchev's efforts to sanitise the KGB and closes with Gorbachev's attempts to resurrect the process under the banner of 'Glasnost'. Despite the periodic 'purges and cleansings' the KGB has essentially remained the same, claims the author.

Interesting, informative and scholarly, the book makes absorbing reading.

— Lt Gen PE Menon PVSM (Retd)

Europe and Japan : Changing relationships since 1945. Edited by Gordon Daniels & Reinhard Drifte. Kent, England, Paul Norbury Publications, 1986, p. 123. £ 10.95 ISBN 0-904404-44-7

This publication has grown out of a workshop organised by the programme for Strategic and International Security Studies (PSIS) at the Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva, in which European Japanologists and Japanese scholars participated to examine contemporary Euro-Japanese relations and the impact of superpower policies upon ties between Japan and Western Europe.

Lessons that can be learnt from the Japanese experience have some important social and political consequences — "since Europeans would have to remove existing obstacles to social flexibility and the fostering of talent in their own societies." (p. 100) As a result of the big Japanese trade surplus with the EC of \$3 bn., European politicians became interested in politicising Euro-Japanese relations. In Japan's bilateral relations with other states Japan insisted on separating political and economic issues, and during the 1975 oil crisis Japan realised that the U.S. was not always a reliable partner, and that she had more in common with EC states than the U.S. in the Middle East. Moreover, both Europe and Japan share a desire to preserve their political independence vis-a-vis the U.S. Yet, Japan is not considered a full member of the Western camp. In 1979, an EC report on trade relations with Japan referred the Japanese as 'workaholics living in rabbit hutches'. Japan's feeling of vulnerability based on her dependence on the import of all her raw materials and the need for free export markets is continuing.

A very important problem in Euro-Japanese relations is the lack of coherent European foreign policy, caused by the incomplete process of European integration. However if "both parties come to see their relations as of greater political importance it will also be easier to find solutions to their trade problems." (p. 103)

This is certainly a well-documented and well-researched publication, which will be found useful by all Japanologists.

-- Dr B.C. Chakravorty.

The Japanese Way of Politics. By Gerald L. Curtis. *New York, Columbia Univ.* 1988, p. 301, \$ 34.50. ISBN 0-231-06680-5.

The book under review is about the evolution of Japanese politics over more than three decades. The basic theme has been the Japanese capacity to combine change with political stability. The author has witnessed Japanese political scene for more than two decades and has authored *Election campaigning Japanese style* (1971). Japan has a population of 120 million, produces almost 15% of the world G.N.P., has the second largest economy in the non-communist world and is the largest capital exporter.

The contemporary Japanese politics is characterised by increased party involvement in the policy process. There is a decreasing role of the state in the economy and in the society at large. Thus Japan has woven the threads of democratic political life-civil liberties, open elections, competitive politics and responsible government into a fibre of nation's social structure to create a stable political system that echoes universal values and behaviour, but at the same time being utterly unique.

In brief, this book will be of interest to teachers and students of comparative politics, to legislatures and other readers who want to know about the functioning of Japan's political system.

-- PC Bansal

NATO at 40 : Confronting a Changing World. Edited by Ted Galen Carpenter. *Massachusetts; Lexington Books, 1990, p. 274, \$ 39.95 ISBN 0-669-21698-4.*

NATO - 40 is the outcome of a conference held at the CATO Institute, Washington DC, to discuss the relevance of NATO reviewed on its 40th birthday in April 1989. The book is a compilation of views of a number of authors, laid out in three parts. The fact that each chapter is written by a different author, does in no way effect its cohesion, flow and style of writing; this indeed speaks of its clever editing.

The CATO Institute is taking a hard look at NATO primarily from the American point of view and addresses itself to the most pertinent questions - Is

NATO essential for the security of USA? Are the European allies taking their fair share of burden sharing in the defence of Europe? Is there need to review the structure and strategy of NATO in the new emerging environment?

To some, the book may read anachronistic when NATO's future is already unfolding. The relevance of NATO hereafter may not be confined to the European scenario, considering that the recent Gulf war against Iraq was conducted by the main NATO partners with Arab military presence adding legitimacy to the war. Yet re-moulding of its roles in the new emerging strategic environment are interesting analyses.

— Lt Gen R Sharma, AVSM

The Army, Politics and Society in Germany, 1933-45 : Studies in the Army's Relation to Nazism. By Klaus - Jurgen Muller, *Manchester, Manchester University*, p. 122, £ 10.95, ISBN 07190-2380-0 (Ph)

Hitler's seizure of power in 1933 posed a new pattern of threat to the leadership of the German Army, already confronted with a double dilemma. The position of the German Officer Corps, traditionally a social and political elite, had been eroded politically by social change and professionally by the widening scope of total war. This study by a German academic of repute analyses the various responses to Hitler among the leadership of the German Army, and then examines the nature of the opposition to Hitler which eventually developed among the German military elite.

This erudite book contains much that is new to the Anglophone reader, in particular the initial results of the detailed study of the military and rearmament policies of the German General Staff between the world wars. The first section of this book presents the dilemma facing the leaders of the German Army; the second section focuses on the transition of the Chief of the German General Staff, General Ludwig Beck, from cautious ally of Hitler to open opposition and ultimately eclipse; and the third section analyses the opposition to Hitler's regime, the dynamics of German aggression and the continuity between the Third Reich and its predecessors.

A meaningful publication at this juncture of German reunification, though admittedly German aggression in the foreseeable future is most unlikely.

— Lt Gen SL Menezes, PVSM, SC (Retd)

The Agony of Uganda; From Idi Amin to Obote : Repressive Rule and Bloodshed : Causes, Effects and the Cure. By Francis A.W. Bwengye, *London, Regency Press*, 1985, p. 379, £ 9.50 ISBN, 07212-07170

Uganda is a land-locked country, covering an area of 75,000 square miles, most of which is fertile green land. It has a multi-cultural and multi-religious population of 13.4 million, 90% of whom live in the rural areas.

The author, Mr. Francis A W Bwengye, is an active politician of standing, and with his intimate knowledge, has portrayed the events and personalities involved, with skill. The book serves the purpose for which it has been written, that is to say, to inform the world at large, about the tragic political situation and the economic chaos that have afflicted Uganda since it gained its independence from the United Kingdom in October 1962.

— Brig Rai Singh, MVC, VSM (Retd)

Treason at 10 : Fiji at the Cross Roads. By Kenneth Bain. *London, Hodder & Stoughton, 1989, p. 236, £ 14.95, ISBN 0-340-49093-4.*

On the morning of 14 May 87, Lt Col Sitveni Robuka, an officer third in Fijian Army's hierarchy, led a military Coup and ousted the legitimate Govt of Dr Timoci Bavadra. Dr Bavadra had become the Prime Minister, only a month earlier, after his coalition of National Front and Labour parties emerged victorious in the general elections of April 87, over the Alliance party of Sir Ratu Mara.

In "Treason at 10" the author Kenneth Bain gives a brief account of the happenings immediately after the Coup and analyses with rare insight as to why, the 1970 Constitution could work and remain acceptable for 14 years, so long as Alliance Party of Fiji's Chiefs under Sir Rotu Mara won elections and stayed in power, but was subverted, the moment, the electorate voted Sir Rotu Mara out of office, and in doing so, how the underlying racial tensions were inflamed and Fiji born Indians made scapegoats.

Kenneth Bain, having served the Govt of Fiji for over three decades (20 years as administrator and 10 years as diplomat), shows deep knowledge of Fiji and its people. He is eminently suited to tell the story of what went wrong in Fiji - a story to be of interest to all those concerned with democracy in a multi-racial society.

— Lt Col YP Gupta (Retd)

Fletcher's Gang: A B-17 Crew in Europe 1944-45 by Eugene Fletcher. *Seattle, University of Washington, 1988, p. 267, \$ 19.95 ISBN 0-295-96604-1.*

When a group of like minded young men, with the same aim, get together as a team they can produce wonders. Specially when they have a do or die loyalty towards one another. This is an essential lesson for all combatants, specially those carrying out flying missions over enemy territory.

The author, a young pilot began training as a Bomber Pilot at the air base Ardmore in Oklahoma. Within a year he and his crew had completed 35 missions from England over occupied Europe, bagging many a gallantry awards, including a number of DFC's. Fletcher was responsible for knitting together this formidable team.

With the advent of supersonic jets, the book may not give us many lessons for the future technique in combat flying. What makes the book important is the lessons our young and not so young pilots can learn from the saga of bravery sometimes

bordering on foolishness, the initiative taken in fulfilling their missions. But such is the life of any combatant, specially a flyer.

— Brig YP Dev (Retd)

Jack Northrop and the Flying Wing; the Story Behind the Stealth Bomber. By Ted Coleman with Robert Wenkham. *New York, Paragon House, 1988, p. 284, \$ 24.95. ISBN 1-55778-079-X.*

Ted Coleman, a Vice President and director in the Northrop Aircraft Company has co-authored this book along with Robert Wenkham, an aeronautical engineer. The book gives a very descriptive and detailed account of the career of Jack Northrop, the founder of one of the largest companies in aviation industry spanning almost six decades.

Northrop, a high school student, started his aviation career in 1916 by drawing aircraft designs when these were built "by guess and by golly". He designed his first sport Bi-plane in 1918. Obsessed with the idea of designing a 'Flying Wing', he eventually designed the first, almost all-wing aircraft in 1929. The next two decades saw him design and produce two variations - the B 35 and the YB-49. The latter was designed to operate as a large bomber capable of flying non-stop from America to Europe and back. The end of World War II, however, curtailed any further production.

Almost forty years lapsed before the project was resuscitated, in the form of the much-written about but seldom seen B-2 Stealth Bomber. This interregnum saw inter-company rivalry and behind the scene pressure groups manipulating to win billion dollar contracts. Lobbyists for rival companies included Air Force Generals and both Republican and Democrat Senators with access to the Pentagon and the White House. Jan 88 saw the first appearance of the B-2 Stealth Bomber on the aviation scenario of the USAF.

Jack Northrop died in Feb 81 at the age of 86. Though he did not live to see the fruition of his dream of the Flying Wing, there is no gainsaying that his association of six decades has changed the face of American Aviation.

The book is recommended for those interested in the history and development in American Aviation.

— Maj Gen Nirmal Sondhi, AVSM and Bar (Retd)

The Invasion of England 1940 : The Planning of Operation Sealion. By Peter Schenk, *London, Conway Maritime, 1990, p. 372, £ 20.00 ISBN 0-85177-548-9*

Until 1940 there had been only two amphibious operations in recent history. Both these were in World War I. The first was the ill fated British attempt to land at Gallipoli in 1915 and the other was the German invasion of the Russian Island of Orel in 1917. Both were comparatively small scale operations. Between the wars little thought had been given anywhere to the development of the technique of amphibious warfare. Hitler's Directive No 6 issued on 9 October 1939 laid down the aim of operations in the west as the capture of the Dutch, Belgian and French Coasts. In the summer of 1940, after the fall of France, German troops were inexplicably halted

under Hitler's orders and the British Expeditionary Force permitted to pull out through Dunkirk after abandoning all its equipment. At end of June 1940 General Jodl, Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff produced a study on the continuation of the War against the British which included plans for an amphibious strike against England if required. Hitler approved these plans and formalised his approval in his Directive No 16. This book covers the planning and preparation for Operation Sea Lion, its postponement and finally its abandonment.

The book is extensively illustrated with photographs and drawings which the author must have laboriously dug out from various archives and official as well as private collections. The author has evidently done a great deal of archival research. The book does not have the customary references or notes, presumably because these would have amounted to repeated reference to the archives used by the author for this research. References to the few published works consulted are included in the text at appropriate places. The book is translated from the original German Edition by Kathleen Bunten who has done an adequate job. The language is easy to read and follow.

— Brig RD Law (Retd)

War and Secession : Pakistan, India, and the Creation of Bangladesh. By Richard Sisson and Leo E. Rose. *Berkeley, University of California, 1990, p. 338, \$ 13.95, ISBN 520-07-665-6.*

The authors have done an exhaustive study of the events which led to the establishment of Bangladesh and drew on many sources including quite a few not available earlier. Their analysis is based on their interviews with key political leaders and their advisors and the military commanders in all the three countries. It has resulted in a logical build up of the events of that period resulting in this interesting and very informative book.

— Lt Gen KK Nanda (Retd)

Naukar, Rajput and Sepoy : The Ethno-History of the Military Labour Market in Hindustan, 1450 - 1850. By Dirk H.A. Kolff. *Cambridge, Cambridge University, 1990, p. 219, £ 30.00 ISBN 0-521-38132-0.*

The aim of this book is to study the ethno-history of North Indian peasant society, the importance of its military labour market for social change as well as for the energetic survival strategies of the villages in India and the relationship of the polity and the peasantry. According to the Emperor Jehangir what mattered in politics were territory and forces, in other words agrarian revenue and manpower. Since World War II production, taxation, prices and in particular agrarian relations and the system of land revenue have received relatively large proportion of historians attention. This study highlights some of the aspects of the other source of power namely manpower which as a factor contributed to the formation and upholding of the state and the ways in which a large portion of the income of the state was distributed to military work force of India.

The author has done valuable research and the book provides an indepth historical background to the evolution of soldiering in India.

— Maj Gen Amarjit Singh (Retd)

India's Security : Super Power Threat. Edited by K.S. Nagar and Lt Col Gautam Sharma. *New Delhi, Reliance, 1979, p. 219, Rs 175/-, ISBN 81-85047-63-4.*

Gorakhpur University had organised an international seminar on "The Security of the Indian Sub Continent : Challenges from the Super Power Politics", in November 1986. KS Nagar and Lt Col Gautam Sharma, edited the papers presented during this seminar and brought out this book under review.

The underlying theme in this book is the super power rivalry in South Asia, particularly in the Indian sub-continent. With the thawing of the cold war, and USSR getting more and more involved with 'prestroika' in practically all aspects of its domestic and foreign policies, and also looking forward to the western funds for the revival of its flogging economy, one should not be too removed from the actualities of the present day geo-political scenario, to say that 'rivalry' per se, between the two super powers, is a thing of the past.

All the papers have been deeply researched and supported by convincing arguments, in which political scientists and defence analysts should find much food for thought.

— Lt Col AK Sharma

Bofors : A Selling of a Nation. By Prashant Bhushan, *New Delhi, Vision Books, 1990, p. 275, Rs. 170.00 ISBN 81-7094-066-4.*

Much has been written on the Bofors controversy, during the last couple of years. As of today, nothing concrete has emerged, to unveil the truth. It is an anticlimax and the whole exercise appears to be another dirty political game, played by petty people, for own selfish interest.

This book is a blow-by-blow account of the Bofors affair. After 'clinical' analysis, of the meagre facts available, the author makes his own conclusions/deductions, about the guilty. Every one will not agree, with the author's assessment. Its for the reader to decide, whether the author's opinions are politically motivated.

The author is a lawyer and wrote his first book in 1977. He has a lucid style of writing. His father was a law minister in a non-congress government.

An interesting book to read, now that Bofors, has become a household name.

— Maj Gen Ram Nath

The Indian Metropolis : A View Toward the West. By Norma Evenson. *London Yale University, 1989, p. 294, £ 35.00 ISBN 0-300-04333-3.*

The author is a professor of architectural history at the University of California, Berkeley. Her association with India goes back to 1961-62 when she first visited the country as a Fulbright Scholar. Her book is in keeping with the tradition of fine writing about Indian architecture and town planning by Western experts. The author's style is facile but in places the academe takes over with sentences like "postmodernist

rhetoric embodies a respectful view of cultural differences, acknowledging the validity of historical symbolism".

It is a pity that she has limited herself to the four traditional metropolitan cities, namely Bombay, Calcutta, Delhi and Madras. The inclusion of the newer growth cities like Bangalore and Ahmedabad would have been welcome.

A vast array of architects finds mention in the book. This includes a number of Indians in the post-independence era. The book would have gained by the addition of some biographical and/or background data about those architects whose influence on the Indian landscape has been profound.

The book is profusely illustrated with drawings, maps and photographs. The selection is eclectic and sympathetic to Indian sensibilities. The index is adequate though in places incomplete. For example, the index fails to list page 142 under Haussmann. Only pages 114, 122, 125 and 131 are mentioned. The bibliography is extensive and further complements the book.

On the whole an enjoyable and useful read.

-- Dr Rajesh Kadian

Men of the Red Beret Airborne Forces 1940-1990 by Max Arthur. *London, Hutchinson, 1990, p. 430, \$ 16.95. ISBN 0-09-173931-4.*

This book is a history of the then British Airborne Forces the Royal Parachute Regiment right from their inception in 1940 till 1990, told in a novel and a unique style. It is not written in the traditional and conventional way of writing history by days, dates and in the sequence of events, as they unfold themselves. It is the history of those men and women who constituted the dare devils called The Red Berets, with all their travails and trepidations, hopes and fears, exuberance and despair, successes and failures. It is the history of tough, ruthless, highly adaptable and efficient officers and men. It is not a substitute to official history but a supplement to the deeds of those dedicated patriots who helped in writing the destiny of nations in Africa, Asia, Europe and South America with blood upon the sands of time.

This book is interspersed with tongue-in-the-cheek, irrepressible and irresistible humor where for example the padre just before his first jump confesses that till that date he placed all his faith in God but at that particular moment he placed it in the young lady who had packed his parachute.

A novice, who is not conversant with the sequence of events or the physical, psychological and devil-may-care approach of a paratrooper in the face of an enemy, may perhaps find it difficult to inter-relate the development of events from the historical perspective. Nevertheless, a soldier particularly a paratrooper would like to identify himself with these men who have outstanding courage, endurance and defiance.

In the very first airborne assault, the paratroopers proved their mettle when the 1st Parachute Brigade comprising First, Second and Third Parachute Battalions landed near Algiers in Nov 42. Third Para Bn spear headed the advance of the first Army by seizing the vital Bone airfield on 12 Nov 42. On 16 Nov, first Para Bn dropped near Souk el Arba airfield and occupied a key road junction at Beja only 90 miles from Tunis. Both these operations were successful but the Second Para Bn which was dropped at Depienne on 29 Nov 42 to destroy enemy aircraft at Oudna, had to do a fighting withdrawal and in the process lost 16 Officers and 250 men enroute. The Para Bde inflicted more than 5000 casualties on the Germans with a loss of 1700 all ranks. It is significant to note that the Germans gave them the name of Rote Teufel or The Red Devils.

In May 1944, The Battle of Sangshak north east of Imphal was fought by 50 Independent Parachute Brigade against an overwhelming superior Japanese force thus gaining invaluable time for defence of Imphal. A glowing tribute is paid to the "Indian Other Ranks who stuck it out although exhausted by lack of sleep, food, water and ammunition." Once again the paratroopers proved that they are magnanimous in victory and invincible in defeat.

It is an interesting book to understand the paratroopers and of what courageous stuff they are made of. Nevertheless the experiences narrated by a large number of participants have diminishing interest because of unavoidable repetitions.

Maj Gen JN Goel (Retd)

Second Anglo/Maratha War - 1802 - 1805 (A Study in Military History) by Brigadier K.G. Pitre, Poona, *Dastane Ramachandra & Co.*, 1990. pp. 232. Rs. 140/-.

By the middle of the eighteenth century the English East India Company had discarded their mantle of traders for that of rulers as this new role was more profitable both to the Company and its servants. In their new role the English conquerors were inexorably drawn into conflict with the Marathas, who had replaced the Mughals as the dominant power in India. In this context the three Anglo/Maratha Wars are landmark events in our history. The first conflict had not gone well for the English and the inconclusive results paved the way for the next conflict.

"The Second Anglo-Maratha War - 1802 - 1805" by Brig K G Pitre is a well researched book, that brings out very clearly the weaknesses in the Maratha confederacy, which resulted in their ultimate defeat at the hands of the English. From the very start the narrative illustrates how Lord Wellesly, the Governor General, was successful in systematically dividing the Marathas and defeating them in detail. It is customary to lay the blame for the Maratha defeats on the deceit of the perfidious Albion. But these excuses do not hide the fact that it was possible for the English to successfully sow the seeds of dissension in the Maratha Camp only because it fell on such fertile soil. The selfish and unscrupulous leaders of the confederacy were busy scheming against each other and they placed their own narrow self-interests before that of the country or the confederacy. There is thus perhaps a lesson in this even today for the leaders of modern India.

The scene opens with Yeshwantrao Holkar attacking Pune and defeating the joint armies of the Peshwa Bajirao II and Daulatrao Scindia, in Oct 1802 at the Battle of Hadapsar. This drove Bajirao Peshwa to flee the battlefield and seek protection of the English and accept a subsidiary alliance with them by signing the Treaty of Vasai. The English after reinstating Bajirao as Peshwa decided to destroy his friends Daulatrao Scindia and Raghuji Bhonsale, Raja of Berar, both of whom were not prepared to accept the Treaty of Vasai.

Yeshwantrao Holkar was prepared to sink his differences with Bajirao Peshwa and Daulatrao Scindia and join them against the English. But a deceitful letter - in which Daulatrao wrote to Bajirao stating with reference to the Holkar, "Let us make a show of satisfying his demands. After the war (with the English) is over, we shall both wreak our full vengeance on him" - fell into the hands of the British and was passed promptly on to the Holkar. Thus Daulatrao's deceit kept the Holkar out and the British were able to first defeat the Scindia and Bhonsale combination and then deal with the Holkar afterwards. They had managed to buy over the Gaikwad earlier thus keeping him out of the war.

The book makes fascinating reading. Unfortunately, its poorly produced maps, tucked away at the end of the book, and numerous spelling and printing errors spoil the good effect. The publishers would be well advised to do a proper 'proof reading' when re-printing this book.

Maj General S.C. Sinha PVSM (Retd)

The Great Game: On Secret Service in High Asia by Peter Hopkirk (*London: John Murray, 1990*) p. 562 £ 19.95.

The work is a classic study of the two empires, the Russian and the British, which tried to gain control and influence in the states of Central Asia during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and an absorbing account of Russian expansion in Central Asia. Britain made several attempts to prevent it because she feared the Russian expansions' final goal was India, the brightest jewel in the British Crown.

The story of the players of the 'Great Game' who were the heroes on 'Secret Service in High Asia' is a magnificent chapter of espionage and often fatal adventure in the history of the colonial era. It is an objective account of great power politics in Central Asia, as well as in Turkey, Persia and Afghanistan, by an author who is an authority on this subject having widely travelled in the region and written several books on it.

This book is of special interest for understanding the motives of Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan, the causes of the recent break-up of the Soviet Union, and the historical background of the Central Asian states which were part of the Soviet Union for the last 150 years.

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
Maj Gen Afsir Karim, AVSM (retd.)

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

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